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In times gone by, environmental issues on farmland were seen largely 
through the lens of agricultural production — we viewed the problems 
and their possible solutions in terms of how they affected agricultural 
outputs. Weeds, pests and erosion were challenges because they 
reduced the land’s productivity.
In recent decades, it has been recognised that farms can deliver much 
more than the sum of their agricultural products. In Australia, farming 
landscapes cover more than half our land mass, they provide refuge for 
many unique native animals and plants, and they are home to people. 
In acknowledgement of the multiple values associated with 
farmland, Australian governments have been paying farmers to 
provide public goods and services for many years. These goods and 
services include habitat for wildlife, and healthier soil and water 
quality. Many countries around the world have been doing this too. 
These government  programs have been commonly referred to as 
agri-environment schemes, as they are about improving environmental 
values in an agricultural space.
The Australian experience goes back a little over a quarter of a 
century, with well over $7 billion of public money having been 
invested. Unfortunately, Australia’s National Audit Office has found 
(repeatedly) that the programs have been unable to demonstrate 
enduring environmental outcomes. Over the same period, the nation 
has seen continuing declines in biodiversity, and land and water 
quality. To turn this around, can we learn from what has been done in 
the past (both here and overseas)?
Agri-environmental policy is an inherently complicated beast, 
involving a raft of different players, from farmers and conservationists 
to taxpayers and politicians. Each group brings with it a diverse set 
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of motivations and interests, including maximising profit, minimising 
biodiversity loss, and everything in between. A proper evaluation 
of agri-environment policies, therefore, requires a multi-disciplinary 
approach.
Towards the end of 2014, a group of people interested in biodiversity 
conservation and agriculture — ecologists, economists, social scientists, 
practitioners, and policymakers — met at a workshop in Canberra to 
share their knowledge and experience of agri-environment schemes 
in Australia. This book draws together the diverse experiences, ideas, 
and perspectives presented at that meeting.
Each chapter presents a different perspective on the challenge 
of  designing and running effective agri-environment schemes. 
For anyone with an interest or a stake in agri-environment investment 
in Australia or overseas, we are confident there will be many lessons 
and insights for you in the following pages.
The workshop on lessons from agri-environment schemes was 
sponsored by the National Environmental Research Program 
Environmental Decisions Hub with additional financial support from 
Phil Gibbons (The Australian National University) and Dave Pannell 
(University of Western Australia). Logistics support was provided by 
Jane Campbell (University of Queensland). We are also indebted to 
the Spillers, owners of ‘Woodlands’, for showing us through their 
Whole of Paddock Rehabilitation site, and also Mick Woods, manager 
of ‘Woolooware’, for taking the time to show us a Box Gum Grassy 
Woodland Project site of the Environmental Stewardship Program. 
Lastly, we also thank Graham Fifield and Greening Australia for 
providing refreshments and guidance when we visited these two 
field sites.
Dean Ansell, Fiona Gibson, and David Salt1
1  Dean, Fiona, and David jointly managed the workshop that led to this book and shared the 
jobs of editing and authoring the introductory and concluding chapters. Each claims an equal 
share of the book and names are ordered alphabetically.
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Introduction: Framing the 
agri‑environment 
Dean Ansell, Fiona Gibson, and David Salt
Conservation in an agricultural space
Do our agricultural landscapes hold the key to protecting our 
declining biodiversity? If they do, how would it be done? And who 
would pay? Would it be the landowner, or the general public (via the 
government)? These might sound like simple questions, but when 
you consider some of the environmental, social, and economic factors 
at play, it quickly becomes apparent that we are dealing with very 
complex issues.
To illustrate this, consider these two relatively simple situations, both 
examples of efforts to conserve biodiversity on farmland in Australia. 
The first involves a run-down paddock from which the landowner has 
removed his sheep and sown a mixture of native trees and shrubs in 
strips several metres apart. In exchange for a stewardship payment of 
$50 per hectare per year, the farmer agrees to keep his sheep out of 
the paddock for five years. He gets half the payment at the beginning 
and the rest at the end of the initial five-year period, at which time 
grazing stock are permitted back into the paddock under a regime 
where sheep are allowed into the site in short bursts (called  ‘pulse 
grazing’) for the last five years of the agreement. By this time, the 
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native vegetation should have developed enough to be able to cope 
with the reintroduction of grazing. Indeed, the presence of trees and 
shrubs will provide the grazing animals with valuable shelter.
Figure 1.1: Do our agricultural landscapes hold the key 
to protecting our declining biodiversity?
Source: Photo by Greening Australia.
The second situation involves a farmer agreeing to remove grazing 
sheep from a patch of box gum grassy woodland — an ecosystem 
now threatened in Australia. The farmer is allowed to let sheep into 
the woodland for pulse grazing, whereas previously the woodland 
experienced set stocking, meaning a certain number of animals were 
always there. The landowner also agreed not to use fertiliser in the 
woodland. For these actions, the government is prepared to pay the 
farmer over $200 per hectare per year, and the farmer has entered into 
a contract that will run for 15 years.
The first situation describes a process of restoration, with the aim of 
returning native vegetation to the landscape. It is about improving 
the natural value of degraded land, providing habitat for biodiversity 
and other environmental benefits. The second example is more about 
the preservation or conservation of an existing ecosystem. It is about 
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sustaining the health and resilience of land with high natural values. 
Both schemes are undertaken in production landscapes, and the land 
under each scheme is expected to continue to provide agricultural 
outputs into the future. 
Even with these simple descriptions, many questions immediately 
arise:
• Which approach is better for biodiversity, restoration, and/or 
conservation?
• Where do we get the best value for money? One farmer is paid 
four times the amount the other farmer receives; do we receive four 
times the return?
• Why should the government pay for a scheme which benefits the 
farmer (in the case of new trees providing shelter for stock)?
• Why does one scheme only run for 10 years when the other goes 
for 15?
Of course, there are many answers to each of these questions given by 
different groups. ‘Which approach is better?’, for example, would most 
likely be responded to differently by ecologists, economists, farmers, 
policymakers, and the public — and there would be considerable 
variation within each group. This variation simply underscores the 
complexity and uncertainty surrounding the operation of these 
schemes.
The two case studies described here are far from hypothetical exercises. 
They are based on real-life examples of publicly funded programs 
currently in operation on farmland in south eastern Australia. 
The first example (restoration) is called the Whole of Paddock 
Rehabilitation scheme (WOPR) being operated by Greening Australia 
(an environmental non-government organisation (eNGO)). The second 
case study (conservation) is part of an Australian Government program 
called the Environmental Stewardship Program. Both are described 
in more detail in this book (see Chapter 2 by Graham Field for 
background on WOPR, and Chapter 3 by Emma Burns and colleagues 
on the Environmental Stewardship Program).
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Figure 1.2: Agri‑environment researchers and practitioners 
in a five-year-old WOPR site. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
In addition to having differing aims, payments, and duration, the 
schemes are also quite different in how they were developed and 
managed. WOPR came out of a grass-roots engagement between 
farmers and Greening Australia. The Environmental Stewardship 
Program was developed as a top-down government program to protect 
natural values that are considered to have national significance 
— in  this case, the conservation of a threatened ecosystem. WOPR 
involved many ‘back paddock’ experiments, custom-made equipment, 
discussion, reflection, and trial and error (Streatfield et al. 2010). 
The  Environmental  Stewardship Program involved ecological, 
economic, and social science inputs, the development of legal contracts 
and the setting aside of funds beyond the traditional three- to four-
year budget cycle.
WOPR and the Environmental Stewardship Program are but two 
examples of what are commonly referred to as ‘agri-environment 
schemes’. There are many other variations of such schemes in Australia 
and around the world. Some, like WOPR, aim at restoring lost natural 
values. Others, like the Environmental Stewardship Program, aim to 
modify existing practice to conserve natural values. 
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We are not holding up these two schemes as examples of good or 
bad schemes. Rather, the differences between them offer a valuable 
reference point to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of society’s 
effort to achieve environmental outcomes, generally regarded as public 
goods and services, from working agricultural landscapes, generally 
operated in the private realm. The particular environmental outcome 
this book focuses on is the conservation of biodiversity. 
Before we begin to explore the many issues surrounding the design 
and implementation of effective agri-environment schemes, it is worth 
reflecting on the relationship between agriculture and biodiversity.
Why our farms are part of the solution
What is the connection between biodiversity conservation and our 
agricultural landscapes? Doesn’t government look after biodiversity 
on behalf of the public through the creation and operation of national 
parks and nature reserves? Biodiversity conservation is an important 
goal of the management of most national parks, but the sad truth is that 
the world’s system of nature reserves is not protecting biodiversity. 
A mere 15 per cent of threatened species on land are adequately covered 
by the existing network of reserves (Venter et al. 2014). In Australia, 
80 per cent of threatened species are inadequately protected by 
the reserve system, with 12 per cent receiving no protection at all 
(Watson et al. 2010).
This is important because the world is witnessing a crisis of declining 
biodiversity. Species are being lost at 100–1,000 times what is believed 
to be the natural background rate of extinction, which scientists 
believe may have profound consequences for the future of human 
civilisation (Rockström et al. 2009). Governments around the world 
have signed up to the Convention on Biological Diversity, pledging 
that they will take actions that will slow and hopefully reverse these 
declines (Watson et al. 2014). To date, despite this commitment, little 
has been achieved. The fourth Global Biodiversity Outlook released 
by the United Nations in 2014 revealed that the rate of species loss 
is increasing and that the five principal drivers of extinction — 
habitat change, overexploitation, pollution, invasive species, and 
climate change — are getting worse (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 2014). 
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Figure 1.3: An Environmental Stewardship Program site 
— a box gum grassy woodland in which grazing has been 
modified to protect the woodland’s natural values. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
So what is the connection with farming? There are several broad areas 
to consider. The first relates to the point made above: our public reserve 
system is simply not providing adequate protection to our threatened 
biodiversity, as most threatened species and ecosystems lie outside of 
reserves, much of it on and around agricultural land. At least 40 per 
cent of global land surface is used for agriculture (Foley et al. 2005). 
In  Australia, agriculture accounts for more than half of the land 
surface, with the majority of that land (86 per cent) used for grazing 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2014). If we want to conserve our 
biodiversity, we need to focus our efforts on agricultural land.
The second area relates to the impact of agriculture on biodiversity. 
About 70 per cent of the projected global loss of terrestrial biodiversity 
is attributed to agricultural drivers (Secretariat of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity 2014). The conversion of land to agriculture 
results in the loss and degradation of habitats. This directly impacts on 
plant and animal populations and communities, and alters ecological 
and hydrologic processes that underpin key ecosystem functions 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). Australia’s settlement by 
Europeans over two centuries ago was followed by rapid and extensive 
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landscape modification, as the settlers sought to tame the bush and 
establish grazing and cropping land. The initial focus was on clearing 
temperate grasslands and grassy woodlands (Kirkpatrick 1999). Records 
suggest that approximately half of the woody vegetation in Australia 
has been cleared since European settlement (Barson et al. 2000).
In addition to habitat loss, farming practices such as tillage, burning, 
livestock introduction, and nutrient and chemical usage have had 
significant negative impacts on biodiversity as well as soil, water, 
and air quality (Stoate et al. 2001). The early to mid-1900s saw 
a shift from smaller, low-input, mixed-enterprise farms to more 
intensive, specialised systems focusing on increased yields from 
fewer commodities, bringing with it increased fertiliser and pesticide 
use, and further loss of natural and man-made habitat (Bignal and 
McCracken 2000; Young et al. 2007). It is undeniable: agriculture has 
contributed greatly to the global decline in biodiversity. 
The third area concerns the importance of biodiversity to the 
sustainability of our agricultural enterprises. Some elements of 
biodiversity underpin the quality and quantity of our agricultural 
output, through the provision of ‘ecosystem services’ — the wide 
range of benefits that we receive from ecosystems, ranging from food 
and water to recreation and cultural use. For example, bee pollination 
contributes more than €1 billion every year to Europe’s strawberry 
producers (Klatt et al. 2014). Biodiversity can also provide benefits 
in the control of agricultural insect pests, improved soil fertility, and 
agricultural productivity (Altieri 1999). (The perceived importance 
of ecosystem goods and services to farmers is discussed by Saul 
Cunningham in Chapter 8.)
Lastly, as well as improving the financial outcome from farming, 
biodiversity benefits farmers by improving the amenity value of 
some properties and satisfying some farmers’ goals of stewardship. 
(See Chapter 14 by Maksym Polyakov and David Pannell on the 
private benefits of biodiversity, and Chapter 12 by Saan Ecker and 
Chapter 13 by Romy Greiner on non-financial drivers of biodiversity 
conservation.) Biodiversity is also known to influence peoples’ health 
and well-being (Keniger et al. 2013). 
The bottom line is that agriculture requires the support of a raft 
of ecosystem services. The problem is that some of these services 
are valued more highly than others by agricultural producers, 
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whose values may not align with those of the broader public. Juggling 
these contrasting values is one of the major challenges of farmland 
environmental management, and is a key theme throughout this book. 
Solutions in the agri-environment
To anyone with an interest in conservation and agriculture, these ideas 
are hardly revolutionary. The question is, what can we do to conserve 
biodiversity in productive landscapes? There are many answers here, 
ranging from individual farmers volunteering their time and effort 
to re-establish native plants and animals on their farms, through to 
governments proclaiming laws regulating what farmers can and cannot 
do. As a spectrum of activity, these approaches might represent end 
points, going from volunteer effort through to regulation. 
Most landowners have a limited capacity to sacrifice the productive 
capacity of their land (or their time) for non-income earning activities, 
and volunteer efforts have real limitations on what can be achieved 
(Curtis 2000). Indeed, the early investment in agri-environmental 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s focused on stimulating volunteer effort 
through programs such as Landcare. While popular, this effort failed 
to address the growing problems of land and water degradation and 
declining biodiversity (see Chapter 7 by David Salt). 
Regulatory approaches, on the other hand, usually entail high 
transaction costs — especially, for example, in terms of compliance 
and enforcement — and are widely considered less efficient and cost-
effective than alternative strategies (Hahn and Stavins 1992). They are 
also often unpopular in the agricultural sector. Indeed, the prevailing 
belief in most western democracies is that farmers have the implicit 
right to carry out the most profit-maximising activity on their land, 
irrespective of the external costs (and benefits) of doing so (Hanley 
et al. 1999). Regulation is usually only introduced where the activity 
is seen as being clearly unacceptable by the broader population, such 
as controlling the use of dangerous chemicals or the unacceptable 
treatment of livestock.
Between volunteering and regulation, however, there are many options 
employed and implemented by governments and conservation groups 
around the world, chief among which is the agri-environment scheme. 
Agri-environment schemes, though highly variable in their structure 
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and application, can be broadly defined as programs involving 
payments to farmers in exchange for the provision of environmental 
goods and services (Burrell 2012; European Commission 2014). 
Most involve an acknowledgement that the farmer is sacrificing some 
aspect of their productive potential by providing environmental 
goods and services for the public good. The two case studies discussed 
at the beginning of this introductory chapter are examples of 
agri-environment schemes.
Over time, agri-environment schemes have attracted a growing share 
of government investment in agriculture across Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and now 
represent a significant component of biodiversity conservation in 
agricultural landscapes, with billions of dollars spent on such schemes 
around the world each year (Hajkowicz 2009).
Along with Europe and the United States, Australia has been working in 
the agri-environmental space for some 30 years. Australia’s investment 
in this area has been tiny compared to Europe or the United States, 
partly reflecting our smaller population and economy, although the size 
of our agricultural landscape is comparable (Hajkowicz 2009). Given 
the enormous scale of the environmental challenges being faced in 
Australia, it is important that our investments in the agri-environment 
area are cost-effective.
Learning from agri-environment schemes 
in Australia: About this book
This book is targeted primarily at anyone working in 
agri-environmental  policy or looking at establishing an agri-
environment scheme in Australia, including policymakers, project 
officers, and non-government organisations. It has a secondary aim of 
producing a short and readable text for anyone interested in the topic 
of biodiversity conservation on agricultural land. 
Chapters are short, engaging, and seek to educate rather than 
exhaustively prove finer points of analysis. Where possible, we have 
kept the use of jargon and acronyms to a minimum. Each chapter is a 
stand-alone story, and we have organised the book into the following 
three themed sections. 
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
10
Part I — The agri-environment in the real world sets the scene by 
describing the challenges and tensions that go hand in hand with 
running agri-environment schemes. The chapters in this section 
present a variety of discussions of the complexities surrounding how 
agri-environment schemes function in real life, and discuss the case 
studies of the WOPR scheme and the Environmental Stewardship 
Program, which were presented at the beginning of this chapter. 
Part  I  also provides some contextual history of agri-environment 
schemes in Australia and Europe, and discusses dealing with different 
types of farmers and the importance of non-government organisations. 
Part II — The birds and the beef explores the many natural, social, 
and economic values involved in agri-environment schemes, and the 
ways these are framed or marketed. In this section, we discuss the 
concept of ecosystem services, consider the debate over different 
conservation strategies, and are presented with an economics 
perspective on restoration. We also explore the issue of scale in 
designing agri-environment schemes, the importance of accounting for 
private benefits in project selection, and the social and psychological 
dimensions of agri-environment schemes.
Part III — Planning, doing and learning examines many of the 
issues surrounding the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
agri-environment schemes. It examines the many challenges of ranking 
different projects, given that most schemes are oversubscribed — 
there is never enough money to go around, so how do you get the best 
outcomes? We discuss approaches to measuring and maximising the 
conservation benefits, the importance of counterfactual thinking, and 
the choice of different policy tools. We conclude with the reflections 
of David Pannell, one of Australia’s most experienced agricultural 
economists, on the performance of agri-environmental policies. 
He  provides a checklist of factors that experience has shown are 
important to the success of any agri-environment scheme. For anyone 
with an interest or responsibility in agri-environment policy, this is 
one list you cannot afford to ignore.
So, what does it all this add up to? We attempt to make sense of the 
many perspectives in this book in the concluding chapter. We begin 
our conclusion with a simple hypothetical: if circumstances were to 
suddenly create a funding opportunity for a new agri-environment 
scheme, how should the nation respond? This is not idle speculation, 
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because in many ways the Decade of Landcare was not an opportunity 
that was widely anticipated. It arose from a historic agreement between 
the National Farmers Federation and the Australian Conservation 
Foundation in 1989, coupled with a receptive prime minister. 
And  while that scheme was enthusiastically embraced, it did not 
generate the enduring environmental outcomes that many hoped for.
A quarter of a century later, and the threat of environmental decline is 
as great, if not greater, with a rising expectation that our agricultural 
landscapes will dramatically increase their productive output in order 
to feed a growing population (see Box 1.1). Furthermore, biodiversity 
decline is just one of several issues facing society that must compete 
for limited funds.
Box 1.1: Farming, biodiversity and the future
The world’s population is changing rapidly. In the next three decades there will 
be up to 10 billion people on the planet; Australia’s population alone is expected 
to double by 2075 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013). Not only can we expect 
a lot more mouths to feed, but improvements to the socio‑economic status 
of people across many regions, including Asia and Africa, will lead to changes 
in diet. This will result in a large increase in food demand, which will in turn require 
increased food production through the expansion and intensification of agriculture 
(Phalan, Green, and Balmford 2014). We will need to produce more with less. 
The Australian Government’s agricultural policy is heavily focused on capitalising 
on this growth by increasing productivity. The National Food Plan seeks 
to increase agricultural productivity by 30 per cent by 2025, aiming to increase 
the value of agricultural exports by 45 per cent (DAFF 2013). The Agricultural 
Competitiveness Green Paper sets out a plan to increase farm‑gate profits 
by reducing costs and ‘unnecessary barriers to productivity and profitability’ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2014). At the same time, this policy is aiming 
to ‘streamline’ the environmental approvals established through key legislation 
such as the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 . 
These major changes to agriculture present a significant threat to our biodiversity. 
Agricultural intensification carries greater biodiversity impacts than extensive 
farming practices (Reidsma et al. 2006). The amount of remnant vegetation 
expected to be cleared globally for agricultural use in the next 35 years is in the 
order of 0.2–1 billion hectares (Tilman et al. 2011). Facilitating the conservation 
of biodiversity in agricultural landscapes in the face of growing agricultural 
production represents a key conservation challenge at a global scale (Green et 
al. 2005). Policies that use incentives to balance conservation and agricultural 
production will play an increasingly vital role in safeguarding biodiversity in 
agricultural landscapes.
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Should another major opportunity present itself — the announcement 
of a substantial government investment in agri-environment schemes, 
for example — will we be able to say we are ready? We should be, 
after 25 years of experience and research in these programs. Many of 
the perspectives in this book question our efforts in agri-environment 
investment and ask exactly what we have learnt. In many places it 
is suggested we can do a lot better than we currently do with the 
available resources, in areas including planning, prioritisation, 
monitoring, evaluation, and learning. In that light, it is our hope that 
this book will prove an invaluable resource and reference.
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The agri‑environment 








• Agricultural communities are now more diverse than ever, therefore 
incentive schemes must be flexible, and developed, at least in part, 
in consultation with the intended audience.
• Less than perfect ecological outcomes may be better than no 
outcomes at all.
• Voluntary schemes, whether subsidised or incentivised, deliver 
cost-effective outcomes, but must have ownership by landholders.
• Our largest scheme for private land revegetation was collaboratively 
developed with landholders and has uptake across the country.
• Environmental change takes time and requires an ongoing 
commitment to the site and the landholder to guarantee a return 
on the initial investment.
As a project manager with Greening Australia, I have been fortunate 
to work with a broad range of farmers and landowners on a 
variety of restoration and rehabilitation schemes in south east New 
South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory. This involves 
frequent collaboration with a range of scientists working in the 
agri-environment realm. (Indeed, I became involved in natural resource 
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management  (NRM) by undertaking an Honours Science degree in 
resources and environmental management at ANU). This experience 
has given me some overview of the ecological, economic, and social 
elements of the agri-environment.
Figure 2.1: Graham Fifield (left) listens to farmer Bob Spiller 
talking about his experience with Whole of Paddock 
Rehabilitation. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
It is my opinion that for any agri-environmental program to be 
effective it needs to acknowledge the diversity of the communities 
it engages with, and be implemented in such a way as to give 
ownership to farmers and encourage a voluntary ethic. Feedback from 
landowners and an understanding of the social barriers to adoption are 
critical when designing agri-environment schemes because without 
landholder support, schemes are unlikely to deliver the results 
desired by funding agencies — a view supported by Vanclay (2011). 
Furthermore, it is Greening Australia’s experience that farmers often 
supply the innovation that will produce real and enduring results.
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Agricultural communities are now more 
diverse than ever, therefore incentive 
schemes must be flexible and developed, 
at least in part, from the bottom up
Delivering any agri-environment scheme on private land requires 
an understanding of the agricultural enterprise, if one is being 
undertaken, and the social drivers for adoption. That is because 
these days the description of ‘farmer’ is an unhelpful stereotype that 
doesn’t encompass the variety of people that are out on the land. 
The rural demographic is now as diverse as Australia’s many unique 
and wonderful landscapes. Farms come in many forms, from the 
ever increasing lifestyle farms and peri-urban developments, to the 
dwindling numbers of traditional family farms as well as the increasing 
number of corporate agri-businesses. (See Barr 2009 for an overview of 
the changing agricultural landscape.) 
Some of the reasons people get involved with revegetation or 
conservation programs are to provide shade and shelter for livestock, 
reduce the impact of soil erosion or salinity, increase birdlife on the 
farm, provide cleaner water for stock and fish, or to provide free 
fencing to assist management or as a buffer to adjacent land use. Other 
reasons have nothing to do with farming or the environment per se, 
such as for improved aesthetics, to increase property values or simply 
to block the view of neighbouring houses. Without delivering one or 
more products or services that the landholder values, we are unlikely 
to achieve repeat projects or widespread adoption. With this in mind, 
successful programs are typically those which are devised from the 
bottom up. 
Are less than perfect ecological outcomes 
better than no outcomes at all? A case 
study in working with farmers
Herein lies a challenge: there is often a conflict between the best 
available science and the expectations of the project’s participants. 
For  example, revegetation guidelines for south east Australia 
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(e.g.  Munro and Lindenmayer 2011; Taws 2007) clearly state that 
to create habitat for declining or threatened woodland bird species, 
bigger is better, and revegetation in wider or square configurations 
is preferable to narrow linear strips. Many farmers, however, desire 
a long narrow configuration which acts as a windbreak over a large 
area of paddock, and the perceived loss of agricultural production 
caused by planting trees over more land is a serious concern. 
For smaller landholders, wider corridors can simply take up too much 
land proportional to their holding. 
While a 15-metre wide native vegetation corridor with four rows of 
native trees and shrubs provides habitat for a range of birds, including 
many of conservation interest, a 25- or 30-metre wide corridor provides 
habitat for even more. But if we are uncompromising and insist on the 
best ecological outcome and the landholder isn’t willing to forfeit the 
extra land, we risk achieving no outcomes at all. The question that 
arises then is: Are less than perfect ecological outcomes better than no 
outcomes at all?
If the demand for incentive schemes exceeds the capacity to supply, 
then, yes, we can prioritise towards the best environmental and most 
cost-effective outcomes. Over 30 years, however, Greening Australia 
has seen the benefit of working with willing and early adopters and 
getting early runs on the board. The value of a demonstration site 
that can be seen by others cannot be underestimated. To continue 
the wildlife corridor example, the benefits of having corridors on 
farms, such as improved stock shelter and increased birdlife, were 
demonstrated in an era where planting trees was considered radical. 
Incrementally, the next generation of corridors became progressively 
wider. The cost of fencing was the same regardless of width, so the 
desire to increase the shelter and wildlife benefits increased, and the 
loss of productive land became less of a concern. Locally, we have seen 
the transition from one- and two-row revegetation corridors in the 
early 1990s, to 12 metres wide, to 15 metres, and now it is generally 
accepted to create 18-, 20- or even 25-metre-wide corridors. 
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Figure 2.2: Over time, landholders have increased the size 
of their linear plantings. 
Source: Photo by Dean Ansell.
Locally, the demand for these native vegetation corridors, even in 
the wider configurations, now exceeds our capacity to supply — 
it’s  a nice problem to have. I would suggest that if we had insisted 
on 20-metre wide corridors in the early 1990s, we would not have 
gained the necessary traction within the agricultural community to 
be in the position we are in now. There are still those landholders, 
however, often positioned in key locations for habitat connectivity, 
who insist on the current minimum width of 18 metres. With the trade-
offs between the best available science and prioritising cost-effective 
actions described above, would you fund these?
In the case that supply exceeds demand for project funding, 
we  typically seek to work with early adopters and innovators. 
These are often members of local Landcare groups. Further advertising 
may then be required to attract broader participation in a program. 
It is  interesting to note that delivering projects in a region where 
Greening Australia has not had a strong or continuous presence often 
follows this path, highlighting the value in regional staff, regional 
offices, and a connection to regional areas.
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Voluntary schemes, whether subsidised 
or incentivised, deliver cost-effective 
outcomes, but must have ownership 
by landholders
As a non-government organisation, Greening Australia is reliant 
on voluntary and incentivised schemes to achieve environmental 
outcomes on private land. Whilst Greening Australia does not have 
a legislative stick at its disposal, as agencies do, neither does it have 
to satisfy the same expectations regarding accountability. This has 
enabled Greening Australia to develop an incentive framework that 
appeals to landholders where ownership and personal investment 
(often sweat equity)1 are required in the project, but the agreements 
are simple, concise, and not legally binding. The investment of time, 
money, and/or labour by the landholder is thus invested in their 
project and it is valued accordingly. It is our experience that, without 
this investment, environmental outcomes are easily compromised — 
stock enter exclusion areas, planted trees die, and electric fences stop 
working. In short, they have a stake in ensuring their project works.
Here are a few examples:
1. The establishment of linear vegetation corridors. Also known as 
windbreaks or wildlife corridors, the establishment of native 
vegetation in multiple rows along an existing fence line is now 
a feature of the agricultural landscape. Through corporate or 
government funds, Greening Australia disseminates a cash 
payment to the farmer to purchase the materials for the new 
fence to exclude stock. Importantly, he or she then builds the 
fence, or pays a contractor to complete the job. One of the 
best and longest running examples of this style of project is 
GreenGrid (a partnership between Transgrid and Greening 
Australia, see www.greeningaustralia.org.au/partner/transgrid). 
The new vegetation may be established by planting tubestock 
or by direct seeding. Tubestock are supplied free of charge from 
the Greening Australia nursery, but the landholder is responsible 
1  An interest in a property earned by a tenant in return for labour towards upkeep 
or restoration.
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for the site preparation and planting. Conversely, direct seeding 
is carried out by experienced Greening Australia staff while the 
landholder is responsible for site preparation. Their share of input 
to the project — whether it be labour, materials, time, or cash — 
is approximately 50 per cent.
2. Protection of rivers, creeks or existing native vegetation. Commonly 
known as fencing incentive programs, Greening Australia provides 
funds to the farmer to buy fencing materials. Again, the farmer is 
responsible for erecting the fence. In the case of rivers, payments 
towards alternate water sources, such as pipes and troughs, are 
available. The installation of this infrastructure is up to the farmer. 
Rivers in Australia are commonly invaded by woody weeds, and in 
the temperate zone these are typically willows (Salix sp.). Removal 
of mature willow trees is performed by contractors with heavy 
machinery and is funded through Greening Australia, with the 
smaller follow up infestation control performed by the landholder. 
Both parties have considerable input into the project. (See the 
Rivers of Carbon project at: riversofcarbon.org.au/.)
3. Whole of Paddock Rehabilitation (WOPR, pronounced ‘whopper’ 
— see Fifield et al. 2014). In 2008, Greening Australia launched 
a new style of incentive scheme that combines traditional 
revegetation incentives, such as fencing and revegetation, with 
fixed-term stewardship payments to offset the loss of agricultural 
production during a short period in which native vegetation 
is established and matures. The payment has been deliberately 
set at a rate that is less than the full productive potential of 
agriculture (typically 30–60 per cent, depending on soil type) thus 
requiring an additional investment by the farmer into the project. 
Once trees and shrubs are sufficiently established, typically 
after five years, agricultural production resumes and the 
stewardship payments are stopped. Direct seeding and fencing 
(where occasionally required) follow the models described above. 
Approximately 3,000 hectares of productive agricultural land 
within the threatened Grassy Box Woodland communities of 
temperate Australia have now been revegetated and productively 
enhanced using this approach. WOPR is also a great example 
of innovation. Passive tree regeneration schemes with similar 
payments to landowners exist in Victoria (the Bush Returns Project 
described by Miles 2008).
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Our largest scheme for private land 
revegetation was devised by landholders 
and now has uptake across the country
Farmers are fantastic innovators; working with them and respecting 
their knowledge and skills can result in excellent outcomes. A good 
example of such collaboration can be seen in WOPR.
WOPR grew out of an experiment between a couple of local farmers 
and Greening Australia in south east NSW. In 1989, following bushfires 
and an alarming rise in the water table, a paddock on one of these 
farmer’s properties became waterlogged, salty, scalded, and provided 
little agricultural productivity. The landholder contacted Greening 
Australia and the phenomenon was identified as dryland salinity.
In 1994, the farmer decided to sow native trees and shrubs across this 
paddock to combat the high water table. The design was to sow alleys 
of trees, comprising four rows of trees and shrubs separated by 30–50 
metres of pasture for grazing between each alley. The wisdom of this 
became clear after four or five years when sheep were reintroduced to 
graze amongst the trees. The widely spaced tree alleys didn’t suppress 
grass growth over large areas of the paddock, while providing shade, 
shelter, additional fodder, and lowering the water table. Anecdotally, 
the rest from grazing benefited the native perennial grasses, which 
were able to grow unhindered and set seed. Areas that were bare and 
scalded stabilised. The diversity of trees and shrubs provided valuable 
habitat, and birds that hadn’t been seen on the property for many 
years returned to the area.
WOPR is essentially a form of alley farming, as described by Lefroy 
and Stirzaker (1997). Greening Australia has refined the scheme over 
several years to include stewardship payments, and by adjusting the 
design and seeding rates to strive for the best social, agricultural, 
and ecological outcomes. Several iterations of the program have been 
undertaken with money from a variety of sources. In every case, 
the scheme was readily accepted by farmers because it was easy for 
them to incorporate into their farm budget. Paddocks were a unit of 
production, Greening Australia was a trusted partner, and the scheme 
did not involve legal contracts or involve heavy transaction costs. 
WOPR agreements simply give the farmers half of the stewardship 
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payment up front and half at five years, if the farmer has met their side 
of the bargain — not putting sheep in. Since the project’s inception in 
2008, approximately 85 per cent of landholders have qualified for the 
second stewardship payment. The remaining 15 per cent of projects 
have typically been cancelled due to poor plant establishment rather 
than deliberate stock grazing. It is worth noting that when properties 
have changed owners, the second stewardship payment, which is 
available to the new owners, has provided the incentive to continue 
with the stock-free period and thus contributed to the success of 
the project.
Figure 2.3: A before and after photo of a WOPR project near 
Bookham, NSW. 
Source: Photo by Graham Fifield.
WOPR is now being implemented at a larger scale, with Greening 
Australia receiving significant grants from the federal government’s 
Caring for Our Country (CfoC) program in 2011 and the Biodiversity 
Fund in 2013 to run region-wide programs across several catchments 
in south east NSW. A variation of the program is now being delivered 
in the Avon valley of Western Australia and is being considered across 
several states and territories of Australia.
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Environmental change takes time and 
requires an ongoing commitment to the 
site and the landholder to guarantee 
a return on the initial investment
Greening Australia has planted many trees in its time and delivered 
many great environmental outcomes. (For examples, see Briggs et al. 
2008; Spooner et al. 2002 — remnant fencing; Gould 2013; Higgisson 
2014 — riparian restoration; Taws 2007; Lindenmayer et al. 2012 — 
birds in revegetation; Gibson-Roy et al. 2010 — grassland restoration). 
But possibly a greater impact has been achieved in the relationships and 
knowledge it has established in the farming community. Restoration 
takes time, trees grow slowly, so it’s important to nurture long-lasting 
relationships with the landowners who are participating in the 
various agri-environmental schemes being run around the country. 
Unfortunately, it is not enough to simply throw a few handfuls of seed 
over the land and walk away. There will be many challenges facing 
the landowner with the project over the years, so follow up and being 
available to provide advice is essential.
A major issue with some government agri-environment programs is 
that once the program has concluded — and they rarely run longer 
than a few years — landowners don’t have anyone to provide them 
with advice or feedback on what they should do when problems arise. 
This may be exacerbated by the loss of NRM staff to state agencies 
(Curtis et al. 2014). This is where non-government organisations such 
as Greening Australia and various catchment management groups play 
an essential role (see Chapter 5 by David Freudenberger). Follow up 
visits are a challenge, as they are never directly funded, but rather have 
to be conducted while delivering other projects or from organisational 
surpluses.
Issues that may arise with project sites are, of course, varied and may 
include such issues as ‘my direct seeding hasn’t worked’, ‘the erosion 
is still occurring’, or ‘what should I do about this troublesome animal/
plant?’. Without subsequent advice, it is possible that livestock 
may be allowed to enter the site and graze on the tiny seedlings, 
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that the erosion continues to occur, or that a noxious plant or animal 
compromises the success of the project. In each case, the investment of 
public and private time, money, and resources is jeopardised.
Of course, this ongoing relationship is essential for Greening 
Australia too, and is a necessary investment. One of the challenges in 
environmental restoration is predicting the trajectory of a site in five, 
10 or 100 years into the future. It is only by carefully recording what 
actions are undertaken today and checking what the site looks like 
tomorrow that we can begin to learn and adapt our methodology for 
the best social, ecological, and agricultural outcomes. 
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The Environmental Stewardship 
Program: Lessons on creating 
long‑term agri‑environment 
schemes
Emma Burns, Charlie Zammit, 
Simon Attwood and David Lindenmayer
Key lessons
The conservation of biodiversity on private land is both a high 
priority and a considerable challenge. An effective response to 
this challenge requires a combination of legislative and incentive 
mechanisms, coupled with preparedness by government to review 
and revise administrative arrangements. Preliminary results from the 
Environmental Stewardship Program, established by the Australian 
Government, highlight that there is a role for market-based approaches. 
However, implementation of this program through a Commonwealth 
bureaucracy was not without its challenges. Here we provide an 
overview of the program’s implementation from 2007 to 2012, followed 
by discussion of some key lessons learned. 
We summarise these lessons as:
• Designing for the long-term presents many challenges.
• Land managers liked the program but there were a few surprises.
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• Monitoring is important.
• Start simple and engage early and often.
• Governance and administrative reforms are needed.
Figure 3.1: A sign on the gate of a property involved in the 
Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project, part of the Environmental 
Stewardship Program. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
Introducing the Environmental Stewardship 
Program
In mid-2007, the Commonwealth established the Environmental 
Stewardship Program, a ground-breaking scheme that used competitive 
tenders to engage private land managers in long-term contracts 
(up to 15 years) to manage environmental assets of high public value. 
The  program resulted in a series of tenders being implemented by 
the Commonwealth across New South Wales, Queensland, and South 
Australia. We were involved in the design and implementation of 
the program and, more than most, we are aware of the challenging 
ecological, social, and economic dimensions of designing and 
implementing such a process. Here we reflect on the experience and 
offer several lessons that may help with the design of similar schemes 
in the future.
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3 . ThE ENvIRONMENTAL STEWARDShIP PROGRAM
The Environmental Stewardship Program initiated a new way for the 
Commonwealth to support the conservation of biodiversity on private 
land, through a process where land managers were empowered and 
funded to be recognised as environmental stewards.
Being a Commonwealth initiative meant funding was targeted at 
matters of National Environmental Significance as listed under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC).1 
Therefore, the program was only permitted to target nationally 
threatened species and ecological communities, migratory species and 
wetlands of international importance, and natural values associated 
with world and national heritage places.
Aligning a market-based incentive scheme to clear Commonwealth 
legal responsibilities for biodiversity conservation was critical to 
gaining initial approval for the program. Depending on the assets 
targeted, the program sought to achieve a range of outcomes including: 
• Improved habitat quality across the landscape.
• Increased viability, integrity, and buffers to high quality remnants 
for species, ecological communities, Ramsar wetlands, and World 
Heritage areas.
• Improved long-term protection of nationally threatened species 
and ecological communities.
• Improved condition and function of ecological communities.
• Enduring changes in land manager attitudes and behaviours 
towards environmental protection and sustainable land 
management practices.
The initial funding for the program was $42.5 million from 2007/08 
to 2010/11, with a contingency reserve to allow annual payments 
until 2024/25 (a contingency reserve for a program represents funds 
committed for the program beyond the standard three-year forward 
estimates period). In the 2011 budget, the Commonwealth announced 
additional funding of $84.2 million from 2011/12 for a further four 
years. However, no further funding rounds were offered after 2012. 
1  Note, not all departmental programs need to target matters of National Environmental 
Significance. They can have their constitutional basis through external affairs powers — 
helping the Australian Government meet their international obligations under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, for example.
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In the implementation phase of the program (2007–2012), managers 
designed and delivered the competitive tenders through two projects 
in collaboration with on-ground delivery agents and external 
scientific experts: the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project and the 
Multiple Ecological Communities Project. Both projects, which 
comprised the entire program, employed a reverse auction tender 
process (see Zammit et al. 2010), which resulted in a total government 
investment of approximately $152 million in approved grants with 
individual land managers up to 2025/26. Landowner contributions 
remain uncosted, but are likely to be significant.
From 2007–2009, the program targeted the critically endangered box 
gum grassy woodland ecological community in south east Australia 
through the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project. This project targeted 
the remaining patches of woodland on private land, without specific 
reference to the adjoining matrix of agricultural lands or other non-
target native habitats. In total, five tender rounds across New South 
Wales and Queensland were conducted under the Box Gum Grassy 
Woodland Project, resulting in 26,470 ha being managed by 210 land 
managers for an approximate cost of $71 million over 15 years. 
Program managers recognised an opportunity to increase the 
program’s efficiency through experience gained from implementing 
the Box  Gum Grassy Woodland Project; desktop research; staff 
expertise (see, for example, Attwood et al. 2009); and formal review 
and structured feedback mechanisms with delivery agents and 
land managers.
Consequently, they sought to improve program design by broadening 
the program’s reach through targeting multiple EPBC-listed ecological 
communities in a region, and incorporating options for conservation 
management of the surrounding matrix through buffers and 
connectivity. These program refinements were subsequently found to 
have improved the efficiency and effectiveness of the implementation 
model (see, for example, Marsden Jacobs Associates 2010). 
In 2010–2011, the program implemented the Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project in New South Wales and South Australia, across 
six different Natural Resource Management Regions. Five nationally 
threatened ecological communities were targeted: in New South Wales, 
basalt and alluvial grassland, weeping Myall woodland, and box gum 
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grassy woodland; in South Australia, iron-grass grassland, and 
peppermint box woodland. In 2011–2012, a second round of the 
Multiple Ecological Communities Project was implemented in South 
Australia. In total, after these two tender rounds, 87 land managers 
were contracted to manage 26,988 ha of threatened ecological 
communities, which included over 7,000 ha of adjoining land for an 
approximate cost of $81.3 million over 15 years.
Relative to the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project, the development 
of the Multiple Ecological Communities Project recognised the need 
for a more integrated and landscape-scale approach to conserving 
threatened ecological communities. As such, more technically nuanced 
protocols and tools were required (Whitten et al. 2011). These, in 
turn, required more sophisticated management planning with land 
managers. Building on the successful uptake of the Box Gum Grassy 
Woodland Project and Multiple Ecological Communities Project, 
the program managers commenced designing a more generic reverse 
auction framework that targeted native vegetation (habitat), which 
supported nationally threatened species and ecological communities. 
Under this approach, the program could then be rolled out without 
specifying a precise target, but rather allowing land managers with 
different assemblages of EPBC-listed species and communities on their 
properties to participate in a tender round. This approach was never 
implemented, given the Commonwealth’s decision not to undertake 
further funding rounds of the program. 
In summary, after five years of implementation, 297 land managers 
across New South Wales, Queensland, and South Australia were 
approved by the Commonwealth to implement (up to) 15-year 
conservation management plans over 56,527 ha of private land. 
The last  of these contracts will end in 2026/27. The realisation 
of the potential conservation benefits from a public investment 
of approximately $152.3 million will depend on how these contracts 
are managed, and how land managers are supported. 
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Figure 3.2: A reptile monitoring station within a Box Gum 
Grassy Woodland Project site. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
The program can justifiably be called groundbreaking because it 
required a longer-term perspective to the management of grants 
than has customarily been taken by Commonwealth governments. 
Consequently, the program contained many innovations, which were 
developed and implemented in a relatively short period of time. 
As we look back on what was achieved, we believe there are several 
important lessons for policymakers seeking to set up similar schemes 
in the future.
Designing for the long-term presents 
many challenges 
The original design of the program that supported long term payments 
for conservation management on private land was a significant 
achievement. The original budget — for the full funding term to 
2026 — contained the necessary allocations for outsourcing the 
management of tenders to third-party providers, environmental and 
social monitoring, compliance, and extension support. 
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Retaining these features adequately through the implementation 
and maintenance phases of the program proved to be difficult due 
to a combination of factors, including budget pressures, changes 
in department staff, and changes in priorities and attitudes within 
government and the department towards how the program should 
best be managed. For example, the Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project 
featured ecological and social monitoring, and externally contracted 
delivery agents to manage site assessments and provided ongoing 
extension support to land managers. However, the Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project had few of these features. The challenge was 
presented by the fact that governments always retain the prerogative to 
reallocate limited funds, and other resources — and to shift priorities 
as circumstances change.
The translation of policy decisions into programs with long-term 
budgets can be difficult to maintain successfully over time. Original 
planning cannot deliver intended results without the institutional 
commitment and enduring support to implement a program as 
intended. This is a reflection of the vulnerability of agreed government 
policies and investment programs to shifting political ideologies and 
their preferences. Such shifts can limit long-term policy coherence in 
favour of short-term flexibility. This can, in turn, limit opportunities 
for securing enduring long-term environmental improvements. 
The major challenge for any future agri-environmental program will 
therefore be securing enduring bi-partisan political support, combined 
with institutional governance arrangements that make it more robust 
to withstand short-term pressures and shifting attitudes. 
Land managers liked the program 
but there were a few surprises
Land manager feedback
The program was popular with land managers (Coggan et al. 2013; 
Ecker  and Thompson 2010; Marsden Jacobs Associates 2010). 
The features of the program prompting the most positive feedback 
from land managers were site assessments and ongoing monitoring, 
information packs and evenings, and the use of state-and-transition 
models, which were used to explain the desired conservation 
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outcomes. Zammit et al. (2010) and Attwood and Burns (2012) provide 
further information on the use of state-and-transition models by the 
program. Zammit (2013a) outlines the social benefits to farmers from 
participating in incentive programs for conservation. Here we focus 
on land manager feedback, with selected quotes from land managers 
from semi-structured interviews.
To some, the offer of 15-year contracts was appealing; to others it 
was daunting. Some found the Commonwealth’s interest (through 
weighting  in the metric) in conservation covenants —  deeds to 
land titles that define the limitations, conditions, or restrictions 
on the use of that land in perpetuity (see www.environment.gov.
au/topics/biodiversity/biodiversity-conservation/conservation-
covenants) — was a barrier to participation, even though it was not 
a requirement to participate. 
Many land managers were proud of their involvement and thought 
the department should go further to develop a brand for the program 
(something akin to current organic farming branding). The department 
did provide them with signs for display on properties (e.g. gates) that 
recognised their participation in the program, but did not develop 
a brand. As yet, there is no evidence of a clear market advantage 
to properties that have participated in such schemes, but as such 
schemes mature, the competitive advantages of products that arise 
from participating properties might be more evident:
I would like to see stewardship branded as a premium product. 
We  have happy sheep and look after the environment — wouldn’t 
you want to buy that wool?
Some saw the reverse auction process as confusing and undesirable:
I had a hard time coming up with a bid price because I didn’t know 
what I was doing. Why don’t you just tell us a flat price then we can 
decide if it is worth it?
At the outset, managers did not know a reasonable price to make 
direct offers, but after running multiple rounds within a region, there 
was sufficient price information for direct offers. This approach had 
already been successfully used in the Commonwealth’s Tasmanian 
Forest Conservation Fund (Binney and Zammit 2010).
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Some felt the management plans developed were too prescriptive 
and should be outcome-based rather than input-focused:
Rather than tell us what to do, you should have a hands-on person 
come around and pay us a bonus if we are getting the outcome 
you want.
A few surprises
Implementation of the program produced some surprises, including 
a large number of requests for site assessments. For example, the 
Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project had initially budgeted for 
150 site assessments, but received over 350 requests in round one. 
Project managers were further surprised by some applications worth 
millions of dollars over the contract period. To address this, managers 
introduced a capped total bid amount (e.g. $3.5 million maximum over 
15 years for the Multiple Ecological Communities Project). 
From initial rounds, project managers discovered that land managers 
were generally costing their bids linearly. As efficiencies were 
expected, this made large holdings more expensive than anticipated. 
As the program was rolled out, concern grew within the department 
regarding what was an appropriate $/ha/year figure for management. 
The concern was that, in many cases, it could be cheaper to purchase 
the property, as was the approach for funding the purchase and 
covenanting of private land through a state government or private 
entity under the National Reserve System. Under that approach, the 
new owner carries the ongoing costs to implement the conservation 
management plan.
In response to this concern, the Australian Government’s 
Evaluation Panel (which was responsible for overseeing the process 
and  recommending successful tenderers to ministers) developed 
a $/ha/year cap as a red flag when evaluating Multiple Ecological 
Communities Project bids. This figure was informed by cost data from 
existing Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project contracts, such as the 
average annual cost and the variation from the mean. This information 
is commercial-in-confidence. However, in a commissioned review, 
Marsden Jacobs Associates (2010) reported that across the Box Gum 
Grassy Woodland Project, the average annual cost was $202 per hectare 
per year, with significant variation around the average both within 
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and between regions. The actual figure used was not communicated 
to land managers, but the Evaluation Panel’s discretionary powers 
to support their responsibility to make the best value for money 
judgements was communicated in the program guidelines (see, for 
example, nrmonline.nrm.gov.au/catalog/mql:2408).
Monitoring is important
In recognising that several kinds of monitoring and engagement 
activities are needed, a set of monitoring tools and approaches were 
developed for the program. These aimed to:
• Provide feedback to land managers to engage them to increase 
their understanding of the program and its aims, and to engender 
positive attitudes towards the environment.
• Provide information for compliance checking, risk management, 
grant acquittal requirements, and departmental reporting for the 
program.
• Provide rigorous evidence for the performance of the program 
in achieving its conservation and attitudinal change outcomes.
A structured approach should highlight the benefits from the 
investment, and the positive behaviours and attitudes of those 
participating. Critical components include annual (short term) 
compliance reporting by land managers against contracted obligations; 
longer term ecological monitoring to reveal ecological improvements; 
and longer term social monitoring to track changes in attitudes and 
priorities to biodiversity conservation among farmers. 
These monitoring systems are coupled with extension support, which 
gives land managers somewhere to go for advice, and provides them 
with opportunities to build capacity and share their learnings with 
other land managers, researchers and government. Finally, monitoring 
systems require regular independent auditing of a proportion 
of  contracts to help detect and deal with fraudulent activity at an 
early stage.
The lack of fit-for-purpose long-term biodiversity monitoring has 
been a source of considerable criticism, from both scientific and 
policy perspectives, of agri-environment schemes in Europe, as well 
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as earlier conservation initiatives in Australia (Kleijn and Sutherland 
2003; Morrison et al. 2010; Lindenmayer et al. 2012). In recognising 
these shortcomings, the program contracted The Australian National 
University to undertake scientific monitoring of woodland sites on 153 
farms in New South Wales and southern Queensland (Lindenmayer 
et al. 2012). Securing this monitoring project was a significant 
policy achievement, and was vital for determining progress towards 
achieving the program objective and desired outcomes. 
Figure 3.3: A native skink found in a monitoring station 
in a Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project site. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
The monitoring project had an initial budget of $2 million over 
four years. In 2013, the project was re-funded, but at half its initial 
budget. Consequently, the size of the monitoring has been adjusted 
by introducing rotational sampling, as described in Lindenmayer 
et al. (2012). In addition, some sites are no longer visited, such as those 
for which property ownership has changed and stewardship payments 
are no longer being made. Despite these changes, the monitoring 
project is still considered appropriate to assess many aspects of change 
in certain groups of biota, and woodland condition.
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The results of the monitoring project are provided to the department in 
annual reports. These reports include evidence-based recommendations 
for alterations to the prescribed Box Gum Grassy Woodland Project 
grazing regime. To date, results from the monitoring indicate that 
the areas of vegetation being managed are on a different trajectory 
to the controls (currently being prepared for publication). More time 
is needed to understand these trajectories, but early indications are 
that the management plans are effective in achieving conservation 
outcomes. (See Kay et al. 2013 for an insight into reptile and amphibian 
assemblages at these sites.)
Start simple and engage early and often
When seeking to establish a new biodiversity market, it makes sense 
to begin with a simple investment target, but one that is sufficiently 
recognisable and widespread to ensure a reasonable number of eligible 
participants. In the case of the Environmental Stewardship Program, 
the targeted asset was box gum grassy woodlands. This critically 
endangered ecosystem is distinctive and widely spread from north 
eastern Victoria across western NSW and into southern Queensland. 
Building on the targeting of a single asset (i.e. box gum grassy 
woodlands), one can then use early learnings to improve effectiveness 
and efficiency through increasing the amount of land secured 
and decreasing the administrative costs associated with program 
management. In the case of the Environmental Stewardship Program, 
this led to introducing multiple ecological communities into the 
reverse-auction process, and thereafter to the design of a more generic, 
habitat-based approach to tender design. The habitat-based approach 
leads logically into more explicit consideration of how landscape-scale 
outcomes can be secured through formal inclusion of opportunities 
for creating corridors and other kinds of functional connectivity 
(see Chapter 11 for Geoff Kay’s discussion on how the landscape-scale 
of an agri-environment program can affect outcomes).
Agri-environment schemes and markets for biodiversity are a novel 
idea to many land managers, so misinterpretation of the process and 
resulting contracts is a risk. It is important to investigate concerns 
early and to regularly engage with land managers. It is also important 
to use simple tools to communicate program intentions, operational 
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guidelines, and contractual conditions. As understanding grows 
and early successes become evident within rural communities, there 
is significant opportunity to build land manager capabilities for 
biodiversity conservation on their properties and to cultivate new 
social networks around these environmental assets. This is because 
some of the biophysical and social benefits from stewardship projects 
could be privately captured (i.e. be of personal rather than public 
benefit). This should help facilitate the acceptance of such programs 
within land manager communities (see Chapter 10 on restoring 
ecosystem services on private farmland).
Governance and administrative reforms 
are needed
Several independent reviews provided valuable insights and generally 
concluded that the program was well designed (Ecker and Thompson 
2010; Marsden Jacob Associates 2010; Whitten et al. 2011). During this 
time, it was also well regarded by the ministers for the environment, 
the scientific community, many farmers, and the National Farmers 
Federation. The program proved successful in targeting threatened 
ecological communities, and in highlighting the role played by other 
native habitats and the surrounding agricultural matrix in market-
based conservation management on private land. 
There were other benefits for the department in meeting its legislative 
requirements under EPBC, including improved knowledge of the 
location, condition, and extent of certain threatened ecological 
communities, with flow on benefits to recovery planning processes. 
Most recently, a senate committee inquiry into threatened species 
protection endorsed the Environmental Stewardship Program, and 
recommended longer time frames for funding (see recommendations 




For all these benefits, however, there were also considerable challenges, 
and the Commonwealth closed the program to further investment 
rounds in 2012. While the authors do not know the reasons why the 
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program ceased further investment after two successful projects, we 
speculate several factors had some influence on that decision. As a 
relatively small and discrete investment, the program was vulnerable 
to cost-savings efforts during the more restrictive fiscal budgets from 
2012. Second, the program never secured the political support of the 
mainstream environmental non-government organisations during its 
life, so no pressure was placed on government by them when funding 
was under threat. 
The program, as originally approved, was designed to be innovative 
in addressing the long-term management of specific matters of 
national environmental significance on private land. But the realities 
of implementing an innovative conservation program through a 
Commonwealth bureaucracy, with rigid business processes, were 
broadly underestimated. Essentially, implementing reverse auctions 
was demanding because running a cycle of market-tenders inside a 
broader culture based around funding open-call public grants caused 
a range of procedural and time-critical constraints.
There was also the issue of dealing with scientific knowledge and 
its application, something essential in designing a program aimed 
at sustaining complex threatened ecosystems. The Commonwealth 
successfully administers a number of technically and scientifically 
complex policy areas (e.g. the Bureau of Meteorology, Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Authority, and the Antarctic Division within the 
Department of the Environment) which are resourced and willing to 
support scientific research and analysis in policy design and program 
management. However, this kind of approach to scientific knowledge 
and its application was not fully adopted for the Environmental 
Stewardship Program. Rather, it was delivered through the Caring 
for our Country (CfoC) initiative, and administered by a bureaucracy 
with a primary focus on managing a large and complex national 
grants program. (CfoC involved spending $2 billion over four years.) 
However, an administrative culture more akin to those in the above 
Commonwealth areas, which have a strong scientific focus, will be 
critical to designing and implementing any future national agri-
environment scheme successfully over an enduring period.
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Institutional learning is a slow and iterative process, with inevitable 
pockets of resistance to change. Governance and administrative 
arrangements need to be made more responsive and adaptive to 
implementing new policy innovations — with scientific underpinnings 
— if there is a genuine commitment to significant policy reform. 
Policy reform will take a long time, and will be built step by step 
through innovation and experimentation. The Environmental 
Stewardship Program experience showed that, although governments 
demonstrate that they are sometimes willing to try new ways to 
protect biodiversity, their administrative arrangements are often so 
inflexible that they stifle the original innovative idea and approach. 
Innovative policy instruments need to be supported by more flexible 
and adaptive governance arrangements and an enduring commitment 
to credible scientific input. If this can be achieved, governments will 
be best placed to successfully implement market-based conservation 
initiatives.
Summary
Despite the challenges, we consider that the lessons learnt from the 
Environmental Stewardship Program can usefully inform future 
agri-environment schemes implemented by governments. Our key 
recommendations for any future public-funded and market-based 
program are:
1. Design and implement fit-for-purpose business processes and 
staff management strategies up front. Procurement plans that 
allow for ongoing provision of external services are needed, 
and  land manager  contracts should not be considered grants 
(and be regulated under grant guidelines). Rather, they should be 
commercial fee-for-service contracts to promote a business culture 
reflective of the service(s) the government is purchasing. 
2. Focus on developing a more generic approach to maximising 
high-value biodiversity outcomes for as many priority investment 
targets (e.g. threatened species or ecological communities) as 
possible. A generic approach targeting habitat for multiple species/
communities will minimise the knowledge intensity of program 
design. That is, it will reduce the need for species-specific or 
community-specific conservation value metrics and management 
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plans. This approach could also easily accommodate the design 
principles of the Multiple Ecological Communities Project, including 
conservation management actions in the adjoining matrix at little 
additional cost (Whitten et al. 2011). 
3. Any habitat-based approach should continue to develop greater 
landscape-scale connectivity between properties and across 
catchments (Zammit 2013b). This can be achieved by designing 
biodiversity markets that also support corridor development and 
continue to manage the agriculture matrix more sympathetically 
for conservation.
4. A greater emphasis needs to be given to the development of 
conservation management plans and appropriate performance 
assessment of their effectiveness. In particular, different grazing 
management strategies used by any new agri-environment scheme 
should be monitored and compared, to inform future programs. 
5. A direct offers option can be implemented once sufficient market 
price information is available. Subject to considering other 
conservation priorities and the availability of funds, there is scope 
to offer additional interested land managers a fixed $/ha/year rate, 
and thereby improve efficiency and increase the area managed for 
biodiversity. A direct offer is a one-off offer of a contract by the 
government to a land manager with a stipulated price, duration, 
and management plan. The price is based on modelling price 
information from successful bids in previous tenders (see Binney 
and Zammit 2010 for a forest example). These land managers would 
hold an asset of quantified biodiversity value, as they would 
have participated in the initial aspects of a previous tender but 
either withdrew or were not successful. The subsequent fixed-
price scheme would improve the return on investment for the 
program, which has high upfront costs because of the initial 
assessments, developing a suitable conservation value metric, and 
management plans.
Finally, a valuable outcome that the Commonwealth secured through 
this program (in addition to the hectares being managed) were the 
relationships forged with the contracted land managers and developed 
with the CSIRO and ANU. These relationships should be nurtured 
to foster further learning and trust (Gibbons et al. 2008). Effective 
conservation will come from mutual respect and common goals — the 
implementation phase of the program has provided the framework, 
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but ongoing land manager support to 2025/26 is needed for enduring 
success. The more educational support provided to generate effective 
conservation outcomes, the more likely it is that land managers will 
believe in the benefits of a change in management practice. This will 
become critical for the maintenance of asset condition beyond 2025/26, 
although regulatory frameworks which prevent wilful degradation of 
protected assets will also play a role, as will conservation covenants 
for a number of properties.
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Do farmers love brolgas, 
seagrass and coral reefs? 
It depends on who’s paying, 
how much, and for how long! 
Geoff Park 
Key lessons
• Productive farming can work hand in hand with environmental 
protection, especially when it is supported through understanding 
of farm-scale realities — such as a better understanding of the costs 
and risks associated with practice change — and better integration 
of biophysical, economic, and social knowledge.
• There needs to be better recognition of the extent to which 
improved private land management contributes to public good 
outcomes.
• The voluntary adoption of best management practices (BMPs) is 
unlikely to go far towards achievement of SMART environmental 
goals, as  most required practices are simply not profitable or 
adoptable at the scale required.
• Successful outcomes will rely on the establishment of long-
term financial incentives, in the form of stewardship payments 
to farmers, for the protection of important environmental assets.
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• Evaluation of the ecological, social and economic implications 
of  SMART targets is a critical step in understanding their 
attainability and desirability.
Figure 4.1: Farmers are better able to engage with 
environmental protection on their land where such work 
takes into account farm‑scale realities. 
Source: Photo by Geoff Park.
When it comes to farming and the environment, the rhetoric 
(some  would say hyperbole) is full of claims about win–win 
outcomes. The truth, however, is less straightforward, and often not 
so convenient. 
This chapter will reflect on this notion of win–win by examining the 
relationship between land management practices and the protection 
of significant environmental assets: natural assets of importance to 
the wider Australian community. Three case studies are provided, 
which are connected by a common thread: achieving significant 
and enduring environmental outcomes can only be contemplated if 
the public and private benefits (Pannell 2008) of land use and land 
management change are analysed and understood.
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The first case study is set in the volcanic plains of central Victoria, 
the second in the catchment of Corner Inlet in Gippsland (south east 
Victoria), and the third lies northwards in the beef and sugar cane 
country that drains to the southern extremity of the Great Barrier 
Reef. Each case study spans dimensions of investment planning, 
strategic planning, and implementation. A feature of all three is the 
establishment of SMART targets that have been used to guide the 
design and evaluation of projects and plans. In all three case studies, 
an assessment was made using INFFER, the Investment Framework 
for Environmental Resources (Pannell et al. 2011, and see Box 4.1), 
to assess the cost-effectiveness of different scenarios, and to support 
the choice of appropriate actions and policy interventions. This was 
crucial, particularly in understanding the nature and scale of actions 
required by private landholders, the private costs associated with 
adopting these actions, and the technical feasibility and risks involved 
in generating the predicted environmental benefits.
What are SMART targets? There is some variation in how the letters 
of this acronym are defined. Our definition is widely used and simply 
asks if a target is Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and 
Time-bound? The importance of SMART targets has been explicitly 
recognised by governments (Australian Government 2014).
Specific: The goal is described in a precise and unambiguous way.
Measurable: The goal definition is based on a variable which can be 
monitored and recorded reliably without unreasonable expense.
Attainable: A goal is more likely to be attainable when you plan your 
steps wisely and establish a time frame that allows you to carry out 
those steps. Thinking about attainable and realistic goals at the same 
time is useful.
Realistic: To be realistic, a goal must represent an objective toward 
which everyone is willing and able to work. A goal can be both high 
and realistic; the goal should represent substantial progress.
Time-bound: A particular date is provided by which time the goal will 
have been achieved. The time frame for the goal can be of any relevant 
duration. The time frame of achieving goals is related to the time for 
reasonable ecosystem response and costs.
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The development and specification of SMART goals is crucial to 
understanding and analysing the costs and benefits of any proposed 
project (Doran 1981; McDonald and Roberts 2006). As a side note, I led 
a recent analysis that found that the use of SMART goals in planning 
by Australian regional natural resource management (NRM) bodies is 
not widespread and, in some cases, is getting worse (Park et al. 2013). 
Table 4.1 details the SMART goals that form the three case studies 
examined in this chapter. 
Table 4.1: Summary of SMART goals respective case studies.
Case study SMART goals
Moolort wetlands By 2015 to: 
• Increase the extent of native vegetation surrounding the 
swamps on private land by 150 ha from 1,034 ha to 1,184 ha.
• Improve the condition of native vegetation in and around the 
swamps on private land by 10 per cent (as measured by 
appropriate habitat assessment metric).
Corner Inlet By 2032, reduce sediment and nutrient loads to:
• Corner Inlet — nitrogen by 15 per cent, phosphorus by 
15 per cent, and suspended sediment by 10 per cent.
• Nooramunga — nitrogen by 10 per cent, phosphorus by 
10 per cent, and suspended sediment by 15 per cent.
Great Barrier Reef 
and Great Sandy 
Straits — Burnett‑
Mary region
By 2033, to achieve:
• 20 per cent overall reduction in anthropogenic suspended 
sediment load . 
• 20 per cent in anthropogenic loads of particulate nitrogen 
(PN) and particulate phosphorus (PP).
• 50 per cent reduction in anthropogenic loads of dissolved 
inorganic nitrogen (DIN).
• 50 per cent reduction in anthropogenic loads of dissolved 
inorganic phosphorus (DIP).
• 60 per cent reductions of loads of PSII herbicides 
(hexazinone, ametryn, atrazine, diuron and tebuthiuron).
The Moolort Plains 
The Moolort Plains consists of a chain of approximately 50 wetlands 
in the Loddon catchment, north central Victoria. The catchment of 
these wetlands is on the Victorian Volcanic Plain, and is Victoria’s 
only national biodiversity hotspot (Australian Government 2015). 
The  wetlands consist of freshwater meadows, shallow freshwater 
marshes, and deep freshwater marshes. No two wetlands in the 
network are the same; they vary in size (ranging from 1–2 ha to more 
than 200 ha in size), shape, and flora. These wetlands provide a range 
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of breeding, roosting, and nesting sites for native fauna species, and 
are located in a largely cleared and fragmented landscape. A number 
of the wetlands are lignum dominated, providing excellent habitat for 
nesting waterbirds, including brolga.
The wetlands occur within the farm area, as islands of biodiversity, 
amongst intensive grazing and cropping systems. At the commencement 
of the project, few of the wetlands were fenced, with most grazed 
regularly or on an occasional basis. A number of the wetlands have 
been cropped in the past, and the possibility of future cropping is 
ever present. While many of the farmers who own these areas are 
driven, at least in part, by conservation values, the wetlands are seen 
as part of the farm production system, providing valuable fodder for 
animals, especially in times of drought, or as potential cropping land. 
Figure 4.2: Frogmore Swamp is a wildlife refuge on the 
Moolort Plains. 
Source: Photo by Geoff Park.
Preliminary discussions with the relevant landholders indicated that 
if projects demanding permanent changes in land use (e.g. cessation 
of grazing and cropping) and/or land management (e.g. fencing and 
changed grazing regimes) were to be successful, then landholders 
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would need to be compensated for losses in production. This would 
require an appreciation of the economic production value of these areas 
before landholders would enter into agreements aimed at securing 
long-term conservation outcomes. On this basis, farm-scale economic 
assessments were undertaken to inform the design of a system of 
stewardship payments, tied to the establishment of conservation 
covenants. 
As a result, some 400 hectares of significant wetland has been secured 
with permanent conservation covenants through the implementation 
of a project funded by the Australian Government. The level of 
funding (provided over a two-year period as works were implemented) 
through landholder stewardship agreements has been significant 
(on  a  per  hectare basis), approaching current land values. Without 
this level of funding, it is doubtful that the project objectives would 
have been even partially achieved.
The remaining two case studies represent strategic planning 
projects for water quality, designed to inform future investment and 
implementation activities at sub-regional and regional scales.
Corner Inlet
Situated in south eastern Victoria, the Corner Inlet catchment is 
approximately 2,300km2 in size and stretches along the South 
Gippsland coastline from Woodside to Wilsons Promontory. It is a 
highly productive area, supporting dairy, beef, and mixed grazing 
enterprises, and significant areas of production forestry. The region 
supports a significant Victorian commercial bay and inlet fishery, 
including 18 licensed commercial fishers. Corner Inlet itself supports 
outstanding environmental values that have been recognised through 
its listing as a wetland of international importance under the Ramsar 
Convention. The Ramsar area within Corner Inlet is the most southerly 
marine embayment and tidal mudflat system of mainland Australia, 
with extensive areas of seagrass supporting key ecological, economic, 
and social values.
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Figure 4.3: Cows grazing in the Corner Inlet, near Wilsons 
Promontory, Gippsland, Victoria. 
Source: Photo by Geoff Park.
Improvement of water quality in Corner Inlet requires a range of land 
management changes on farming lands, associated with the adoption 
of BMPs (e.g. maintaining ground cover and direct works, such as 
riparian fencing and revegetation) on agricultural land. Extension, 
positive incentives, and regulation compliance activities have all been 
used in Corner Inlet. 
For activities on agricultural land aimed at improving water quality, 
most programs have been focused on incentive and extension activities 
to influence the implementation of actions and the adoption of BMPs. 
Some of these programs operate in tandem; for example, extension 
activities often identify on-ground works, such as waterway fencing, 
which are then implemented through direct grant programs. Likewise, 
incentive delivery is generally coupled with extension information for 
landholders outlining appropriate maintenance activities. Historically, 
these programs have been successful in engaging landholders in the 
implementation of actions and the adoption of BMPs, and have been 
delivered in a collaborative way across agencies.
Initially, in the development of the Corner Inlet Water Quality 
Improvement Plan (WQIP) (Dickson et al. 2013), a set of aspirational 
targets were analysed. These targets, requiring significant reductions 
in the load of phosphorus (30 per cent), nitrogen (30 per cent) and 
sediment (10 per cent), were deemed to be crucial to protect the 
ecological values of the area. 
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However, bio-economic modelling results indicated (Dickson et al. 
2013) that while these targets were theoretically feasible, they would 
require large-scale changes in land use (e.g. conversion of grazing land 
to native vegetation), together with long-term stewardship payments 
to support landholder adoption of BMPs. Not only would the cost 
of these changes have been very large (in the order of $35  million 
annually)  they would have invoked unacceptable socio-political 
risks, such as those associated with conversion of marginal farm 
land into permanent conservation areas. Consequently, a set of more 
modest SMART targets were used (see Table 4.1) to inform the future 
implementation of works to protect water quality in Corner Inlet. 
These targets could be reached without land use change, but  still 
require ongoing payments for BMP adoption, together with significant 
waterway and erosion works. 
The degree to which these modest targets will support a significant 
ecological response (e.g. an increase in the extent and condition of 
seagrass) remains a matter of conjecture, as the science regarding 
ecologically relevant targets for Corner Inlet is equivocal (Dickson 
et al. 2013).
What is clear is that the level of funding available through current 
programs (approximately $1 million annually) is not sufficient to 
achieve the required reduction in nutrient and sediment entering 
Corner Inlet, and that a scaled-up program (in the order of $4 million 
annually) is required to meet the modest, but agreed, implementation 
targets that form the basis of the WQIP. This is not surprising given the 
findings of analyses for similar environments, such as the Gippsland 
Lakes, where it has been estimated that a 40 per cent reduction in 
phosphorus entering the system would require around $1 billion 
over 25 years (Roberts et al. 2012), well beyond the current levels of 
funding available for catchment scale works.
The Great Barrier Reef and Great 
Sandy Straits
The Great Barrier Reef and Great Sandy Straits areas are located 
adjacent to the Burnett-Mary NRM region, in southern Queensland. 
The Burnett-Mary region contains a diverse range of riverine, coastal, 
and marine habitats. Included in the region is the southernmost 
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portion of the World Heritage-listed Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, 
and the Ramsar-listed Great Sandy Strait, which host biodiversity 
values that are globally important, including important populations 
of threatened dugong. 
The Burnett-Mary region has an approximate catchment area of 
56,000  km2 and is approximately 12 per cent of the total Great 
Barrier Reef catchment area (423,122 km2). The health of the marine 
environment is affected by a range of short-term and chronic longer 
term threats. The  major pressures and threats include terrestrial 
pollutants (sediment, nutrients and pesticides), coastal development, 
shipping (and boating), fishing/netting, and climate change. 
Collectively, terrestrial runoff (and resulting pollutant loads and poor 
water quality) is considered to have the most effect on coastal and 
marine assets in the region.
The experience in the Burnett-Mary region has a number of parallels 
with Corner Inlet. In the development of the Burnett-Mary WQIP, 
an initial set of ecologically relevant targets were set for nutrients, 
sediments, and pesticides. Again, the cost and feasibility of achieving 
these targets was assessed using a bio-economic model, with the results 
suggesting an annual investment of $16 million would be required 
to support BMP adoption in the sugar cane and grazing industries. 
While not requiring land use change, as was the case for Corner Inlet, 
this result was deemed to be unrealistic, given current and likely 
future levels of funding. Consequently, a set of revised SMART targets 
(see Table 4.1), based on the Reef Plan Water Quality Protection Plan 
(Secretariat for Reef Water Quality Protection 2013), were used to 
underpin the WQIP. Reaching these targets is still challenging, with 
an annual investment of $5 million, and would require a targeted 
approach to BMP support, largely involving the sugar cane industry 
rather than grazing, and with areas of specific geographic focus. 
As with Corner Inlet, the extent to which the agreed targets would 
protect the key ecological values of the Great Barrier Reef and Great 
Sandy Straits requires further research. 
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Box 4.1: INFFER — Investment Framework 
for Environmental Resources
INFFER™ is a tool for developing and prioritising projects to address environmental 
issues such as reduced water quality, biodiversity, environmental pests, and land 
degradation. It is designed to help environmental managers achieve the most 
valuable environmental outcomes with the available resources. 
It consists of a seven‑step process, which begins by identifying significant assets 
and works through project development, project assessment and selection, 
implementation, and, finally, monitoring, evaluation, and adaptive management. 
(For the logic behind these steps, see Chapter 22, in which David Pannell reflects 
on the how the performance of agri‑environment programs can be improved.)
The Project Assessment Form, completed in step three, is the key component of 
the process. This is where users record information about the asset, the threats 
compromising it, the goals that the project will achieve, and the actions needed 
to achieve those goals. Judgements about the likelihood of success in terms 
of technical feasibility and community and government support are also made 
and recorded here, and the proposed project budget is specified. The core 
information is used to calculate a benefit–cost ratio that indicates the project’s 
value for money.
Step 1: Identifying significant assets
A list of significant natural assets that are candidates for investment is prepared. 
These assets can be drawn from existing documents or lists, from community 
workshops, from relevant experts, or from analytical processes, such as 
systematic conservation planning. At the regional level, the list may include 
100 to 300 significant assets. 
Step 2: Filtering significant assets 
Using a simplified set of criteria, the list of significant assets is filtered down to 
~20–40 assets. Our suggested approach is to identify assets of high significance, 
with high current or predicted future damage. The filtered list is further reduced 
(to ~10–20) using the five questions on the INFFER pre‑assessment checklist. 
Assets may be culled at this point because they are not spatially explicit, because 
a specific, measurable, time‑bound goal cannot be formulated, or because an 
initial assessment indicates that the project would not be cost‑effective. 
Step 3: The Project Assessment Form 
Using the INFFER Project Assessment Form, develop an internally consistent 
project for each asset on the reduced list. This process draws together readily 
available information, consisting of desktop review of publications and reports, 
and consultation with the community and relevant experts. Information required 
at step three includes asset significance, threats, project goal, works and 
actions, time lags, effectiveness of works, private adoption of actions, delivery 
mechanisms, and costs. Using this information, apply the Public: Private 
Benefits Framework to help select policy mechanisms, and calculate a benefit–
cost ratio to be used in project ranking. The output from step three is a Project 
Assessment Report, which includes the benefit–cost ratio, risk factors (practice 
change, technical feasibility, socio‑politics, long‑term funding), spin‑offs, quality 
of information, and key information gaps. 
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Step 4: Selection of priority projects 
Select a short list of priority assets/projects based on the information in the 
Project Assessment Report and other relevant considerations. 
Step 5: Investment plans or funding proposals 
Develop investment plans or proposals for external funding (depending on 
whether INFFER is being used to allocate an internal budget or to develop and 
assess projects for external funding). 
Step 6: Implementing funded projects
Implement those projects that receive funding. In many cases, the first stage of 
a project should consist of a detailed feasibility investment, involving targeted 
collection of additional information to strengthen the assessment done in step 
three. 
Step 7: Monitoring, evaluation, and adaptive management
Monitor, evaluate, and adaptively manage projects. After feasibility assessment, 
and at regular intervals thereafter (every two years, for example), the data in 
the original Project Assessment Form for each funded asset/project should be 
updated to reflect lessons learned, progress towards outcomes, and any new 
data or analysis that has become available. At this point, managers should 
consider whether the original design of the project is still suitable, and whether 
the project should remain a priority.
More information: www.inffer.com.au
Conclusion
These case studies highlight the important role that farmers play in 
protecting significant environmental assets at a range of scales. While 
these assets occur in the private land estate and on public land, it is 
the actions of farmers that have a principal impact on the achievement 
of public good outcomes. Achievement of these outcomes requires 
significant, long-term changes in land use and management, which 
come at considerable financial and social cost to farmers, and will not 
be adopted without the provision of adequate financial incentives in 
the form of stewardship payments. 
In all three case studies, an assessment was made using INFFER, the 
Investment Framework for Environmental Resources (Pannell et al. 
2011, and see Box 4.1), to assess the cost-effectiveness of different 
scenarios, and to support the choice of appropriate actions and 
policy interventions. Unsurprisingly, the detailed analysis supported 
by INFFER revealed that the actual cost of the described projects 
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was far greater than originally anticipated, perhaps by an order of 
magnitude. The specification and analysis of SMART targets is crucial 
to understanding the scale of payments required to meet ecologically 
and socially meaningful results.
In both water quality projects examined, not only are the direct 
upfront costs considerably greater than could be accommodated 
through current state and Commonwealth environment programs, but 
there are also significant ongoing costs associated with maintaining 
benefits. The payment of ongoing stewardship costs, especially when 
linked to BMPs, is likely to be challenging and require improved 
scientific and technical understanding of the effectiveness of practices 
and a major shift in Australian NRM policy. 
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The vital role of environmental 




• Complex markets need brokers; eNGOs have performed this role 
well.
• Innovation is critical, and this requires organisations willing to fail. 
eNGOs are important for innovation.
• Engaging farmers is important, but sometimes it is not enough.
• Making a profit is OK.
• eNGOs provide a voice for the voiceless.
Environmental non-government organisations (eNGOs) have been 
actively involved in agri-environment schemes since their inception 
in Australia. These include a range of groups — large and small — 
operating over a range of scales. Their role and value is sometimes 
overlooked in discussions on agri-environment schemes, yet their 
contributions are profound and often critical to the success of the 
scheme. In this chapter, I outline why eNGOs are so important to 
agri-environment schemes and list five key lessons that should always 
be kept in mind by the designers of future schemes.
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Figure 5.1: Greening Australia conducts a WOPR field day. 
Farmers and NRM officers are being shown over one of the 
first WOPR sites. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
Who are we talking about when we speak of eNGOs? At the national 
and international end of the scale we have organisations such as 
Greening Australia, Landcare Australia, Conservation Volunteers 
Australia, WetlandCare Australia, Birdlife Australia, World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), Australian Conservation Foundation, Bush Heritage 
Australia, Australian Wildlife Conservancy, The Wilderness Society, 
and The Nature Conservancy. While all of them have an environmental 
dimension, they are quite different characters with different areas of 
focus, different people, skill sets, and modus operandi.
In addition to these large eNGOs, many hundreds of state-based, 
regional, and local non-government organisations have also been 
deeply involved with Australian agri-environment programs for 
over two decades. State-based organisations include trust-for-nature 
organisations established under state legislation in New South Wales, 
Victoria, and Queensland. Regional organisations include quasi-
government natural resource management (NRM) organisations, such 
as catchment management authorities (CMAs) in Victoria. At the local 
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scale, Landcare groups and networks, many of them incorporated, 
have played a pivotal role in shaping and implementing government 
agri-environment schemes.
Over the past two decades, I have gained insights from being involved 
with many of these organisations operating at all scales (international 
to local), although I am biased by having been Chief Scientist with 
Greening Australia for five years (2007–2012) and having collaborated 
with Greening Australia as a research scientist with CSIRO. I currently 
collaborate with Greening Australia and Bush Heritage Australia as 
an academic at ANU. So here is my shortlist of insights from 20 years 
of being an insider and outsider to many of the eNGOs involved in 
Australian agri-environment schemes. 
Complex markets need brokers
Agri-environment schemes are a market with essentially one 
buyer (the  government) and a great diversity of many sellers 
(farmers). Australian governments essentially purchase public good 
environmental outcomes from many thousands of private agricultural 
enterprises that manage over 50 per cent of the Australian continent. 
Government purchases environmental outcomes primarily through 
direct or indirect grants to farmers. These grants generally subsidise 
the cost of inputs, such as planning, fencing, pest control, and 
revegetation (see Chapter 2 by Graham Fifield), as well as some 
organisational overheads. Like any buyer, the government has choices: 
direct one-to-one purchases of public goods from farmers, or one-to-
many purchases through a  diversity of brokers and arrangements. 
These two broad options are no different to an individual buying 
company shares on the stock market directly, or through the expertise 
(and additional cost) of a stockbroker. 
A few national eNGOs, such as Greening Australia and WWF, 
pioneered the role of broker. Starting in the mid-1980s, they received 
a few large contracts from the Australian Government and delivered 
devolved grants to farmers through simple one-stop shop programs. 
These eNGOs handled the reporting obligations to the federal 
government; the farmers did the work on-ground, with planning 
advice and implementation assistance from the eNGOs. 
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This brokering or facilitation role was particularly important in the 
early agri-environment schemes. At the time, farmers were very 
reluctant sellers to a distant and seemingly suspicious national 
government buyer, with little capacity to get staff out into the paddock 
and into the kitchen for a cup of tea. At one point in the mid-2000s, 
Greening Australia had more than 350 staff and over 30 regional 
offices brokering thousands of public-good environmental purchases, 
facilitated through many paddock walks and cups of tea. Similarly, 
WWF secured funding and had regional staff who facilitated the 
national Threatened Species Network, which help create awareness of 
threatened species on private land and brokered many small grants to 
improve their conservation. 
This brokering role has generally been taken over by, at one point, 
57  NRM organisations, mostly based in regional  Australia and 
set up by  state legislation and funded or co-funded by the federal 
government (Curtis et al. 2014). However, particularly in New South 
Wales, these NRM organisations have become another branch of 
government, as they are responsible for, among other things, the 
administration of land clearing legislation. It  can be argued that 
eNGOs  are rarely fully independent of government, since so many 
receive government funding. But they have been shaping and 
delivering many agri-environment schemes on behalf of Australian 
governments over the past 30-plus years. 
The advantage of engaging a broker is the ability to build lasting 
relationships to help navigate the complexities and risks of entering 
and persisting in any market. Many eNGOs have persisted through 
decades of agri-environment schemes that often don’t last for more than 
one election cycle. Continuity and organisational identity is a strength 
of many eNGOs. The environmental market is particularly complex, 
with high overheads (e.g. reporting to the government funder). Many 
eNGOs provide this brokerage service to government (the risk-averse 
buyer) and farmers (the risk-averse sellers). Without such brokers, the 
public good market for environmental services and outcomes would 
likely have been slower to develop in Australia. 
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Innovation: Willingness to fail 
Environmental NGOs involved in Australian agri-environment schemes 
have a demonstrated record of risk-taking leading to outstanding 
innovations. They are small enough to take on risky research and 
development, but large enough to survive small failures. I assert that 
many technical innovations in securing environmental outcomes 
originated from or were nurtured by a diversity of local, regional, 
national, and international eNGOs. Here are a few notable examples:
• Direct seeding: Direct seeding technology that has successfully 
reduced the cost and increased the diversity of native vegetation 
restoration was developed by local farmer innovators and rural 
engineers, facilitated and marketed by the likes of Greening 
Australia, with support from corporate partners and government 
agencies. 
• Fencing: Planting fences around woodland remnants (e.g. fencing 
incentive schemes) rather than just planting trees was rigorously 
promoted to the Australian Government during the 1990s by 
local Landcare groups and Greening Australia, who had the 
capacity to lobby government in Canberra. Only later did research 
organisations test the effectiveness of these fencing programs to 
protect and enhance remnants of native vegetation (Spooner et al. 
2002; Briggs et al. 2008). 
• Seed production: Greening Australia made a notable contribution to 
the development of commercial-scale seed banks and on-farm seed 
production areas. 
• Restoration and rehabilitation: Greening Australia facilitated the 
technological innovations needed to restore, at scale, species-
rich temperate grasslands (Gibson-Roy et al. 2010). The Whole 
of Paddock Rehabilitation (WOPR) program was invented by a 
farmer, but was marketed and rolled-out by Greening Australia 
(see Chapter 15 by Dean Ansell and Chapter 2 by Graham Fifield). 
• Floodplain management: The then Murray Wetlands Working 
Group pioneered small-scale floodplain restoration, including the 
management of two environmental water licenses, recognised by 
the award of the prestigious National Thiess Riverprize in 2007 
(www.murraydarlingwetlands.com.au). 
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• Conservation planning: The Nature Conservancy played a pivotal 
role in introducing conservation action planning to Australia 
(now termed ‘Open Standards for the Practice of Conservation’ — 
cmp-openstandards.org). This is a participatory planning process 
that is particularly effective at engaging a diversity of stakeholders 
in setting conservation objectives. 
• Corridors: Local, regional, and international NGOs have been 
particularly influential in developing large-scale corridor initiatives, 
such as Gondwana Link (www.gondwanalink.org), Habitat 1410 
(www.habitat141.org.au), and the Bunya Biolink (Freudenberger et 
al. 2013). Only much later did the federal government develop the 
National Wildlife Corridor Plan (www.environment.gov.au/topics/
biodiversity/biodiversity-conservation/wildlife-corridors). 
As environmental brokers, eNGOs are in the position to recognise 
and facilitate innovation addressing local, regional, and national 
environmental challenges. 
Figure 5.2: Direct seeding of trees has successfully reduced 
the cost and increased the diversity of native vegetation 
restoration. 
Source: Photo by Greening Australia.
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Engaging farmers is sometimes 
not enough
In many agricultural landscapes, significant conservation gains cannot 
be achieved just by fencing off a few on-farm remnants and planting 
shelter belts. In places, there is a need to buy the farm and restore the 
lot for public good conservation outcomes. 
Environmental NGOs, including the Tasmanian Land Conservancy, 
Bush Heritage, and Australian Wildlife Conservancy (and Greening 
Australia to a lesser extent), are doing just that — purchasing farms 
and pastoral properties in strategic locations and engaging in long-term 
restoration and conservation. To date, Bush Heritage Australia works 
across more than 4.8 million ha, including their own reserves and land 
owned by their partners. The Australian Wildlife Conservancy owns 
and manages 23 properties covering more than 3 million ha. The trusts 
for nature in Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria also facilitate 
private investment in purchasing farmland and converting tenure to 
conservation in perpetuity. 
Figure 5.3: eNGOs have purchased whole properties in 
strategic locations in southern Western Australia. These have 
formed the backbone of the biolink called Gondwana Link.
Source: Photo by David Salt.
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The entrepreneurial nature of many eNGOs allow them to be free to 
operate at a variety of scales and locations that would be difficult for 
government. These agricultural land purchases and environmental 
management changes by eNGOs contribute to the public estate of 
nature reserves, but have far greater flexibility in funding, purchasing, 
and management than is possible for government. In general, purchases 
by eNGOs appear to create much less local angst than government 
agencies purchasing farmland on the open market. The important 
role of eNGOs in contributing to the national conservation estate was 
recognised by the Australian Government’s National Reserve System 
Program, which co-invested in NGO conservation land purchases. 
For example, the National Reserve System Program has contributed 
more than $8 million to Bush Heritage Australia since 1999 to assist in 
the purchase of 11 protected areas covering 890,000 ha. This program 
has also invested more than $430,000 with the Tasmanian Land 
Conservancy and $6 million to the Australian Wildlife Conservancy for 
land purchases (www.environment.gov.au/land/nrs/getting-involved/
conservation-organisations). 
Making a profit is OK
Government and quasi-government environmental organisations are 
constrained by the political vagaries of annual budget allocations and 
zero-sum accounting (e.g. annual funding must be fully acquitted 
within the financial year). Environmental NGOs, as registered charities 
or not-for-profit businesses, can carry over funds from one year to the 
next. They can act as businesses and make a surplus (profit) that must 
be re-invested within the organisation (rather than paid out to private 
shareholders). NGOs can (and do) build financial reserves to support 
long-term strategic programs, as well as using reserves to maintain 
staff continuity and corporate memory (Maier et al. 2014). 
Such flexibility and governance structures (e.g. boards) continue to 
attract philanthropic investment from individuals and foundations. 
Philanthropy rarely donates funds to government agencies; rather, 
donations to eNGOs are effective in leveraging government co-
investment (see www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/bush 
telegraph/private-park-funding-slows/5888378). The history of 
Australian agri-environment schemes includes long-term involvement 
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of philanthropy, from the early days of Potter Foundation Farmland 
Plan (www.ianpotter.org.au/potter-farmland-plan) to the many 
thousands of individual small-scale donations to eNGOs, such as the 
Nature Conservancy, Bush Heritage Australia, and the Australian 
Wildlife Conservancy actively conserving biodiversity in agricultural 
landscapes across Australia. 
A voice for the voiceless
Environmental NGOs continue to have a significant role in lobbying 
governments to direct funding to the environment, including 
agri-environment schemes. The original National Landcare Program 
was initiated by a proposal arising from collaboration between the 
Australian Conservation Foundation and the National Farmers 
Federation. WWF gave a voice to Australia’s highly depleted temperate 
grasslands and was successful in securing government funding 
for grassland conservation, assisted by devolved grants to farmers. 
NGOs  have had a significant role in including farmland in Ramsar-
listed wetlands, such as the Gwydir and Macquarie Marshes in central 
NSW. Environmental NGOs have been influential in highlighting 
the global significance of the Great Western Woodlands of south 
west Western Australia (Watson et al. 2008) and Australia’s tropical 
savannas (Woinarski et al. 2007). Both these regions are dominated by 
agricultural (pastoral) uses.
As brokers between governments and private landholders, many 
eNGOs also provide a collective voice to progressive (green) farmers 
who may not be well represented by their often highly politicised 
state and national agricultural organisations, who are more focused on 
agricultural productivity issues than public good nature conservation. 
Many eNGOs have the time and talent to provide this voice through 
a myriad of conversations in capital cities where political power and 
funding reside. 
Conclusion: Still a role
Based on my personal involvement with agri-environment schemes 
and eNGOs over the past 20 years, I assert that a remarkable diversity 
of eNGOs have shaped and continue to shape agri-environment 
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schemes. These eNGOs have likewise been shaped by these schemes, 
largely funded by governments. These schemes would have been 
far less innovative, flexible, and responsive without this history of 
NGO involvement. eNGOs have a critical role in continuing to deliver 
innovation, efficiencies, and effectiveness in supporting significant 
public good outcomes from government investment in conservation 
on-farm. 
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Agricultural land use policy in the 




• Unforeseen consequences: the origins of the European Union’s land 
use policy was in setting aside agricultural land as an instrument of 
production control. It was not aimed at generating environmental 
benefits, and yet it ended up doing this as well.
• Carrots versus sticks: the European Union has felt (increasingly) 
socially empowered to use policy sticks on its farmers to deliver 
improved environmental goods and services from the agricultural 
landscape, whereas in the US and Australia policymakers have felt 
obliged to offer mainly carrots to farmers to do so.
• Environmental benefits versus foregone agricultural income: the 
UK is in the process of introducing a new Countryside Stewardship 
Scheme whereby applications to participate will be scored according 
to their fit with empirically validated attributes of environmental 
benefit. As a consequence, the cost-effectiveness of environmental 
stewardship in delivering benefits to society will be improved.
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Figure 6.1: Cattle in a UK field ringed by stone walls. 
Source: Photo by Colin virden.
This chapter provides both a brief history of agricultural land use 
policy as a component of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
European Union (EU) and a discussion of some lessons learnt in this 
context. 
Note that the term ‘agricultural land use policy’ refers to the 
component  of the CAP which is now widely referred to as 
agri-environmental policy, because it relates (in policy terms) to the 
impact of food production on the environment within the specific 
context of the agricultural landscape. It focuses primarily on the 
impacts associated with habitats, species (flora and fauna), and water 
and soil quality rather that effects on other aspects of the environment 
such as the air or ocean — it is not concerned with greenhouse gas 
emissions, for example.
81
6 . AGRICULTURAL LAND USE POLICy IN ThE EUROPEAN UNION
A brief history
The CAP’s agricultural land use policy has a comparatively short 
history, having been introduced in the form of voluntary set-aside as 
a production control mechanism in the CAP’s ‘crisis years’ of the late 
1980s, when the cost of funding ongoing production surpluses of the 
EU’s major farm commodities threatened to derail the CAP’s budget. 
In this context, the most comprehensive and up-to-date account of 
the history of the CAP is provided by the European Commission on its 
website: ec.europa/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm.
According to the European Commission, the CAP is characterised 
as comprising three main stages:
i. from 1957 — productivity
ii. from the 1992 CAP reform — competitiveness
iii. from the Agenda 2000 CAP reform — sustainability
In this account, the CAP’s agricultural land use policy is formally 
introduced as a compliance land set-aside program within the package 
of the 1992 CAP reforms. Its aim was to improve competitiveness 
in EU agriculture. (In this program, farmers were required to take 
a stipulated proportion of their arable land out of production in 
order to receive compensation payments for reductions in previous 
(guaranteed) levels of price support.) This characterisation overlooks 
the earlier introduction of voluntary set-aside (in 1988), but in so 
doing emphasises the new (in 1992) requirement of set-aside in order 
to receive compensatory payments for reductions in price support, 
which were central to the 1992 CAP reform package. 
Moreover, the sustainability characterisation represents the formal 
creation of ‘Pillar 2’ as part of the CAP, and the explicit recognition 
of farmers as environmental stewards, who became (in 2003) not just 
required to keep their land in good agricultural and environmental 
condition in order to receive direct payments (previously called 
compensatory payments), but were also offered further financial 
incentives to protect and enhance their provision of environmental 
goods and services on their land. (‘Pillar 1’ is the term used to refer 
to EU budget funding for direct payments; ‘Pillar 2’ is the term used 
to refer to EU budget funding for environmental stewardship.)
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Looking ahead, as the CAP moves towards 2020 we can already see 
proposals to shift more of the CAP’s budget from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2, 
thereby further strengthening the role of the CAP’s agricultural land 
use policy as one of supporting environmental sustainability, with 
farmers as central providers of environmental benefits from this 
support.
The goal of productivity
If we go back to the 1980s, to what the European Commission calls the 
CAP’s ‘crisis years’, with the benefit of hindsight we can clearly see 
the beginnings of the agricultural land use policy process by which 
farmers have now come to be seen as environmental stewards, rather 
than destroyers of the environment, as they were at the time. 
Recalling that the first stage of the CAP is characterised by the European 
Commission as ‘productivity’, we are reminded that one of the principle 
objectives of creating the European Economic Community in 1957 was 
to deliver food security. As a consequence, farmers were encouraged 
to increase their production with a range of market intervention 
measures designed to provide price support (e.g. tariffs, intervention 
purchasing). In response to this price support, farmers did take steps 
to increase their production, both by the intensification (increasing 
yields on a given area of land) and extensification (increasing the area 
under agricultural production) of land use. 
This productivity stage continued successfully through the 1960s and 
1970s, at which point ongoing production surpluses began to become 
apparent, initially in the dairy sector but by the early 1980s extending 
across the range of the EU’s major farm commodities.
These production surpluses can now be seen as the cause of two 
separate concerns that developed during the 1980s. The first was the 
policy concern relating to the CAP’s budget, which was required to 
fund the (supported) prices of surplus farm commodities. The second 
was a social concern, relating to the perceived negative effect of 
the intensification and extensification of agricultural land use on the 
environment.
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The first concern led to the realisation that steps needed to be taken to 
control farm production within the EU. How might this be achieved? 
Across the Atlantic, the US had developed a land-diversion policy 
as a production control mechanism in the 1985 Farm Bill (see Ervin 
1988). Following this lead, the EU took its first step into the domain 
of an agricultural land use policy by introducing voluntary set-aside 
in 1988. This embryonic policy offered a carrot to farmers in the 
form of set-aside payments to take a proportion of their land out of 
production. However, given the level of these payments compared 
with the foregone production income (with supported prices) from 
set-aside land, the incentive for farmers to engage with the policy was 
very weak, and the uptake was therefore very low.
Environmental concerns
Meanwhile, developing alongside this policy concern was the social 
concern about environmental degradation caused by the intensification 
and extensification of agricultural land use. In relation to intensification, 
supported prices gave farmers the incentive to increase yields with 
the addition of fertiliser, leading specifically to the problem of nitrate 
leaching affecting groundwater. This was of particular concern in areas 
where groundwater was used to provide potable water for domestic 
consumption. In addition, this price support encouraged farmers to 
maximise the area of their land under production, thereby leading to 
the destruction of habitats (e.g. hedgerows, native woodland).
This social concern gave rise to calls in the academic literature for 
conservation set-aside to be introduced — to deliver a policy win–
win by encouraging farmers to take land out of production which 
would also deliver environmental benefits (see, for example, Gasson 
and Potter 1988). While there is no doubt that the formal introduction 
of voluntary set-aside as an agricultural land use policy in 1988, 
and its modification in the 1992 CAP reform to compliance set-aside, 
was driven primarily by the EU’s ongoing production surpluses and 
the associated crisis in the CAP’s budget, this social concern in the 
1980s was undoubtedly a precursor to the subsequent policy process 
in the late 1990s. This led to the introduction of the environmental 
‘sustainability’ stage of the CAP with the Agenda 2000 reforms. 
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While this social concern about the negative impact of farming on 
the environment was developing further into the 1990s, so was the 
policy awareness that the CAP’s voluntary set-aside scheme was not 
delivering sufficient production control. In this context, the EC’s 
website detailing the history of the CAP (see above) contains an 
excellent package of information about the development of the 1992 
CAP reform (known also as the MacSharry reform). 
Specifically, it was acknowledged that price support was at the 
centre of the production surplus problem, and so this needed to be 
reduced, encouraging the de-intensification of agricultural land use. 
In  addition, the evolution of the CAP’s agricultural land use policy 
from voluntary to compliance set-aside was intended to encourage the 
de-extensification of agricultural land use. The only risk to compliance 
set-aside was that farmers would choose to forego their compensatory 
payment for reduced price support in order to keep all their land in 
production. As it turned out, this risk proved to be extremely low.
As a consequence, the implementation of the 1992 CAP reform saw 
the amelioration of the EU’s production surplus problem. And while 
compliance set-aside played its role in this process, academic analysis 
of the land-use response of farmers to their set-aside requirement 
also revealed the policy win–win anticipated by the movement for 
conservation set-aside in the 1980s. This situation applied particularly 
to what was called ‘non-rotational set-aside’, whereby land was set-
aside for at least five years. This was always the set-aside option widely 
preferred by farmers.
Striving for sustainability
This reduced concern about the CAP budget, combined with the 
growing social awareness of the environmental impacts of agricultural 
land use, led to increased support for further CAP reform to raise the 
profile of environmental considerations in its operation — hence the 
‘sustainability’ stage of the CAP introduced with the Agenda 2000 
reform. 
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The creation of Pillar 2 was central to the Agenda 2000 CAP reform. 
Pillar 2 provided explicit financial support for the ‘integration of 
environmental concerns into agricultural policy’ (see the Agenda 2000 
reform page of the European Commission’s History of the CAP website). 
Although set-aside was retained as an agricultural land use policy 
within this reform, increasingly farmers were encouraged to see their 
set-aside land in terms of the policy win–win — production control 
plus environmental benefit. 
Moreover, as previously noted, this policy impetus towards 
environmental stewardship by farmers was maintained with the 
2003 CAP reform, which both de-coupled direct payments from 
production and introduced cross-compliance, whereby farmers were 
required to keep their land in good agricultural and environmental 
condition in order to receive direct payments. In addition, there was 
a further shift of CAP financial support from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2 — 
known as ‘modulation’, resulting in the development of voluntary 
environmental stewardship schemes such as the UK’s Higher Level 
Stewardship Scheme. 
So successful was the refocusing of the CAP’s agricultural land use 
policy towards environmental sustainability that the decision was taken 
in 2008 to abolish set-aside. By this time, production surpluses were 
a thing of the past, and social support for farmers to be incentivised 
to protect and enhance environmental goods and services had become 
commonplace. 
Moreover, given the increased exposure of farmers to production 
income risk from market price volatility (following reduced price 
support), farmers themselves were becoming increasingly attracted 
to the certain income stream associated with participating in 
environmental stewardship schemes. Schemes such as the English 
Higher Level Stewardship Scheme became increasingly important to 
farmers in determining agricultural land use. It is now a common sight 
to see field margins and buffer strips side-by-side with crops as joint 
features of agricultural land use.
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Figure 6.2: Hedgerows (in this picture with oak tree) can be 
now be counted as part of Ecological Focus Areas on farms. 
Farmers in the EU need to set aside a portion of their land 
to such uses in order to be eligible for CAP payments. 
Source: Photo by Tom hynes, CCBy‑SA 3.0.
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Lessons learnt
Unforeseen consequences
Set-aside was introduced as a production control instrument. 
However, what became clear during the 1990s was that, in being 
forced to set aside agricultural land, farmers were delivering enhanced 
environmental benefits from that land both in terms of reduced 
negative consequences, such as nitrate pollution and soil erosion 
from cropping, and in terms of increased positive consequences, such 
as improved habitats (see Rygnestad and Fraser 1999 for research 
findings in support of these consequences). That is, the reality of the 
compliance set-aside policy was that farmers, in taking the land out 
of production that was least detrimental to their production income, 
were also de-extensifying their land use in ways that were delivering a 
win–win for the levels of environmental goods and services provided 
by agricultural land.
This evidence set the European Commission on the path of developing 
an agricultural land use policy within the Agenda 2000 CAP. Although 
it was based on the concept of set-aside as a production-control policy, 
it transformed itself into a policy that saw farmers as environmental 
stewards, charged with the task of managing their agricultural land 
to provide environmental goods and services for society, and being 
appropriately remunerated for this provision within the CAP’s budget. 
The recently revealed CAP Reform 2014–2020 has seen the 
re-introduction of set-aside as a requirement, although it is now to be 
called an ‘Ecological Focus Area’ (initially 5 per cent of land, rising to 
7 per cent in 2017). 
Carrots versus sticks
The EU was quick to move its agricultural land use policy into the 
realms of compulsory participation by farmers (and is set to move 
further with the Ecological Focus Area of the CAP Reform 2014–2020). 
Why have other developed countries such as the US and Australia not 
taken this step? 
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I don’t think this difference is to do with the history of government 
support for farm incomes — the US is not unlike the EU in having a 
long tradition of supporting farmers’ incomes with taxation receipts, 
whereas in Australia there is only a history of taxpayer-funding for 
drought relief. 
Rather, I think this difference is more likely to be due to different 
perceptions between these countries in the level of demand by society 
for the provision of environmental goods and services from agricultural 
land. These demand differences probably have their origins in the 
proportion of the population living in or close to the agricultural 
landscape, and therefore more exposed to the environmental problems 
created by the farming of this landscape. 
As a consequence, I think the EU has felt (increasingly) socially 
empowered to use policy sticks on its farmers to deliver improved 
environmental goods and services from the agricultural landscape, 
whereas in the US and Australia policymakers have felt obliged to 
mainly offer carrots to farmers to do so. 
Environmental benefits versus foregone 
agricultural income 
The success of environmental stewardship in the UK in terms of 
improving the provision of environmental goods and services from 
the agricultural landscape has been largely based on the voluntary 
participation of farmers in what is called the ‘Higher Level Stewardship 
Scheme’. In this context, two of the most popular (with farmers) 
scheme options are field margins, whereby a farmer leaves a 4–5 metre 
margin around each cropped field, and buffer strips, whereby a farmer 
leaves a substantial uncropped strip of land which is adjacent to a 
waterway, wetland, or woodland area. Farmers receive the estimated 
foregone cropping income from these set-aside areas, even though this 
is, in most cases, an overestimation of the productivity of such land. 
Recent empirical research in the UK has revealed that society places 
higher values on some components of the overall agricultural landscape 
than others (particularly upland areas compared with lowland 
areas), and that the extent to which people benefit from agricultural 
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landscape depends on its location — with areas of landscape closer to 
large population centres having higher overall social value (see, for 
example, Garrod et al. 2014).
As a consequence, the UK is in the process of introducing a new 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme, whereby applications to participate 
will be scored according to their fit with these empirically validated 
environmental benefit landscape attributes so that, although payments 
to farmers will still be based on foregone agricultural income, at least 
the cost-effectiveness of environmental stewardship in delivering 
benefits to society will be improved. 
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A brief history of agri‑environment 
policy in Australia: From 




• Australia’s agri-environment policy began in the 1980s. 
Early  measures focused on community-based NRM, increasing 
awareness, and building social capital through Landcare.
• The perceived success of these early efforts enabled a ramping 
up of government investment through the Natural Heritage Trust 
and successive programs.
• There have been repeated failures to demonstrate measurable 
outcomes from this increased investment.
• This has led to a greater focus on targeted, strategic, and accountable 
programs. 
• The capacities required to effectively deliver these programs have 
been inadequately addressed.
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Figure 7.1: Early measures in agri‑environment policy focused 
on community‑based NRM. 
Source: Photo by Greening Australia.
A very brief history
A very brief history of agri-environment policy in Australia would 
read something like this: It began back in the 1980s. It started small and 
focused on engaging the community and building capacity. It rested 
heavily on a volunteer effort. Initial efforts were well received and 
the size of the investment grew during the 1990s. However, despite 
increased levels of investment, agri-environment programs failed to 
produce enduring environmental outcomes. This failure has led more 
recent programs to focus on specific environmental assets through the 
application of a suite of market-based instruments (MBIs).
It sounds pretty dry when summarised like this, but the bottom line 
is that agri-environment schemes in Australia have not improved 
biodiversity or reversed the ongoing degradation of land and water 
resources. Farming is the country’s major land use, it always has been, 
and Australia’s governments have invested significant amounts of 
money in programs in our agricultural landscapes — most commonly 
referred to in the literature as agri-environment programs — that aim 
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to reverse these declines. To date, after spending well over $6.5 billion, 
this investment hasn’t produced many enduring environmental 
outcomes (Hajkowicz 2009).
This chapter seeks to expand on this very brief history. It will discuss 
the rise of the agri-environment and the widespread concern that 
investments in this space are not working. It will also touch on the 
counter view that the greater targeting and the complementary use of 
market instruments to deliver this investment may be sacrificing some 
of the gains made in earlier rounds.
The emergence of the agri-environment
While the literature talks about agri-environment policy, the 
term ‘agri-environment’ is not one you’ll hear much out on any 
Australian farm. It’s a description that originated in Europe as part 
of the Common  Agricultural Policy (see Chapter 6 by Rob Fraser). 
Anecdotal feedback suggests Australian farmers regard the notion of 
agri-environment as ‘smelling a bit Euro’ (conveying a widespread 
feeling in the Australian agricultural sector that European farming 
receives too much government support and protection).
In Australia, the term more commonly used is ‘natural resource 
management’ (NRM), though this term is unacceptably broad for our 
purposes as it covers a wide range of issues that fall well outside of the 
farming landscape (e.g. the management of national parks). So, in this 
chapter (and this book), we keep with the term ‘agri-environment’ 
and use it mainly as an adjective describing government investment in 
environmental programs on agricultural land. But the agri-environment 
is also a concept embodying the notion that our agricultural lands 
aren’t just about the production of saleable commodities (e.g. food and 
fibre). They are also a space that provides a range of ecosystem goods 
and services that are valued by the broader public (e.g. biodiversity 
and rural amenity). 
When did the agri-environment emerge? Well, of course, it’s always 
been there in terms of our rural landscapes being valued for multiple 
purposes, not just production (Watson 2014). Indeed, over the past 
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century the relative economic value of our agricultural lands has 
declined from 20 per cent of Australia’s GDP in 1901 to less than 
3 per cent in recent years (Hajkowicz 2009). 
However, it was during the 1980s that Australian governments, and 
particularly the federal government, began investing considerable 
amounts into these landscapes to protect these multiple values, moving 
from a purely commodity-based industry to one that included social, 
economic, and environmental outcomes (Clayton et al. 2011). 
Why then? There are many drivers behind this shift away from 
a single focus, but the 1980s was a time of many international and 
national conversations on conservation (with a World Conservation 
Strategy released in 1980, followed by a National Conservation 
Strategy for Australia in 1983) and sustainability (with the release of 
the groundbreaking Brundtland Report in 1987). 
The notion of sustainability was brought to the fore particularly in 
Australia with a historic drought ravaging our production landscapes. 
The connection between land degradation and sustainable production 
was given a high profile. Of course, dealing with environmental 
degradation was not a new thing in ‘the land of droughts and flooding 
rains’, and state governments had been establishing soil conservation 
committees to address soil erosion from the 1930s (just as the US 
established the Soil Conservation Service following the dust-bowl 
years). But it wasn’t until 1983 that the Commonwealth Government 
established an overarching process: the National Soil Conservation 
Program. This program undertook research, and provided advice and 
extension, with the aim of achieving cooperation between community, 
farmers, and government (Curtis et al. 2014). Starting from a small 
base, funding grew over the program’s life with over $10 million being 
spent in its final year of 1988/99 (Hajkowicz 2009). 
In addition to a growing national focus on how to deal with land 
degradation and conservation, the 1980s also saw community networks 
in the form of Landcare groups emerging in Victoria and Western 
Australia (with state government support). These networks facilitated 
education, raised awareness, and catalysed activities on the ground. 
Towards the end of the 1980s, an unprecedented alliance between the 
conservation lobby (the Australian Conservation Foundation) and the 
farmer lobby (the National Farmers Federation) proposed a Decade 
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of Landcare, in which community action would raise awareness and 
catalyse investment to repair and nurture the land (Curtis and De Lacy 
1998). The Australian Government accepted the proposal, and in 1989 
announced the funding of $360 million for a Decade of Landcare. 
The Landcare movement emphasised local responses to landscape-
wide challenges of national concern. It was hailed internationally as 
a remarkable initiative.
The National Landcare Program initially ran as part of the National 
Soil Conservation Program. Between 1990 and 1996 it was run as an 
independent program, and then through to 2008 as a subprogram of 
the Natural Heritage Trust. The National Landcare Program officially 
concluded in 2008, and has recently been resurrected by the current 
federal government. All of which reflects the patchwork history of 
this national program.
There was significant enthusiasm around the vision of Landcare. Local 
groups were encouraged to self-organise around land and water issues, 
with small amounts of short-term funding. The aim was to harness 
community spirit and catalyse greater investment from a number of 
sources rather than for government to provide most of the funding 
itself (Tennent and Lockie 2013). The approach proved popular: 
within five years of being established the movement had expanded 
from 200 local Landcare groups to 2,200 (Martin and Woodhill 1995). 
By 2004, there were some 4,500 groups, consisting of around 120,000 
volunteers, including 30 per cent of farmers. Some surveys even 
recorded that farmers who did not join Landcare groups believed 
that their properties had benefited from participation in Landcare 




The National Landcare Program signalled a significant increase in 
investment and interest in NRM across Australia. This ramp up in 
investment paralleled large increases in investment in NRM in the 
United States and the European Union (EU), albeit Australia was 
spending a fraction of the amounts they were investing (Hajkowicz 
2009). Around the world there was a growing societal concern about 
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environmental degradation, much of which was (and still is) connected 
to the intensification of agricultural production, and societal permission 
for farmers to be paid for the public good of environmental outputs. 
In the EU and the United States, these environmental payments 
were offered as an alternative way to continue government support 
to farmers, but in a manner that didn’t distort production or harm 
international trade. 
But the situation was different in Australia. At the end of the 1980s, 
the Australian Government wasn’t supporting farmers to the same 
degree as in the United States or the EU, and there was little trade 
protection on offer. This reflected Australia’s smaller population (and 
therefore smaller tax base) and considerably smaller agricultural 
sector. Yet the actual size of our agricultural estate is comparable to 
these other regions. 
The Australian Government simply didn’t have the available resources 
to protect and subsidise agriculture in the manner in which agriculture 
was supported in the EU and the United States. In Australia’s case, it 
wasn’t a matter of attempting to wean farmers off existing support. 
Because there was little existing support in Australia, there was no 
pool of funds available, as was the case in the United States and the EU. 
However, there was a common growing societal concern (from both 
the city and the country) about the environmental costs of agriculture. 
Landcare was an impressive achievement, and yet it was soon realised 
that building networks, raising awareness, and changing attitudes was 
not enough by itself. Significantly greater investment was required 
if Australia was to effectively tackle the multiple problems of soil 
erosion, water degradation, and biodiversity decline (Curtis 2000; 
Hajkowicz 2009).
What Landcare did demonstrate, however, was that government 
funding for environmental activity in regional Australia enjoyed 
widespread electoral support. Indeed, when the Australian 
Government controversially sold the national telecommunications 
company Telstra in 1997, it dedicated $1.3 billion from the sale 
towards a new national NRM program called the Natural Heritage 
Trust (NHT). This represented a quantum leap in NRM, received 
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widespread community support (Curtis et al. 2014), and went some 
way to assuaging the electorate’s concerns about the sale of a large 
public asset such as Telstra.
On paper it was a win–win — a means of providing support to an 
important constituency (the farming sector) in a politically acceptable 
fashion (payments for the environment) that would produce dividends 
for everyone (a healthier, productive landscape).
The only problem was that the promised environmental outcomes 
could not be measured. This was pointed out to the government by 
Australia’s national auditors on several occasions (see ANAO 2008 for 
a summary). The NHT was subsequently described as suffering from 
the Vegemite approach (a uniquely Australian description).1 In other 
words, the investment was spread too wide and too thinly to produce 
changes that could be readily observed. 
NRM evolution
The billion-dollar NHT didn’t counter the growing environmental 
threats facing Australia’s agricultural landscapes, indeed, what it 
had achieved couldn’t even be measured. What it did do, however, 
was set a benchmark for what the nation expected to be spent on 
environmental programs across our production zones. 
Following the NHT, four national NRM programs were rolled out 
over the following decade: a second round of the Natural Heritage 
Trust (NHT2), the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
(NAP), Caring for our Country (CfoC), and, most recently, a new 
version of the National Landcare Program. At the time of writing, this 
new National Landcare Program is still being formulated, so it won’t 
be discussed here. Each program was sold as a billion-dollar (plus) 
fix that would halt environmental decline and ensure the productive 
future of our agricultural landscapes. Figure 7.2 outlines the amounts 
committed to each program.
1  For non-Australian readers, it should be pointed out that Vegemite is an Australian food 
product: a black, oily, salty spread for toast and bread.
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Figure 7.2: The evolving focus of Australian NRM programs. 
Source: Modified from hajkowicz 2009. 
Figure 7.2 summarises the five major NRM programs that have been 
rolled out in Australia over the past quarter of a century. Together 
they have resulted in a total of over $6.5 billion in expenditure. Stefan 
Hajkowicz frames this roll out as an evolution that proceeded through 
three phases (Hajkowicz 2009). He labelled these as awareness raising 
(phase one), building institutional capacity (phase two), and towards 
direct payments (phase three). This categorisation has proved quite 
popular in the academic literature, with several authors using it 
as a frame for their own examination of this period. (For excellent 
accounts of the history of NRM investment policy in Australia see 
Morrison et al. 2010; Clayton et al. 2011; and Tennent and Lockie 2013, 
all of which use the categorisation described by Hajkowicz).
In broad brush strokes, phase one marks the birth of community-
based NRM through the establishment and growth of Landcare, and 
the ramp up of environmental spending to billion-dollar programs. 
Phase one elevated community-based NRM to centre stage and met 
with strong electoral support. But it didn’t address the environmental 
degradation that prompted it. Phase two saw an effort to respond to 
criticisms that these earlier investments, while changing attitudes 
and building social networks, weren’t achieving improvements in 
resource conditions. Problems of salinity, soil erosion, water pollution, 
and biodiversity decline seemed to continue unabated. In response, 
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a greater focus was placed on strategy and regional delivery with 
program funding being delivered via regional catchment management 
authorities (CMAs). 
Phase two saw the development of regional bodies to better target 
the investment to regional needs while assisting in the delivery of 
resources in a more strategic manner. 
In 2000, the Australian Government released a new NAP and in 2002 
the next version of the NHT. Both were to be delivered by these 
regional bodies, with funding being dependent on proposals aligning 
with regional plans. The regional scale was considered appropriate 
to support NRM, as it is holistic and comprehensive (Curtis et al. 
2014). It was expected that this regional empowerment would be 
complementary to Landcare, which still operated at the local level.
Phase three saw NHT2 being replaced by CfoC, with the Australian 
Government adopting a more centralised, strategic, and competitive 
approach to NRM. A key component of this approach involved direct 
payments to farmers through MBIs. For several years, Australian 
Governments had been experimenting with MBIs, with a focus 
on reverse auctions in which farmers were asked to tender for the 
provision  of specified environmental actions and the government 
selected those bids that gave them greatest value for their money. 
(This  was the manner in which money was given out for the 
Environmental Stewardship Program, described in Chapter 3.) Some 
claim MBIs are an effective and efficient way to allocate resources 
(e.g.  Stoneham et al. 2003). Others are worried that the claims of 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness have not been substantiated, and that 
we don’t yet have functioning markets for environmental services 
(Curtis and Lefroy 2010).
Evolution or devolution?
Viewed as a phased progression, as set out by Hajkowicz (2009), 
it might be said that NRM policy in Australia has grown more 
sophisticated and efficient over its 25-year history, harnessing a 
wider range of tools and players; that each phase has developed 
new strategies and capacities that have underpinned subsequent 
investments. Community awareness and social capital developed in 
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
100
the first phase complemented (and  underpinned) growing regional 
capacity and strategy development in the second phase. The roll out 
of MBIs guided by various environmental benefit indexes in phase 
three builds on top of the community capacity building of phase one 
and regional capacity building of phase two.
Indeed, Hajkowicz’s progression finishes with the promise of the 
delivery of a new Environmental Stewardship Program as part of 
CfoC that will target ‘matters of significant interest’ (e.g. threatened 
ecosystems) through direct payments to farmers which will result in 
contracts that last up to 15 years — significantly longer than earlier 
schemes and more in accord with time frames of the ecological processes 
the scheme is attempting to protect (see Chapter 3 by Emma Burns and 
colleagues for a summary of the Environmental Stewardship Program). 
Promoting the scheme and collecting information on the suitability of 
bids would be done in conjunction with the regional CMAs, and there 
were significant resources put aside for monitoring and evaluation 
of those bids that ended up receiving contracts. In many ways, this 
confirms the suggestion of an evolution of policy that is learning and 
improving with each successive round.
Yet there is a growing counter view as well, suggesting that the earlier 
achievements made through Landcare and the development of regional 
delivery have been forgotten, and that the stocks of human and social 
capital that were developed during these earlier times have been 
degraded and lost. Some have suggested that our drive for efficiency 
may have come at the cost of effectiveness (Curtis and Lefroy 2010). 
Several audit reports on national NRM programs have pointed out 
that a lack of monitoring of outcomes and a focus on outputs rather 
than outcomes has made it impossible to determine whether this new 
approach is working (ANAO 2008, 2014).
Evidence has emerged of declining membership in community 
Landcare groups in parts of Western Australia, Victoria and New South 
Wales. Volunteer burn out has been reported in many places, with 
many community Landcare groups in sleeper mode or ceasing to exist 
(Tennent and Lockie 2013). One of the designers of Landcare recently 
described the program as little more than ‘a threadbare patchwork 
quilt of tired volunteers, waiting for the next government program 
with a new website, a new logo, a new departmental name, and less 
money than it had before’ (Bush Telegraph 2014).
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When NHT2 and NAP were rolled out, support for Landcare was 
supposed to flow through the regional CMAs: Landcare provided 
the grass-roots knowledge, volunteers and connections; CMAs 
provided the regional targets, strategy and expert knowledge. But 
the experience in many places was of competition and displacement 
rather than complementarity and cooperation.
With CfoC, the regional CMAs found their role in the delivery 
of community-based NRM constrained, with a reduction in base 
funding, increased competition with a wider range of organisations, 
increased transaction costs, and the need to align projects to national 
priorities. In some cases, regional bodies redirected support away 
from Landcare support, cutting the available workforce in Victoria, 
as one example, by more than half (Curtis et al. 2014). At the same 
time, state governments were making large cuts to NRM expenditure 
across Australia, translating to a 40–50 per cent reduction in funding 
to regional bodies in New South Wales and Victoria (Curtis et al. 2014).
It seemed to some observers that while the government had been 
devolving responsibility to regions and local groups to affect landscape 
change, it hadn’t been passing down the authority or agency, or even 
the necessary resources, to underpin the required effort (Wallington 
et al. 2008). Indeed, given the lack of measurable outcomes from 
previous investment in community-based NRM, it has been suggested 
that governments were introducing MBIs as a way of controlling 
farmers’ behaviour.
This raises a major tension. On the one hand, a collaborative approach 
is still held up as an important dimension of NRM funding and 
management — that investment should cultivate and work through 
partnerships between individuals (farmers), groups (Landcare), 
regions (CMAs), and government (state and federal). Indeed, such 
an approach is consistent with the government’s neoliberal agenda 
of shifting responsibilities from governments to communities and 
individuals. However, on the other hand, this evolution has seen the 
original intent of empowering communities changing to one where 
these bodies have simply become on-ground implementation agents of 
strategies decided elsewhere, largely within a centralised government 
(Lockwood and Davidson 2010). 
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The baby and the bathwater
This brings us back to our very brief history of agri-environment 
policy. Agri-environment policy began in the 1980s as an effort to arrest 
declining environmental conditions in our agricultural landscapes. It 
took off as a partnership, and sought to empower communities and 
regions. But it didn’t fix the things it was set up to fix, so, over the 
years, it progressively moved the emphasis from empowerment to 
targeted grants focused on specific environmental assets. It switched 
from building adaptive capacity and raising awareness, which is 
extremely hard to quantify and measure, to a focus on investing in 
specific actions on definable things. It moved from cultivating an 
ethic rooted in collaboration, sharing, and volunteerism to a culture 
of benefit–cost analysis and fee for service. We are much better placed 
to define and measure what we should be doing, but have lost sight 
of the suite of community capacities that enable those actions to be 
effectively undertaken.
Australia is currently seeing the roll-out of a new national billion-
dollar program named the National Landcare Programme, which will 
involve planting many trees (the target is 20 million), a Green Army 
(to establish on-ground works while training young and unemployed 
Australians), and speaks the rhetoric of empowering regional Australia. 
Whether it succeeds or sustains our track record of failure will likely 
depend on whether we have the capacity to learn from our quarter of 
a century of effort in the agri-environment space.
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Can recognition of ecosystem 




• Ecosystem services thinking explicitly brings farmers and their 
activity into the framework for decision-making and provides 
a  model communicating the benefits of nature conservation that 
is effective for some audiences.
• Communicating the benefits of ecosystem services to landholders 
can promote the advantages of nature conservation actions in their 
landscapes, increasing adoption and community support.
• We should not assume that ecosystem services and biodiversity 
conservation always pull in the same direction for land use 
decision-making.
• Ecosystem services thinking can help to identify stakeholders and 
beneficiaries in a way that improves policy design.
• Management to improve ecosystem services sometimes requires 
a deeper understanding of ecosystems than we currently have.
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Nature conservation policies have increasingly invoked ecosystem 
services as part of their rationale. What were formerly biodiversity 
polices are now increasingly communicated as policies for biodiversity 
and ecosystem services. Views on this shift range from those who 
argue that ecosystem services thinking is not particularly useful to 
conservation policy (e.g. Srivastava and Vellend 2005) through to those 
who argue that the vision is beginning to have real impact (e.g. Daily 
et al. 2009). Agri-environment schemes are particularly pertinent in 
this debate, because they target conservation outcomes in production-
oriented landscapes. In this chapter, I examine the extent to which 
incorporating ecosystem services concepts into policy can affect both 
the targeting of outcomes and encouraging uptake and engagement in 
agri-environment schemes. 
Ecosystem services thinking
The essential feature of ecosystem services thinking is to explicitly 
focus on the values that people derive from nature, unashamedly 
placing humans at the centre of things. In this way it contrasts to 
philosophies that emphasise the inherent values of nature, in 
particular the idea that nature has a right to exist, or that it has an 
intrinsic value that humans should act to preserve. The boundary 
between these perspectives can be messy because some ecosystem 
services frameworks include cultural values. Rather than being drawn 
into the literature on definitions, here I will use ‘ecosystem services’ 
thinking to denote frameworks that put more emphasis on the ways in 
which nature serves people with things we use (e.g. food and water) or 
processes that benefit us (e.g. crop pollination, pest control, nutrient 
cycling). This is in contrast with classical biodiversity conservation 
thinking, which aims to maximise the preservation of species and 
genetic diversity.
Combining ecosystem services thinking with biodiversity conservation 
thinking is relatively simple if the two are tightly linked. If protecting 
biodiversity is the best route to protect ecosystem services, then the 
two goals would appear to be extremely compatible. Sure enough, 
the pattern from extensive reviews of the literature indicate that, 
in general, more diverse communities tend to support better ecosystem 
services (e.g. Cardinale et al. 2006), especially if one considers stability 
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over time in the assessment (simplified systems might have high 
levels of provision in some circumstances, but do not respond well to 
perturbation). 
One fundamental rationale for adopting a nature conservation strategy 
hinges on the idea of protecting these ecosystem services; in this way, 
the ecosystem services perspective is closely aligned with the idea 
of sustainability. However, it is not always the case that the goals 
of biodiversity conservation and ecosystem services protection are 
always and everywhere in step (Macfadyen et al. 2012). If, for example, 
one were to assess a landscape and design a system of protected areas 
to maximise conservation of biodiversity, and then compare it with 
a system that optimised for water yield, carbon sequestration, and 
pest control (three example ecosystem services), one would no doubt 
produce different protected area networks. This is because, at the 
landscape scale, a focus on species conservation pulls in different 
directions to a focus on services, and one ecosystem service might 
pull in a different direction to another. 
Ecosystem services in agricultural 
landscapes
Conservation goals and strategies depend on the landscape in question. 
Agricultural landscapes are characterised by significant historical 
loss of biodiversity and great emphasis on utilitarian production 
values (i.e. the provision of food and fibre). It is in this context that 
ecosystem services thinking will be most likely to influence the uptake 
of conservation actions and the design of strategies. Indeed, pure 
biodiversity-focused strategies will often downgrade the relevance 
of conservation in agricultural landscapes, compared with other 
landscapes which are less modified by people, because much native 
biodiversity is already lost. It is important, though, to recognise that 
ecosystem services are relevant to farmers in three quite distinct 
ways (see Figure 8.1). First, farmers manage their land to provide 
one of the key ecosystem services to broader society (i.e. food and 
fibre). Protection of this service means maintaining farming in the 
landscape. Second, agricultural practice requires the support of a raft 
of ecosystem services. The benefit of these services flows primarily 
to the farmer, and second to society that uses the food and fibre. 
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Third, farmers have the potential to manage their land for a range of 
ecosystem services for the benefit of broader society rather than for 
themselves — by sequestering carbon and thereby reducing the risk 
of climate change, for example. If ecosystem services thinking is going 
to be used to shape agri-environment schemes, the different kinds of 
benefit flow described in this framework need to be understood by 
policymakers.
Figure 8.1: Wasps help to control pests in agricultural systems 
and pollinate crops and native species.
Source: Photo by Saul Cunningham.
Reflecting on the fact that farmers provide society with food and 
fibre is important in terms of validating the role of agriculture in 
the landscape, and recognising the value of that land use to society. 
But it does not follow that all agricultural practice is justified by 
the need for food and fibre. Some conservation planning exercises 
include production in a cost–benefit analysis, asking if the cost of a 
conservation action (in terms of lost production) is justified in terms 
of the benefit (in  terms of nature saved) (e.g. Hodgson et al. 2010). 
This approach leads into the land sparing/land sharing spectrum of 
choices, discussed in Chapter 9. The pragmatic reality is that land 
use decisions will always be influenced by use values, and so the 
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production side of the equation will always affect the decision, even if 
it is not in a formal cost–benefit analysis. The effectiveness of payments 
to landholders to effect land use change will, of course, depend on the 
production values of land.
Recognising and communicating benefits
Ecosystem services that support agricultural activity can be 
considered private benefits (see chapters 14 and 18) because there is 
a direct economic pay-off if farmers increase them. For example, if 
protection of native grasslands around a field margin increases pest 
control and crop pollination on farm, this would be a private benefit 
to the farmer, albeit linked to nature conservation. But there are 
great challenges in using these kinds of benefit to motivate land use 
change (see Chapter 12). In most cases, farmers will not have enough 
information to guide practice change to exploit these benefits. Often 
the benefit of improvement in one particular ecosystem service will 
not be great enough to justify the cost (e.g. lost area of production). 
The  benefit may also require land use changes on a scale beyond 
the area of a single farm, and therefore beyond the scope of a single 
landholder’s decision-making. For example, benefits of natural pest 
control might be influenced by non-crop vegetation that is kilometres 
away, and therefore require cooperation among neighbours to 
achieve. There may also be a lot of uncertainty around the reliability 
in supply of the ecosystem service over time and space compared with 
the relative certainty associated with agronomic inputs, invoking 
new risks.
For these reasons, the use of ecosystem services strategies to increase 
the adoption of on-farm nature conservation requires landholders and 
policymakers to have a high level of understanding of the system, and 
an honest assessment of the economic challenges facing farmers. In 
many circumstances, ecosystem services benefits may only partially 
offset the costs of nature conservation practices. The nature and 
magnitude of costs and benefits are likely to vary according to the 
economic and biophysical characteristics of the type of production 
system (e.g. annual cropping versus grazing). Benefits are likely to be 
greatest when combined with strategic assessment of the productivity 
of different parts of the farm, so that poor areas for production are 
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relinquished but ecosystem services benefits are realised. Public policy 
has a potentially significant role in helping farmers to make the changes 
that lead to these private benefits from ecosystem services.
Ecosystem services that farmers, as land managers, provide to 
society can be considered public benefits (see Figure 8.1). Farmers 
are unlikely to make costly changes to farm practice simply to 
support benefits to broader society, unless they are encouraged by 
incentives (see Chapter 4). In most cases, however, land use change 
in the interest of public benefit (such as management of streamside 
vegetation to support clean water downstream) will also influence 
nature conservation outcomes and sometimes even private benefits, 
such as shade and shelter for stock. In practice, one needs to assess 
all these dimensions. One of the strengths of the ecosystem services 
paradigm is in making sense of these private and public benefits in a 
way that can support cost-effective investments.
The social acceptability of land management action is likely to be 
greatest if advocates are effective in communicating the multiple 
benefits — private benefits, public benefits, and nature conservation 
benefits — associated with the change. Participation in native 
vegetation management programs in Australia was motivated by a 
mix of drivers, including ecosystem service benefits to the farm along 
with nature conservation (see Chapter 12). Payments for stewardship 
or, for example, carbon farming will attract some landholders who 
are sympathetic to the program, even if the payments are modest. 
But one can expect wider acceptance of these programs (even at 
the same payment level) if there is an understanding that the land 
use changes will provide private ecosystem services benefits to 
the farmer in addition to the ecosystem service and biodiversity 
conservation outcomes recognised by broader society (Lin et al. 2013). 
The idea of recognising these co-benefits is particularly relevant for 
the relationship between biodiversity conservation and ecosystem 
services, because while they are not necessarily jointly optimised by 
the same actions, any given action for one is likely to lead to a marginal 
benefit in the other, compared to the alternative scenario of no land 
use change. Well targeted incentives, such as payments for fencing, 
might play an important role in supporting landholders to take up 
these opportunities. 
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Figure 8.2: A wheat crop amongst bushland. 
Source: Photo by Belinda Gibson.
To this point, I have argued that an ecosystem services perspective 
has the potential to drive better engagement in conservation policies 
in agricultural landscapes, but also that there are substantial 
knowledge gaps. In particular, it is difficult to argue that there are 
benefits to farmers, or even to broader society, unless we have a good 
understanding of the natural systems we are dealing with. We have 
enough understanding to promote some general principles that 
suggest biodiversity and ecosystem service benefits are supported by 
protection of habitat remnants. For example, conserving patches of 
native vegetation in agricultural landscapes is known to support crop 
pollinators (Garibaldi et al. 2011). But it is more challenging to advise 
a landholder on the specific benefits that can be expected to flow 
from a given investment in ecological restoration, and by how much 
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
114
and under what circumstances these services will improve a farmer’s 
bottom line. The outcome considering multiple benefits is more likely 
to be positive than that from a single ecosystem service, but also more 
complex to determine (Olschewski et al. 2010). It is also important 
to remember that while the ecosystem services perspective promotes 
engagement with some people, there are others who are put off by 
the utilitarian perspective of nature. Ecosystem services ideas should 
be used strategically as a means of communicating some values from 
nature, not as a replacement to pre-existing frameworks for nature 
conservation.
Paying for ecosystem services
A large part of the literature on ecosystem services focuses on 
economic valuations of ecosystem services and the conceptualising 
and design of markets or payment systems, so that money flows from 
the beneficiaries of the service to those who pay the cost of land 
management. While this has attracted a lot of attention, conservation 
strategies in Australia have not yet been substantially influenced 
by payments for ecosystem services programs. In this respect, talk 
appears to have outstripped action. But this does not mean that 
ecosystem services thinking has no relevance to nature conservation 
strategies. Payments for carbon sequestration are still on the political 
agenda and have the potential to affect nature conservation in some 
agricultural landscapes. It is wrong to judge the impact of ecosystem 
services thinking by focusing only on the degree to which payment 
strategies have been implemented. The best nature conservation 
strategies should address the sustainability of human well-being, 
as well as conservation of biodiversity per se, and this broader goal 
can be guided by ecosystem services frameworks. A focus on the 
utilitarian values of nature is required to get the best engagement 
from the landholders that manage most of the landscape, especially in 
agricultural landscapes (Goldstein et al. 2012).
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Broader society



















Figure 8.3: This framework highlights ecosystem services that 
are most relevant to farmers.
Source: Author’s research.
Note: Purple text names ecosystem services that are widely recognised in the general 
literature. The arrows indicate how these services flow from ecosystems to human society 
in general, and what role farmers have in this flow. The framework deliberately separates two 
different roles that farmers play: their primary role as producers, and their secondary role 
as land managers. The large purple arrow highlights the obvious major ecosystem service: 
the provision of food and fibre. The blue arrows highlight the services that ecosystems 
provide to farmers, supporting their production activity (i.e. private benefits). The green 
arrows identify services that ecosystems provide to society in general (i.e. public benefits), 
which farmers can influence substantially in their role as land managers.
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A perspective on land sparing 
versus land sharing
Anna Renwick and Nancy Schellhorn
Key lessons
• Agri-environment schemes have the potential to increase 
biodiversity in productive landscapes.
• The land sparing/land sharing framework uses trade-offs between 
agricultural yield and biodiversity to choose between two ways 
of achieving biodiversity conservation in agricultural landscapes, 
but its simplicity has generated considerable debate.
• Land sharing and land sparing represent a false dichotomy. 
Strategies for biodiversity conservation in agro-ecosystems form 
a continuum between these two extremes.
• Using different measures of diversity, considering the appropriate 
scale, and incorporating land use history and social factors will 
enable more robust management decisions to be made which best 
support biodiversity and production in agro-ecosystems.
• Addressing these gaps in the current production/biodiversity 
trade-off will enable more efficient management plans to be 
implemented which are directly applicable for the design of 
agri-environment schemes.
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Introduction
Loss of biodiversity in agricultural landscapes is an important issue 
in conservation biology. Simultaneously, there is much concern 
over the ability to produce sufficient food to feed the growing 
global human population. There is often a disparity in the agendas 
of agriculturists and conservationists, with the former focusing on 
increasing production, often to the detriment of the environment, and 
the latter focusing on biodiversity conservation, with little interest 
in increasing food production (Foley et al. 2011). Agri-environment 
schemes, where farmers are paid through agri-environment subsidies 
to manage land primarily for wildlife, have been implemented in an 
attempt to conserve and prevent further declines in biodiversity on 
farmland. However, the effectiveness of these schemes, in terms of 
biodiversity conservation, has been questioned (Kleijn et al. 2011). 
They may also lead to reductions in crop yield (Kaphengst et al. 2010). 
Scientists are currently trying to address the disparity between 
production and biodiversity by analysing trade-offs between 
agricultural yield and biodiversity conservation (Green et al. 2005; 
Phalan et al. 2011; Hulme et al. 2013), called Land Sharing Land 
Sparing (LSLS). Under this approach, land use is categorised as: 
• Land sparing: the intensification of production to maximise 
agricultural yield within a fixed area and dedicating other land to 
biodiversity conservation; or 
• Land sharing (also called ‘wildlife-friendly farming’, such as that 
seen within the agri-environment schemes): the aim here is to 
maintain biodiversity within less intensively farmed agricultural 
landscapes. 
This conceptual framework has stimulated considerable debate, with 
many arguments supporting both LSLS strategies (Fischer et al. 2008; 
Tscharntke et al. 2012; Fischer et al. 2014; von Wehrden et al. 2014). 
In this chapter, we provide a perspective on the main issues of LSLS 
that cause debate and suggest potential improvements in evaluating 
the best management strategy for successfully protecting biodiversity 
without compromising production. Our aim is to help guide the design 
of future agri-environment schemes. 
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Figure 9.1: An example of land sharing in southern Australia, 
illustrating the coexistence of agriculture and biodiversity.
Source: Photo by Dean Ansell.
Issues causing debate in the LSLS 
framework
LSLS is a false dichotomy
The LSLS framework categorises agricultural land as one of two 
extremes. However, in reality there is a need to spare land from 
agriculture (e.g. areas of high biodiversity value and endemism), 
protect high value agricultural land, and identify interventions on 
agricultural land that will support biodiversity and contribute to 
ecosystem services. Agri-environment schemes typically fit into the 
last category. Biodiversity, such as native insect pests, pollinators, and 
below ground invertebrates, underpins a wide variety of ecological 
goods and services which contribute to agricultural productivity. 
Some production systems and landscapes may have the opportunity 
to capture many of the ecosystem services provided by biodiversity, 
such as pollination (Aizen et al. 2009) and pest control (Crowder et al. 
2010), while other systems are more constrained to artificial inputs, 
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such as fertiliser and lime. The issue is not whether we should spare 
or share land, but rather the need to identify opportunities to increase 
agricultural production while minimising the negative impacts on the 
environment and stemming further biodiversity loss — for example, 
managing ecosystem services in agricultural landscapes to maintain or 
enhance yield level rather than relying on external inputs (Bommarco 
et al. 2013).
Efficient allocation of land
Recent articles using the LSLS framework attempt to frame the central 
point of interest as food security or food production (e.g. Phalan et al. 
2011; Hulme et al. 2013), however, their focus can more appropriately 
be described as the most efficient allocation of land. This mismatched 
claim has attracted considerable criticism, as food security is a 
much more complex concept than the simple amount of food that is 
produced, and agricultural landscapes are often used for much more 
than food production (e.g. biofuels and fibre), which needs to be 
considered when managing landscapes (Fischer et al. 2014). This land 
allocation question is central to agri-environment schemes: how much 
land should be designated to production and how much to protecting 
biodiversity, in addition to the spatial arrangement of these activities? 
Biodiversity in agro-ecosystems
Different taxa respond differently to changing land use and processes, 
and the response by species at a plot or field level may be very different 
from the response seen across landscape scales. Extrapolating across 
species groups and various scales commonly produces misleading 
results. This has been seen in the current agri-environment schemes, 
where targeting management to preserve one species may not provide a 
solution for other aspects of biodiversity (Kleijn et al. 2011). Additional 
measures of diversity are therefore needed to ensure actions support 
a multitude of species rather than just a single species. Von Wehrden 
et al. (2014) propose measuring beta and gamma diversities instead of 
simply alpha diversity to better capture the landscape scale variance 
in biodiversity in relation to land use changes.
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Figure 9.2: A bee pollinating a lupin flower on a farm 
in western NSW. 
Source: Photo by Carl Davies (CC By 3.0).
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Scale, landscape composition and leakage
Opportunities identified to increase production from intensification 
need to explicitly consider scale. This will help identify the appropriate 
study and management scale. Many biodiversity-yield interactions are 
affected by the scale and composition of the landscape, yet the LSLS 
framework does not incorporate scale, which can lead to confusion 
when trying to determine appropriate management. In addition, land 
use is often driven by distant drivers, such as global markets, and 
actions taken at the farm or regional scale can impact areas further 
afield. This leakage affect is rarely, if ever, considered, yet can have 
large impacts globally, making it an additional aspect to factor in 
when making land use decisions, including the operation of national 
agri-environment schemes (Renwick et al. 2015).
Land use history
Knowing the historical context of land use can influence the current 
pattern of biodiversity and appropriate management. Most studies 
present a snapshot in time, failing to account for the history of the 
landscape, despite land use history having a key influence on current 
species diversity and land use (von Wehrden et al. 2014). The key to 
determining the optimum land use strategy for a landscape depends 
largely on if it is a frontier landscape, where primary habitat is under 
pressure from agriculture — for example, in northern Australia 
and areas of Brazil — or a traditional landscape, where farming has 
been carried out for centuries. Biodiversity in traditional farming 
landscapes tends to be concentrated in specific areas such as remnant 
native vegetation and plantings (e.g. shelter belts). Protection of 
these areas is essential. However, they are also prime target areas for 
conversion under intensification. In contrast, in frontier landscapes, 
biodiversity is more evenly distributed across the landscape and the 
effect of intensification is more uniform across the landscape. Land 
sparing may be possible in frontier landscapes, whereas land sharing 
is most likely in the former (von Wehrden et al. 2014).
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Figure 9.3: Remnant vegetation surrounded by wheat crops 
in New South Wales, demonstrating a land sparing approach. 
Agriculture is intensified into areas separate from those 
specific for nature.
Source: Photo by Gregory heath (CC By 3.0). 
Social values
Social values are unaccounted for in the LSLS framework. 
The disconnect between people and nature is often cited as a prime 
reason for a decline in biodiversity (Fischer et al. 2014). Both land 
sparing and land sharing may encourage the connection between 
nature and people, but in different ways (wild nature in protected 
areas, or tamer nature within farms themselves). Despite the relevance 
of this observation, to date no data on these social elements have so far 
been incorporated to the LSLS framework. Incorporating social values 
is essential to achieving successful conservation actions, whether land 
sparing or sharing is identified as being the best management option. 
Some actions within agri-environment schemes have social as well as 
conservation value — for example, hedges. Identifying measures to 
incorporate this in evaluating their overall value is essential.
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Conclusion
Identifying the most appropriate land use management is clearly 
imperative for protecting biodiversity in agricultural landscapes. 
The LSLS framework has identified some of the major challenges and 
highly contested aspects of land use. However, by limiting land use 
decisions to two options at either of end of the intensity spectrum, 
the framework omits to consider land use between the extremes. 
Agri-environment schemes may be considered a land sparing approach, 
but determining how these should be designed and implemented is 
imperative. Here we have identified some gaps in the LSLS framework 
that still need to be addressed, and suggested the data that is needed 
to fill these gaps to enable solutions to be found. Addressing the above 
points will enable a more robust analysis and the development of a 
successful land management strategy (e.g. agri-environment scheme) 
to be implemented in agricultural landscapes where biodiversity can 
be better protected with minimal if any compromise on productivity.
References
Aizen, M.A. and L.D. Harder (2009) ‘The global stock of domesticated 
honey bees is growing slower than agricultural demand for 
pollination’, Current Biology 19(11): 915–18.
Bommarco, R., D. Kleijn and S.G. Potts (2013) ‘Ecological intensification: 
Harnessing ecosystem services for food security’, Trends in Ecology 
and Evolution 28(4): 230–8.
Crowder, D.W., T.D. Northfield, M.R. Strand and W.E. Snyder (2010) 
‘Organic agriculture promotes evenness and natural pest control’, 
Nature 466: 109–12.
Fischer, J., D.J. Abson, V. Butsic, et al. (2014) ‘Land sparing versus 
land sharing: moving forward’, Conservation Letters 7(3): 149–57.
Fischer, J., B. Brosi, G.C. Daily, et al. (2008) ‘Should agricultural policies 
encourage land sparing or wildlife-friendly farming?’, Frontiers 
in Ecology and the Environment 6: 382–7.
Foley, J.A., N. Ramankutty, K.A. Brauman, et al. (2011) ‘Solutions 
for a cultivated planet’, Nature 478: 337–42.
125
9 . A PERSPECTIvE ON LAND SPARING vERSUS LAND ShARING
Green, R.E., S.J. Cornell, J.P.W. Scharlemann and A. Balmford (2005) 
‘Farming and the fate of wild nature’, Science 307: 550–5.
Hulme, M.F., J.A. Vickery, R.E. Green, et al. (2013) ‘Conserving the 
birds of Uganda’s banana–coffee arc: Land sparing and land sharing 
compared’, PLOS ONE 8: e54597.
Kaphengst, T., S. Bassi, M. Davis, et al. (2010) Taking into account 
opportunity costs when assessing costs of biodiversity and ecosystem 
action, Ecologic Institute, Berlin.
Kleijn, D., M. Rundlof, J. Scheper, et al. (2011) ‘Does conservation on 
farmland contribute to halting the biodiversity decline?’, Trends in 
Ecology and Evolution 26: 474–81.
Phalan, B., M. Onial, A. Balmford and R.E. Green (2011) ‘Reconciling 
food production and biodiversity conservation: Land sharing and 
land sparing compared’, Science 333: 1289–91.
Renwick, A.R., O. Venter and M. Bode (2015) ‘Reserves in context: 
planning for leakage in protected areas’. PLoS ONE 10(6):  e0129441. 
Tscharntke, T., Y. Clough, T.C. Wanger, et al. (2012) ‘Global food 
security, biodiversity conservation and the future of agricultural 
intensification’, Biological Conservation 151: 53–9.
von Wehrden, H., D.J. Abson, M. Beckmann, et al. (2014) ‘Realigning 
the land-sharing/land-sparing debate to match conservation needs: 





Restoring ecosystem services 
on private farmlands: Lessons 
from economics
Md Sayed Iftekhar, Maksym Polyakov 
and Fiona Gibson
Key lessons
• Biological conservation attempts to preserve and maintain existing 
habitat, while ecological restoration attempts to reverse an 
environmental degradation process.
• The higher cost per unit area (or per ecological outcome) to 
implement restoration projects, compared with conservation 
projects, could negatively influence their formation and acceptance.
• Broad support for restoration projects can be difficult to achieve, 
due to people’s loss aversion behaviour.
• Uncertainty in expected biodiversity benefits can influence the 
acceptance and success of restoration projects.
• Social value could influence the objectives of restoration projects; 
the more aligned the social and environmental objectives are, the 
higher the chances of acceptance.
• Some of the biophysical and social benefits of restoration projects 
could be privately captured, which could increase acceptance of 
restoration projects.
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• Economic incentives, such as monetary benefits, can play a 
crucial role in motivating private landholders to participate in 
agri-environment schemes, but may not be sufficient.
Clearance of the natural environment for farming and intensification 
of land use on existing farmlands puts pressure on the remaining 
natural environment (Michael et al. 2014). As a result, there is a 
decline of species richness as well as biotic homogenisation, as species 
with high conservation concern are gradually replaced by species 
with lower conservation concern (Donald and Evans 2006). Protecting 
and restoring biodiversity on private farmlands can therefore play an 
important part in provision of ecosystem services.
Governments have recognised the importance of conserving and 
restoring ecosystem services on private lands through agri-environment 
schemes. Agri-environment schemes have been developed in Australia 
(e.g. Bush Tender), the US (e.g. Conservation Reserve Program), and 
the European Union (e.g. Common Agricultural Policy). Under these 
programs, landholders receive government support in exchange for 
undertaking environmental management actions, such as ecological 
restoration. 
Traditionally, ecological restoration activities and projects have been 
targeted, prioritised, and planned using ecological considerations 
(Aronson et al. 2006). Only recently have ecologists begun to include 
economic and social considerations in the design of restoration projects 
(Blignaut et al. 2014). With few exceptions, ecological restoration 
studies that include economics focus only on the cost side of restoration 
projects (Bullock et al. 2011; Wilson et al. 2012). Incorporating proper 
cost estimates in benefit–cost analysis is essential to make sound 
economic decisions in terms of the selection and prioritisation of 
restoration projects. However, economics can contribute more broadly 
to restoration programs. Lessons from economics could assist in the 
conceptualisation and planning of programs, reveal factors affecting 
program acceptance and uptake, and inform the design of restoration 
programs to increase success. In  this chapter, we summarise some 
of the key lessons from economics that we hope will help improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of ecological restoration and agri-
environmental schemes. 
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Comparing costs from ecological 
restoration and conservation projects
Restoration projects, which are primarily aimed at restoring ecosystems 
of varying levels of degradation, are generally more costly than 
conservation projects, which are aimed at the protection of existing 
ecologically intact ecosystems (Blignaut et al. 2014). Some types of 
costs are common for both restoration and conservation projects 
(e.g.  opportunity and maintenance costs). However, establishment 
costs  are likely to be much higher for restoration projects, which 
require  a variety of restoration actions with different levels of 
intensity (Hobbs and Cramer 2008). These actions range from allowing 
the ecosystem to recover without human interference — commonly 
referred to as passive restoration — to actively undertaking a 
restoration process. In agricultural landscapes, ecological restoration 
usually requires active intervention (Polasky et al. 2005). 
The opportunity cost of ecological restoration is often much higher 
than the opportunity cost of creating a reserve in an undisturbed 
natural landscape, for the following reasons: 
• Restoration projects tend to occur on intensive production, higher-
value land, such as agricultural or mining landscapes, whereas 
conservation projects are usually located on lower-value land, 
such as grazing land. 
• Restoring ecosystems on land impacted by intensive production 
is often more costly than on land used for other less-intensive 
purposes due to a greater rate of land use modifications. 
• Restoration is an intensive process and restoration projects tend to 
be of a smaller scale than conservation projects, which increases 
both the cost per hectare of restoring small sites and the overhead 
costs associated with managing many smaller projects. 
• Ecological restoration is undertaken when reservation of intact 
habitat is not an option. Such landscapes tend to be highly 
fragmented, which could also influence ongoing maintenance 
costs of restoration projects (Lindenmayer et al. 2002; McBride 
et al. 2010).  
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The success of ecological restoration projects is determined by their 
ecological proximity and connections to existing habitats. Ecological 
synergy benefits from the existing protected areas influence the 
capacity of the restored sites to generate ecosystem services (Bennett 
et al. 2006; Manning et al. 2006). Therefore, the spatial arrangement 
and characteristics of existing habitats inside and outside the planning 
areas need to be carefully considered. Otherwise, restoration projects 
are likely to be less effective and require higher operation costs to 
generate the same amount of environmental outcome (Thomson et al. 
2009). 
Support for restoration projects can be 
difficult to obtain due to people’s loss 
aversion behaviour
Gaining social support for restoration projects can be difficult, compared 
to conservation projects, due to people’s loss aversion behaviour. It has 
been observed that people are more sensitive to changes seen as losses 
than to gains of the same magnitude (Tversky and Kahneman 1992). 
For example, let us assume that an individual owns $100. According to 
this theory, she will suffer greater dissatisfaction if $10 is taken away 
from her than the corresponding level of satisfaction if she was given 
$10. In the presence of loss aversion behaviour, people may be more 
inclined to support a conservation project that proposes to protect a 
bushland (preventing it from being lost) than a restoration project that 
would restore a bushland of the same area and quality (which could 
mean losing productive land). Uncertainty in expected environmental 
outcomes of a restoration project would increase people’s loss aversion 
behaviour.
Uncertainty in expected ecological 
outcomes can influence the adoption and 
success of restoration projects
When designing conservation programs, decision makers often have 
a target of what they plan to conserve or protect, even though in 
most cases the target is poorly defined. With restoration programs, 
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the target is a desired environmental outcome (Yoshioka et al. 2014). 
These predictions are based on ecological and biophysical models, 
such as tree growth models or species distribution models. Even if 
these models use the best available data and advanced modelling 
techniques, there can be substantial uncertainty in their predictions 
(Haila et al. 2014). The probability that a restoration project will deliver 
the expected outcomes depends not only on the on-ground actions 
but many other factors, such as environmental condition, restoration 
technique, and socio-economic factors (Lindenmayer et  al.  2002; 
Maron et al. 2012; Raymond and Brown 2011). Failure to take account 
of these uncertainties diminishes the benefits of ecological restoration. 
However, so far, the probability of success of restoration projects has 
rarely been factored into the ecological-restoration planning process 
(Dorrough et al. 2008).
Social value could influence the objectives 
of restoration projects
The objectives of restoration projects are likely to be influenced by 
social values. Values for conservation projects are easier (more certain) 
to obtain because what is there, in terms of biodiversity, is known, 
and the probability of conservation project failure is arguably lower 
than a restoration project (Robbins and Daniels 2012). For restoration, 
the final condition is not known due to many uncertainties. For this 
reason, it is often difficult to set scientific goals for restoration projects. 
Therefore, restoration efforts require an understanding of community 
values and preferences, which are highly context-dependent (Shindler 
et al. 2011) and should necessitate a participatory process to identify 
goals and aspirations for the site (Schaich 2009; Schultz et al. 2012). 
For example, Alam (2011) found that people’s willingness to pay for 
restoration of a river in Bangladesh varies with their proximity to 
resources, their length of residence in the area, and their depth of 
experience with the area. In Japan, Mitani et al. (2008) found that 
individuals with strong environmental attitudes, a history of past 
visitation, and high income are more likely to prefer restoration 
projects to the status quo. They also observed that people with a better 
understanding of ecological features were willing to pay more to avoid 
the extinction of species. Rogers (2013) has shown that public and 
expert opinion about restoration efforts can diverge, especially when 
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
132
the public have a limited understanding and knowledge. When setting 
the objectives of restoration programs, there is a risk of misalignment 
of social and environmental objectives if governments rely only on 
scientific values.
Some benefits from restoration projects 
could be privately captured, which would 
then facilitate acceptance of restoration 
projects
Restored ecosystems can generate ecosystem services, both on-farm 
and off-farm. Off-farm ecosystem services include changes in water 
and air quality, and protection of endangered species. On-farm 
ecosystem services include reduction in soil erosion, shelter for grazing 
animals, improved soil fertility, and increased recreational benefits. 
The benefits of these services are captured by the participating 
landholders (Polyakov et al. 2015). There is evidence to suggest 
that some landholders may receive personal non-use values from 
undertaking restoration activities. For example, Greiner and Gregg 
(2011) found that, in some cases, farmers are more strongly motivated 
by stewardship aspirations than economic and social goals. Three 
motivation factors — economic/financial, conservation and lifestyle, 
and social — were found to motivate grazier management in Northern 
Australia. Jellinek et al. (2013) found large-scale revegetation on 
agricultural properties was more likely to occur where off-farm income 
is available and/or where the landholder has a preference to achieve 
environmental rather than production goals. 
Understanding the preferences and behavioural dynamics of 
landholders is important to the success of ecological restoration 
activities on private land. Landholders who receive high private 
benefits (including non-monetary benefits) from ecological restoration 
would be more willing to participate in programs with lower rates 
of government support or incentives, which could ultimately reduce 
their public cost and increase their cost-effectiveness (see Chapter 14).
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Economic incentives can play a crucial 
role in motivating private landholders to 
participate, but may not be sufficient on 
their own
There are many studies providing evidence on the importance of 
economic incentives in facilitating the adoption of conservation 
practices by landholders (see Chapter 21). However, economic 
incentives are not the only drivers of adoption. As Greiner and Gregg 
(2011) observe, it is not enough to simply pay farmers to undertake 
restoration activities. Factors such as resource constraints, a lack of 
external support, uncertainty over the future of the property, and 
a lack of industry cooperation can inhibit adoption of conservation 
practices. The influence of these factors is likely to vary between 
different types of landholders (e.g. lifestyle or commercial farmers) and 
between individuals (Pannell and Wilkinson 2009; Welsch et al. 2014). 
For example, Welsch et al. (2014) found that lifestyle landholders 
have more property in woody vegetation than dairy and beef/sheep 
landholders, and were more likely to increase the amount of vegetation 
in the future. Although lifestyle landholders may be more willing to 
participate in conservation practices for non-economic reasons, Pannell 
and Wilkinson (2009) caution that the learning and transaction costs 
are likely to be higher for this type of landholder.
Pannell (2008) provides a useful framework to help policymakers 
select the most effective policy mechanism to encourage change by 
landholders (see Chapter 18). This framework includes economic 
mechanisms (e.g. paying for services and regulation of activities) 
and non-economic mechanisms (e.g. new technology and extension). 
As noted by Pannell (2008), extension plays an important role as a 
policy mechanism, and should be applied when public and private 
net benefits are high. 
Conclusion
The issue of restoring ecosystem services on private lands presents 
a unique setting due to the high cost of implementation, high levels 
of uncertainty in environmental outcomes, and high probability 
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that the program objectives are influenced by social values and the 
impact of people’s loss aversion behaviour. Decision makers need to 
be aware of these issues and take them into account when planning 
and implementing restoration projects. For example, by identifying 
landholder’s preferences for different restoration objectives, it might 
be possible to match landholders with restoration programs that 
fit their preferences, facilitating the acceptability of the restoration 
program. Being able to direct restoration programs towards a group 
of landholders with high environmental motivations could help 
conservation agencies to deliver restoration projects more cost-
effectively, as they might be willing to deliver environmental services 
at lower costs — although it is worth noting the potential issues with 
the equity of how funds are dispersed. Careful applications of these 
and similar lessons will help improve the efficiency and uptake of 
restoration projects in agri-environmental schemes. 
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• Agri-environment schemes have mixed outcomes for biodiversity, 
and more monitoring is needed particularly for certain taxonomic 
groups.
• Agri-environment scheme effectiveness is heavily reliant on the 
spatial scale of implementation, and addressing this at local and 
landscape scales is critical for advancing their application for 
conservation of biodiversity in agricultural landscapes.
• At local scales, information about how species respond to 
environmental features, as well as the impact of management 
actions,  could improve site selection and effectiveness of 
management prescriptions.
• At landscape scales, the offsite benefits of agri-environment 
schemes could be enhanced by better understanding the impact 
of surrounding landscape context.
• Incorporating information about the patterns of diversity over 
large areas, as well as the role and sensitivity of habitat metrics 
to biodiversity, could greatly enhance the biodiversity benefits 
of agri-environment schemes.
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Demand for agri-environment schemes to counteract global biodiversity 
loss has resulted in the development of some large, continental-scale 
agri-environment schemes. While some schemes have been successful 
in addressing the social and policy elements of farmland conservation 
(Zammit 2013), very few have been able to demonstrate effective 
biodiversity outcomes across the scale of program implementation 
(Whittingham et al. 2007). One of the key reasons for this is that, in 
order to work across large spatial scales, programs have tended to 
employ rigid management actions, or a one-size-fits-all approach (Batáry 
et al. 2011; Kleijn and Sutherland 2003). However, recent studies have 
demonstrated that the effectiveness of agri-environment schemes is 
influenced by a number of scale-dependant factors, including the 
amount invested in agri-environment schemes (Dallimer et al. 2010; 
Hiron et al. 2013), surrounding landscape context (Batáry et al. 2011; 
Concepción et al. 2012; Gabriel et al. 2010), and the underlying delivery 
mechanisms used in scheme design (Hajkowicz et al. 2009; Siriwardena 
2010). Designing better agri-environment schemes requires a greater 
understanding and incorporation of these scale-effects.
One of the critical aspects of scale relates to management rules 
applied to achieve agri-environment scheme goals (see Figure 11.1). 
Management rules can be applied at one of two scales: locally at 
the site (i.e. within a single management unit), or across the whole 
landscape (i.e. at multiple management units). Irrespective of the goal 
of a particular agri-environment scheme, both the local and landscape-
wide management rules are important for achieving conservation 
outcomes (Gonthier et al. 2014). If we want to conserve targeted 
species then it is important to not only protect key habitats but also 
the potential processes aiding their dispersal and other important 
aspects of their biology (see metapopulation theory). Conversely, if 
we want to conserve whole communities, we need to understand how 
they respond to local-scale management. Despite this recognition, our 
knowledge and integration of these scale-effects into agri-environment 
schemes remains very limited (Siriwardena 2010). For example, site-
level management actions (such as prescribed or rotational grazing) 
remain poorly resolved (Briske et al. 2011), and landscape-scale 
dispersal information is poorly understood for many taxa (Driscoll 
et al. 2014). Better knowledge of local- and landscape-scale factors 
that influence conservation outcomes would therefore address a key 
knowledge gap and provide an opportunity to enhance biodiversity 
outcomes of agri-environment schemes.
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In this chapter, we address this knowledge gap by revealing 
opportunities to integrate scale-effects to improve agri-environment 
scheme effectiveness for biodiversity across both local and landscape 
scales. First, we address the need for biological monitoring over 
ecologically relevant time frames for quantifying scale-effects on 
agri-environment schemes. Summarising current knowledge of how 
local- and landscape-scale factors influence agri-environment schemes, 
we then provide novel research priorities at these scales. 
Figure 11.1: Conceptual flow for the advancement of 
agri‑environment schemes through incorporation of 
scale-effects. Regardless of agri-environment scheme 
program goals, biodiversity monitoring is required to validate 
program success. Opportunities to enhance performance of 
agri‑environment schemes by addressing key knowledge gaps 
at both local- and landscape-scale are identified.
Source: Author’s research.
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Monitoring outcomes of agri-environment 
schemes
Quantifying scale-effects on agri-environment schemes relies on a 
thorough understanding of the biodiversity response to management 
decisions at different scales. However, despite the significant 
investment and widespread implementation, many agri-environment 
schemes have not demonstrated effective outcomes for biodiversity 
(Kleijn and Sutherland 2003; Lindenmayer et al. 2012; Michael et al. 
2014). Amongst other reasons, this is due to a paucity of rigorous 
assessment and monitoring (Herzog 2005; Perkins et al. 2013), 
especially for certain taxonomic groups, such as reptiles (Michael et 
al. 2014). Even where monitoring data is available, our understanding 
of the scale-effects on biodiversity have largely emerged from what 
we know of agri-environment schemes in a limited set of regions 
(e.g.  American and European landscapes) (Batáry et al. 2015). 
To  properly assess the biodiversity responses to agri-environment 
schemes we need to develop robust, statistically verified scientific 
monitoring programs (Lindenmayer et al. 2012) across a wider set of 
ecological systems (see Chapter 3). Such programs must be designed 
around specific agri-environment scheme goals (i.e. single species 
versus whole communities), and focus on observing population- or 
community-level changes across multiple taxa at target sites, as well as 
comparable reference sites.
It is important to consider the time frames necessary for biodiversity 
response to agri-environment schemes when developing monitoring 
programs. The inability of many existing monitoring programs to 
show effective biodiversity response may not reflect failure of the 
program per se, but that insufficient time has passed for relevant 
ecological processes to succeed. This emphasises the need to continue 
monitoring over long time frames far exceeding policy cycles. Critically, 
however, this does not mean we need to wait until we detect positive 
change to identify the perfect program. Instead, the limited capacity 
demonstrated in agri-environment schemes for achieving mid-term 
outcomes could be addressed by identifying opportunities to enhance 
the current models.
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Advancing agri-environment schemes 
through understanding scale-effects
Local scale
Fundamentally, the success of any agri-environment scheme relies on 
the positive response of biodiversity to investment at the local (i.e. field 
or farm) scale. This is the smallest management scale within an agri-
environment scheme, typically 1–10 kilometres, to which landholders 
apply the funded conservation management actions. 
These actions are generally targeted towards specific groups of 
organisms  or agricultural practices, which often include (but are 
not limited to) promotion of native vegetation, soil health and 
habitat components (possibly for target species), and prevention 
of damaging management practices, such as fertilisation and 
overgrazing (Zammit et al. 2010). Positive biodiversity response in 
agri-environment schemes depends on two fundamental assumptions: 
suitable habitat is incorporated within the investment sites selected; 
and the imposed management actions enhance or maintain suitable 
conditions (e.g.  habitat) for biota. Despite the wide application of 
agri-environment  schemes, major knowledge gaps surround both 
of these assumptions (see Figure 11.1). 
The incorporation of suitable habitat (or the provisioning for 
future habitat) is critical for achieving biodiversity gain in 
any agri-environment schemes program. This requires careful 
consideration of the sites being selected. However, one of the major 
assumptions regarding site selection is that all habitat within a given 
ecosystem or species range are equal in condition and extent. For 
example, native vegetation cover is considered important for a wide 
number of species (McElhinny et al. 2006) and so is included in the 
site selection of many Australian agri-environment schemes. However, 
in many ecosystems targeted under agri-environment schemes, little 
is known about which habitat features are most important for species. 
Moreover, the positive influence of specific environmental features 
is likely to vary for different species, whole communities, and across 
different biogeographic or climatic zones (Whittingham et al. 2007). 
It may be important to ask whether targeting certain habitat features, 
such as those that are important for rare species, can improve the 
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effectiveness of agri-environment schemes for other biota. Indeed, 
some of the most important drivers of biodiversity may be climatic 
or landscape features (e.g. elevation), which cannot be influenced by 
management.
Central to agri-environment schemes policy is the use of carefully 
prescribed site-level management actions, which counteract the 
negative influence of agriculture on biodiversity. Management actions 
addressing the impact on biodiversity from wide-spread agricultural 
practices (e.g. livestock overgrazing, fertiliser application) are 
considered most desirable (Dallimer et al. 2010). Despite a focus on 
these management actions in agri-environment schemes, their role 
in averting biodiversity loss is poorly known. For example, there is 
little consensus on the impacts of livestock grazing as a management 
tool for biodiversity, despite widespread application and decades of 
research (Briske et al. 2011). A better understanding of the outcomes 
of management actions on biodiversity (particularly large-scale ones, 
such as livestock grazing) would have large implications for enhancing 
site-level response to agri-environment schemes.
Landscape scale 
An underlying basis for successful agri-environment schemes is that 
they propagate positive biodiversity benefit from investment sites 
into the broader landscape. The extent to which this occurs depends 
heavily on the hostility of the surrounding landscape (Tscharntke 
et al. 2005). Yet the mechanisms remain poorly understood. This is 
particularly the case for species with limited dispersal (e.g. terrestrial 
invertebrates, reptiles), which are most sensitive to the negative 
impacts of fragmentation in an agricultural matrix. 
Recent studies have found that the biodiversity response to 
agri-environment scheme investment is influenced by the context 
of the surrounding landscape (Carvell et al. 2011; Concepción et al. 
2012),  although this response is inconsistent and poorly resolved 
(Batáry et al. 2011). The greatest positive biodiversity response 
has been observed in landscapes with an intermediate level of 
‘complexity’ — the degree of variation within landscape (Concepción 
et al. 2012). Despite this, other studies have found inconsistent 
results for different taxonomic groups for both simple and complex 
landscapes, and that the effect of complexity depends on the type of 
surrounding vegetation (Batáry et al. 2011). Landscapes with a greater 
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proportion of area covered by management demonstrate stronger 
positive biodiversity response (Baker et al. 2012; Dallimer et al. 2010), 
although whether this is in response to direct agri-environment scheme 
investment or greater inclusion of suitable landscapes remains unclear. 
A greater number of studies exploring the influence of surrounding 
landscape on agri-environment schemes success are clearly required 
to systematically investigate each of these conflicting elements. Given 
that our current understanding is nearly exclusively from European 
(e.g. Concepción et al. 2012) and American landscapes (e.g. Carvell 
et al. 2011), future investigations of this kind within Australian 
landscapes are critical for providing a more rounded understanding of 
how to enhance agri-environment schemes at landscape scales.
In addition to understanding how landscape context can affect 
agri-environment schemes success, it is important to know why 
landscape context may affect agri-environment schemes success. One 
of the key assumptions in agri-environment schemes policy is that 
investment will promote even propagation of biodiversity into the 
broader landscape (Whittingham et al. 2007), although it is clear that 
dispersal into surrounding landscapes for some species (e.g. ground-
dependant species such as reptiles) will be more challenging than 
others. This is because the type of land-use and style of management 
employed in surrounding landscapes is likely to greatly influence the 
capacity of species to disperse, particularly for those with limited 
dispersal ability most at risk to fragmentation. For agri-environment 
schemes to better support the conservation of such species in the 
broader landscape, it is crucial that we gain a greater understanding 
of how these species disperse in different matrix environments. Non-
hostile matrix environments can then be created. We can achieve 
this by examining the effect of surrounding land-use (e.g. cropped 
landscapes), as well as the impact of certain management actions 
(e.g. grazed and open pastures versus ungrazed and dense pastures), 
on the movement of limited-dispersing species.
The capacity for agri-environment schemes to achieve landscape-scale, 
positive biodiversity response is dependent largely on the ability of 
these schemes to adequately capture the best elements of the landscape. 
Agri-environment schemes that pay landholders for biodiversity 
actions create a market for biodiversity, but the value assigned to 
actions is determined by metrics adopted in the scheme (Zammit et 
al. 2010). Despite widespread use of habitat metrics in biodiversity 
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markets, relatively little attention has been paid to their design and 
performance (Hajkowicz et al. 2009), and their capacity to summarise 
the actual biodiversity present at a site within an agri-environment 
scheme (Oliver et al. 2014). The use of metrics that misrepresent the 
condition of the target ecological community has dire implications for 
the overall success of an agri-environment scheme, and yet we have 
very little knowledge linking biodiversity response to metric scores 
for agri-environment schemes worldwide.
Finally, landscape-wide biodiversity outcomes for agri-environment 
schemes can also be achieved by developing a broader understanding 
of the patterns of diversity across the landscape. Currently, the 
distribution of diversity is known at a very general level — for 
example, species richness is greater near the equator (Gaston 2000) 
— with little or no understanding of diversity patterns at landscape 
scales for most groups of organisms. Understanding landscape patterns 
of diversity would have considerable benefit for agri-environment 
schemes by allowing managers to develop regionally targeted 
conservation strategies. For example, focused management of low-
quality sites within high diversity areas (hotspots) could be used to 
achieve high conservation gain. Although the tools for developing 
such diversity maps have now been developed (Ferrier et al. 2007), 
they have yet to be integrated into agri-environment schemes, despite 
the clear conservation benefits of doing so.
Conclusions
Enhancing the effectiveness of agri-environment schemes for 
biodiversity conservation requires management attention at multiple 
scales, from local to landscape. We have identified key knowledge 
gaps  and priority areas for research that would improve the rigid 
one-size-fits-all model commonly applied to agri-environment schemes. 
We  contend that the effectiveness of agri-environment schemes 
must be  advanced if we are to counter the effects of agriculture on 
biodiversity, and that monitoring data across multiple scales, for 
a much wider range of taxa, is required.
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• Respond to landholder motivations for biodiversity conservation. 
• Understand the socio-demographic profile of potential participants.
• Support those already making the change.
• Design programs to achieve compatibility between financial and 
biodiversity outcomes.
Social dimensions play an important role in landholder participation 
in natural resource management (NRM) programs. Many regional- and 
community-based NRM organisations have a good understanding of 
landholder characteristics and capacity from data collected through 
national, regional, or catchment scale landholder surveys and other 
social studies. But, often, NRM plans only include aspirations for 
integrating this data into program design, project communications and 
evaluation. While various frameworks have been developed to do this 
(Fenton 2004; Robins and Dovers 2007), there are few recorded cases 
where integration of social, environmental and economic information 
has been used to support successful implementation of NRM programs 
(Bammer et al. 2005).
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This chapter draws on two examples in which landholder characteristics 
were examined to gain insight into how specific NRM programs could 
be better implemented. The case studies used in this chapter are 
former Australian Government NRM programs: the Environmental 
Stewardship Program, and the Sustainable Farm Practice component 
of the Caring for our Country (CofC) initiative. A study into the 
motivations, drivers, and barriers associated with involvement in 
the Environmental Stewardship Program was undertaken at the 
beginning of the program. A longitudinal national survey on adoption 
and reasons for adoption was undertaken at the beginning and end 
of the Sustainable Farm Practice component of the CfoC initiative. 
Findings from these studies support five social dimensions considered 
important in the development and implementation of biodiversity 
conservation programs.
Respond to landholder motivations for 
biodiversity conservation
Human behaviour is complex. At the very least, decisions to act 
include the combined influences of behaviours, intentions, perceived 
behavioural control, attitude and societal norms (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010). Lack of understanding of what drives biodiversity 
conservation can lead to simplistic policies and potentially alienate 
possible participants. Effort in understanding landholders’ complex 
motivations for biodiversity conservation is likely to benefit outcomes 
of biodiversity initiatives, particularly when this understanding is 
embedded in program design and extension.
For example, the national Drivers of Practice Change survey canvassed 
1,400 commercial farmers to identify their motivations for adoption of 
sustainable land management practices which were promoted under 
the CfoC initiative (Ecker et al. 2012). The survey asked respondents 
to select one of three motivational areas (financial, environmental, 
and personal) for each practice. Farmers rated environmental factors 
as most frequently influencing their adoption of native vegetation 
management practices. Respondents selected up to three detailed 
statements for each motivational area (see Table 12.1). These provided 
insight into the diverse factors that farmers considered in facilitating 
adoption of these practices.
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Table 12.1: Most frequently selected motivational areas and 
motives for native vegetation management practices, listed 
in order of importance to respondents.
Motives
Financial benefits Environmental factors Personal motivations
Motivational 
area









Provides habitat for 
fauna
Desire to protect 
natural resources
Desire to improve 





Source: Ecker et al. (2012); Kancans et al. (2014).
The results from a different survey on landholder motivations 
for involvement in the Environmental Stewardship Program also 
demonstrated complex considerations influencing participation 
in conservation activities (Ecker and Thompson 2011). Financial 
motivations, environmental stewardship interests, prior conservation 
efforts, the opportunity to engage in a social network, and the 
opportunity to learn more about native vegetation management 
contributed to landholder participation in the program. Most 
respondents ‘strongly agreed’ that conservation and enhancement 
of native vegetation contributed to improved property or landscape 
health, aesthetics, soil stabilisation, and controlling rising water tables. 
Few thought that conservation and enhancement of native vegetation 
increased fire risk, and fewer saw it as an impediment to controlling 
pests and weeds. Understanding what actually motivates people to 
participate in biodiversity initiatives can assist with engagement 
strategies and lead to better communication and relationships with 
participants. 
Understand the socio-demographic profile 
of potential participants
The farm business and farmer’s personal characteristics are important 
to consider in program design of and stakeholder engagement 
with biodiversity protection initiatives. Social profiling has been 
widely used by regional NRM groups to better understand the 
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socio-demographic profile of communities. However, the usefulness of 
this information depends on scale and the quality of data collection 
and its interpretation. 
In the context of the CfoC initiative, Kancans et al. (2014) explored 
demographic and other adoption-related characteristics relevant to 
land management practices. Table 12.2 reflects the findings from a 
series of one-way analysis of variance, comparing the characteristics 
of adopters and non-adopters of each practice. These findings show 
that landholders more likely to conserve or manage native vegetation 
are older, well-educated, have a strong financial status, are a member of 
a land management group, and have prior involvement in a government 
land management initiative. 
Table 12.2: Characteristics more likely to be found in adopters 











higher cash income No yes yes
higher rate of return No yes yes
Larger farms yes No No 
younger No No No 




Participate in extension No No No 
Member of land 
management group
yes yes yes 
Source: Kancans et al. (2014)
A landholder’s previous experience with an NRM program has been 
shown to influence their involvement in a future conservation initiative 
(Windle and Rolfe 2006). Supporting this, Ecker and Thompson (2011) 
found that 45 per cent of applicants in the Environmental Stewardship 
Program had previously been involved in environmental or NRM 
programs, including financial and non-financial support. 
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Farm income is often cited as an import driver of land management 
practice adoption, however, the influence of farm income on 
conservation adoption is ambiguous, as financial assistance from the 
NRM program may overcome farm income constraints (Cary et al. 
2002). Another important aspect to understand is baseline knowledge 
in regard to conservation practices. Seventy per cent of Environmental 
Stewardship Program applicants said they had never undertaken 
training relevant to native vegetation conservation, and less than half 
could identify box gum grassy woodlands on their property (Ecker 
and Thompson 2011). Baseline information such as this can be useful 
for assessing enduring change in the long term. 
Support those already making the change
There is evidence that external support sources are secondary to 
intrinsic motivations in NRM decisions. For example, Farmar-Bowers 
and Lane (2006) suggest that farmers use a number of lenses when 
seeking and identifying an opportunity, starting with personal 
motivations related to the opportunity (intrinsic interests, family 
considerations, and personal knowledge), before moving onto external 
components, such as knowledge and support. It is likely that support 
is associated with increasing capacity to implement new management 
practices once landholders have decided to adopt. This is the point 
at which they seek support. The implication is that support is better 
received by those who have made the decision to implement the 
practice. As obvious as it sounds, this thinking is not always embedded 
in policy and program approaches. 
Lending some support to this concept, Ecker and Thompson (2011) 
found that the majority of participants applying for the Environmental 
Stewardship Program had previously participated in conservation 
activities, with more than 80 per cent saying they had revegetated 
parts of their property, and more than half having fenced remnant 
vegetation. Repeat customers may be frowned upon in program 
evaluations, as there is often a preference within the program to attract 
new participants. Targeting landholders who are ready and able to 
make changes, and support the improvement of biodiversity values 
over time, may be a more realistic and efficient target. This is supported 
by Greiner and Gregg (2011), who demonstrated that landholders 
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with higher intrinsic motivation (i.e. higher scores for ‘lifestyle and 
stewardship motivation’) had undertaken more conservation action on 
their properties. 
Ecker et al. (2012) outlined the role that support providers play 
in influencing landholder decisions to adopt land management 
practices. Non-financial support played a secondary role to financial, 
environmental, and personal motivations in decisions to adopt NRM 
activities. Relatively few respondents (9 per cent) said the availability 
of non-financial support influenced them in land management practice 
decisions ‘to a great extent’. While support is of critical importance in 
maintaining the impetus for adoption of native vegetation management, 
these findings suggest that support is generally accessed after the 
decision to adopt the practice is made. 
Recognise the importance of community-
based conservation and NRM 
organisations
Community-based groups, such as regional NRM groups (often a mix 
of government and community), Landcare, catchment, conservation 
and other care groups, maintain momentum and continuity between 
shifts in government policies. As noted in Chapter 5, environmental 
NGOs are often more focused on on-ground activities and, as such, 
are in the best position to facilitate between individuals and national 
environmental challenges. When the groups adequately represent 
social catchments, they provide foci and forums for NRM in the 
community. While the importance of community-based groups is well 
covered in the literature (e.g. Marshall 2010), quantitative measures 
that provide substantive evidence of the importance of these groups 
is harder to come by. 
Results of the national Drivers of Practice Change survey on farmer 
motivations for sustainable land management practices, administered 
in 2010 and 2012, demonstrated the importance of community groups 
in supporting landholders’ adoption of native vegetation management 
practices from three different survey questions. First, Landcare 
or farmer production groups were found to be the most important 
influence on native vegetation management adoption (Ecker et al. 
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2012; Kancans et al. 2014). Second, of the 27 per cent of adopters who 
sought non-financial support, over half said they obtained this support 
from Landcare groups, followed by catchment management authorities 
(CMAs) (20 per cent). Third, as shown in Table 12.2, members of NRM 
groups, including community- and production-focused groups, were 
more likely to adopt native vegetation management practices than 
non-members (Kancans et al. 2014). 
Ecker and Thompson (2011) also found that around 60 per cent of 
participants involved in the Environmental Stewardship Program 
indicated that CMAs are an important information source when 
making decisions to conserve native vegetation. They considered 
CMAs more important than any other information source. The 
importance of Landcare as a source of information to participants was 
also evident: 44 per cent of the participants indicated that Landcare 
groups were important in their decision-making processes related to 
native vegetation management. The influence of these community-
based groups is moderated by factors such as longevity and degree of 
connection with the community. 
A relationship with non-government NRM and conservation 
organisations, through both regular (e.g. extension) and irregular 
(e.g. forums and events) interactions, and the degree of trust held and 
the valuing of this support provision is known to affect landholders 
involvement in land management programs (Jennings 2005). Landcare 
groups and other community-based organisations, such as regional NRM 
groups and CMAs, established in the community are well positioned to 
deliver or partner with other delivery agents in biodiversity program 
design and implementation, and have an important role to play in the 
long-term success of these initiatives.
Design programs to achieve compatibility 
between financial and biodiversity 
outcomes
A profitable farming enterprise is an important goal for farmers. It is 
important that biodiversity conservation initiatives consider this goal 
in program design and extension. The phrase ‘need to be in the black 
to be in the green’ is popular amongst farmers. The first strategy in this 
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chapter emphasised the interrelatedness of financial, environmental, 
and personal motivations. While the environmental stewardship 
motivations of those involved in biodiversity conservation are clear, 
a balance between environmental and financial outcomes is important 
for some farmers. 
Lockie and Tennent (2010) note issues with previous schemes included 
an inability to coherently link farm operations and biodiversity 
outcomes. In the study by Ecker and Thompson (2011), participants 
said that the Environmental Stewardship Program had succeeded in 
linking production farming and biodiversity outcomes through the 
flexibility allowed for productive use of conservation areas under 
certain circumstances. Landholders who rely on farm income need 
to have adequate flexibility to manage drought conditions and other 
tough financial periods. Participants in the study were generally well 
informed about the impacts and benefits of different grazing regimes 
on both biodiversity outcomes and profit, including understanding 
the importance of having functioning grassy woodland ecosystems in 
managing livestock through these tough periods. Many participants 
indicated that they had reduced stocking numbers in order to maintain 
native pastures, and that in some cases this had improved the quality 
of wool and lambing percentages. Encouraging debate, discussion, 
and shared learning on how to best maximise profit and conservation 
outcomes, and subsequent incorporation of this information into 
program design is important in ensuring the long-term success of 
biodiversity initiatives. 
Summary
This chapter draws on recent studies on landholder adoption of 
biodiversity conservation programs to lend support to five key 
strategies that are important in ensuring the success of such initiatives: 
respond to landholder motivations for biodiversity conservation; 
understand the socio-demographic profile of potential participants; 
support those already making the change; recognise the importance of 
community-based conservation and NRM organisations; and design 
programs to achieve compatibility between financial and biodiversity 
outcomes. These strategies relate to understanding and responding to 
the complex human ecology of participation in biodiversity initiatives 
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where financial, environmental and personal factors interrelate to 
enhance or impede this participation. While past NRM programs have 
adopted some of these strategies, rarely are all these factors considered 
in program design. Time spent in improving the understanding of the 
target audience, building a strong community-based support network, 
recognising past initiatives, and piloting the program prior to broad-
scale implementation is time well spent. These five strategies, amongst 
the other insights recorded in this book, can help towards building 
effective approaches to achieve successful biodiversity outcomes that 
benefit both environment and society. 
References
Bammer, G., C. Mobbs, R. Lane, S. Dovers and C. Allan (2005) 
‘An introduction to Australian case studies of integration in natural 
resource management’, Australasian Journal of Environmental 
Management 12 (supplementary issue). 
Cary, J., T. Webb and N. Barr (2002) ‘Understanding land managers’ 
capacity to change to sustainable practices: Insights about practice 
adoption and social capacity for change’, Bureau of Rural Sciences, 
Canberra.
Commonwealth of Australia (2002) National natural resource 
management capacity building framework, Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry and Environment and Heritage, 
Canberra.
Cullen, P. (2004) ‘Using local and scientific knowledge to inform 
catchment management’, presentation to Upper Murrumbidgee 
Catchment Coordinating Committee Biennial Natural Resource 
Management Forum, 29 September, University House, 
The Australian National University, Canberra.
Ecker, S. and L.J. Thompson (2011) Participation in the Environmental 
Stewardship Program Box Gum Grassy Woodlands Project: 
key findings and implications, ABARES report to client for the 
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and 
Communities, Canberra.
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
160
Ecker, S., L. Thompson, R. Kancans, N. Stenekes, and T. Mallawaarachchi 
(2012) ‘Drivers of practice change in land management in Australian 
agriculture’, ABARES, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry, Canberra.
Farmar-Bowers, Q. and R. Lane (2006) Understanding farmer decision 
systems that relate to land use, Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, Victoria, report to the School of Global Studies, 
Social Sciences and Planning, RMIT, Melbourne.
Fenton, D.M. (2004) A monitoring and evaluation framework for the 
social dimensions of the NHT and NAPSWQ, National Land and 
Water Resource Audit, Canberra.
Fishbein, M. and I. Ajzen (2010) Predicting and changing behavior: 
The reasoned action approach, New York, Taylor & Francis.
Greiner, R. and D. Gregg (2011) ‘Farmers’ intrinsic motivations, 
barriers to the adoption of conservation practices and effectiveness 
of policy instruments: Empirical evidence from northern Australia’, 
Land Use Policy 28: 257–65.
Jennings, J. (2005) On the Effectiveness of Participatory Research in 
Agriculture, PhD thesis, University of Western Sydney.
Kancans, R., S. Ecker, A. Duncan, N. Stenekes and H. Zobel-Zubrzycka 
(2014) Drivers of practice change in Australian agriculture: Synthesis 
report: Stages I, II and III, Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Canberra.
Lockie, S. and R. Tennent (2010) ‘Market instruments and collective 
obligations for on-farm biodiversity conservation’, Agriculture, 
Biodiversity and Markets Livelihoods and Agroecology in Comparative 
Perspective (eds S. Lockie and D. Carpenter), Earthscan, London.
Marshall, G.R. (2010) ‘What “community” means for farmer adoption 
of conservation practices’, Changing land management: Adoption of 
new practices by rural landholders (eds D. Pannell and F. Vanclay), 
CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne. 
161
12 . SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF BIODIvERSITy CONSERvATION PROGRAMS
Pannell, D.J., G.R. Marshall, N. Barr, A.F.V. Curtis and R. Wilkinson 
(2006) ‘Understanding and promoting adoption of conservation 
technologies by rural landholders’, Australian Journal of 
Experimental Agriculture 46(11): 1407–24.
Robins, L. and S. Dovers (2007) ‘NRM regions in Australia: The haves 
and the have nots’, Geographical Research 45(3): 273–90.
Rogers, E. (2003) Diffusion of Innovations, fifth edition, Simon and 
Schuster, London.
Windle, J. and J. Rolfe (2006) Fitzroy Basin Association’s Biodiversity 





Contract preferences and 
psychological determinants 




• Agri-environment schemes offer positive financial incentives to 
farmers, and are favoured by farmers over other policy approaches, 
but this does not translate into unconditional participation. 
To maximise participation, agri-environment scheme design needs 
to consider farmer preferences for contract features, motivations, 
and attitudes. 
• In general, farmers are more likely to sign up to agri-environment 
scheme contracts that allow some form of agricultural production 
on the contract area, offer a higher per hectare payment, are shorter, 
allow flexibility, and are externally monitored. 
• Preferences are context specific and there is significant 
variation in  preferences among farmers, meaning that a suite of 
agri-environment scheme contract options works best to maximise 
participation. But  contract choice must not compromise the 
intended conservation result. 
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• Agri-environment schemes need to be supported by complementary 
measures, such as information and extension, to shape attitudes 
and ensure that agri-environment scheme design, implementation, 
and administration do not jeopardise existing altruism and intrinsic 
motivation for conservation among farmers.
• Biodiversity conservation on private land, funded by voluntary 
contractual arrangements, is likely to be an expensive way to do 
conservation. From the perspective of efficiency and permanency 
of investment, inclusion of land into the formal conservation estate 
is preferable. However, agri-environment schemes can play a vital 
role of securing strategically important areas into a multi-tenure 
conservation system in the short- to medium-term.
Figure 13.1: Conducting research on pastoralists’ participation 
in contractual biodiversity conservation at Hayfield Station in 
the Northern Territory. 
Source: Photo by Romy Greiner.
Paying farmers for environmental services is a novel concept in the vast 
landscapes of northern Australia. These landscapes remain sparingly 
used and the tropical savannas vegetation has been largely retained 
(Greiner et al. 2009a). But degradation is occurring, and pressures 
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for agricultural development and intensification are mounting. 
The  opportunity still exists to prevent the scale of environmental 
decline and species extinctions that has been experienced in other 
parts of Australia. Could agri-environment schemes be an effective 
policy instrument to safeguard northern Australia’s biodiversity, and, 
if so, what should an effective agri-environment scheme look like? 
Europe has 30 years’ experience with conservation programs, which 
provide incentives directly to farmers to protect and manage land for 
biodiversity. A recent review of these biodiversity agri-environment 
schemes has shown that they can be effective for conserving wildlife 
on farmland, but that agri-environmental schemes need to be carefully 
designed to achieve their goals (Batáry et al. 2015). Schemes need 
to be feasible across large landscapes and incentivise landholder 
participation. 
An obvious aspect of agri-environmental scheme design is deciding 
on the level of incentive to pay to participating landholders. 
Microeconomic theory of profit maximisation might suggest that 
landholders will consider participating in a scheme if they do not incur 
a net loss of income. Assuming that a switch to conservation-focused 
land management causes a loss of income in most circumstances and 
can result in additional costs, the financial incentive has to at least 
compensate these imposts. However, a singular focus on the financial 
dimension is misguided, because adoption and participation decisions 
by farmers are influenced by consideration of various aspects of the 
innovation (Pannell et al. 2006). In the context of agri-environment 
schemes this means that, in addition to its immediate financial 
dimension, other contract attributes are also important, as are social 
and psychological factors (Greiner et al. 2009b).
As the theory of planned behaviour explains, psychological factors 
such as motivations and attitudes can be important predictors of 
behaviour (Ajzen 1991), including adoption of innovation and 
program participation. Knowledge of which factors influence 
participation, and how, can help with the design and implementation 
of agri-environment schemes so as to maximise farmer participation, 
improve scheme effectiveness, and maximise efficiency of investment. 
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This chapter summarises relevant knowledge and offers illustrations 
based on a survey of 104 farmers in northern Australia, as part of 
the Australian Government’s National Environmental Research 
Program Northern Australia Hub. Face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with pastoral land owners and land managers, mostly on 
their properties. Respondents represent approximately 15 per cent 
of farmers  in the rangelands of the tropical savannas and manage 
a combined area of over 250,000 km2 of land. Methodological 
specifications and detailed results can be gleaned from Greiner (2014a, 
2015) and Greiner et al. (2014).
Figure 13.2: The Einasleigh Uplands are one landscape within 
northern Australian tropical savannas. 
Source: Photo by Romy Greiner.
Farmers have diverse preferences for 
contract attributes
Agri-environment schemes are principally implemented using contracts 
between purchasers of conservation services, typically governments, 
and farmers as providers of various conservation services. In essence, 
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an agri-environment scheme constitutes a payment for environmental 
services (Greiner et al. 2009a). Contract attributes as a minimum entail 
the conservation actions that farmers have to undertake, the level of 
stewardship payment they receive in return ($/ha), and duration of 
the agreement (years). They also tend to stipulate arrangements about 
monitoring and administration, and possible flexibility provisions. 
The payment levels offered in the choice experiment were guided 
by long-term estimates of farm cash income in the tropical savannas 
and industry consultations. Across the tropical savannas, the average 
annual cash income is approximately $3 per hectare (DAFF  2014, 
2013 equivalent values). However, income is highly variable, 
both  temporally and spatially: the coefficient of variation between 
1990–2013 is close to 100 per cent, and in good seasons cash income 
can be four times the average income, while in bad seasons cash 
income is negative. Across the tropical savannas there are vast areas 
of marginal land with zero productivity while some pockets of fertile 
land average 10 times the landscape average cash income. 
A body of literature is dedicated to exploring how farmers trade-off 
contract attributes against each other and the per hectare payment 
(e.g. Garrod et al. 2012; Burton and Schwarz 2013; Espinosa-Goded et 
al. 2010; Broch and Vedel 2012). The literature shows that, in general, 
farmers prefer higher payments, shorter contracts, more flexibility, 
less accountability, and less paperwork. Preferences and trade-offs 
are context specific, meaning they are dependent on the geographical 
setting, type of agricultural sector, and the conservation goal to be 
achieved.
Observed and stated preference techniques can be used to quantify 
farmers’ preferences and how they trade off between contract attributes, 
and to explain how each attribute affects the likely participation 
by farmers in the scheme. Preferences indicate the monetary value 
that farmers attach to contract attributes. If, for example, a farmer’s 
preference is for a short contract and the funder wants to offer a 
long contract, then the funder will most likely need to offer a higher 
per-hectare stewardship payment to secure the farmer’s participation.
The research with northern Australian farmers used a stated 
preference technique — choice experiment — to explore 
participation in hypothetical biodiversity conservation contracts 
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(Greiner et al. 2014). Biodiversity in this context was defined as native 
flora and fauna, and the ecosystems that support them. Analysis of 
the choice experimental data confirmed the aforementioned generic 
findings in the literature regarding preferences for contract features 
and provided context specific preference estimates (Greiner 2015). 
For  example, across the industry, graziers were asking for a $0.40 
increase in annual per hectare payment (value in 2013 equivalent) for 
an additional year of contract duration. In terms of the conservation 
requirement, across the industry, graziers required an extra $11.08 
per hectare a year (95 per cent confidence interval: $7.45–$14.47) as 
a premium for participation in contracts for the complete removal 
of cattle from the contract area, compared to contract options that 
required the exclusion of cattle for only a short period of time each 
year (such as when the biodiversity was most susceptible to grazing 
impact). This would suggest that, across the industry, landholders are 
benchmarking opportunity costs against income in favourable years 
rather than long-term average conditions — they are hedging their 
bets with participation in agri-environment schemes.
The results of that choice experiment also illustrated the significant 
variation in preferences for all contract attributes (Greiner 2015). 
For  example, across the industry, some farmers preferred that 
monitoring of contract compliance be undertaken by external 
providers, and others preferred to undertake the monitoring 
themselves (with occasional spot checks). Some farmers charged a very 
high premium for total exclusion of cattle, while others were prepared 
to accept this option more cheaply, all else being equal — but still 
at a premium above opportunity cost. Understanding the diversity 
of preferences for contract attributes — even within a seemingly 
homogenous farming sector such as the northern beef industry — 
helps investors to gauge the likely responses by farmers in a region 
or in an industry to certain contract features. This information 
consequently enables agri-environment scheme design to be tailored 
— contractually and administratively — so as to ensure fit for purpose 
and program efficiency. 
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Making money is important but other goals 
may be more important to some
Age and education are the personal characteristics of farmers most 
often associated with participation in agri-environment schemes 
(see Chapter 10). However, in the research with northern Australian 
farmers, neither of these characteristics was found to have a 
significant influence (Greiner 2015). Psychological constructs, such 
as attitudes and motivations, seem to be more relevant to behaviour. 
Both have previously been found to be antecedents of conservation 
behaviour of northern Australian farmers (Greiner and Gregg 2011). 
Empirical research with farmers elsewhere has similarly established 
the importance of motivations (see Chapter 12). To test this theory 
in the context of agri-environment scheme participation, the survey 
included separate five-point Likert scales to derive measures of 
motivation and attitudes towards biodiversity (Greiner 2014a). 
The research found that the five most highly rated goals (based on 
mean value of motivation items) did not include financial items but 
were to: ‘look after cattle’, ‘get satisfaction from living and working 
on the land’, ‘pass on land in good condition’, ‘enjoy life and work 
on the property’, and ‘look after the natural assets of the property’ 
(see Table 13.1). Survey results supported the idea that farmers in 
northern Australia have a high intrinsic stewardship motivation for 
safeguarding their cattle, land, and biodiversity assets, and that this is 
fundamentally linked to the pursuit of pastoralism as a chosen lifestyle 
(Greiner and Gregg 2011). 
Principal component factor analysis was used to group the goals into 
broad themes, or factors, which represented three different types of 
motivations: ‘stewardship and lifestyle motivation’, ‘social motivation’, 
and ‘economic/financial motivation’. Respondents who tended to have 
high ratings for stewardship and lifestyle motivation were driven 
by a custodianship ethic (‘look after the natural assets’, ‘look after 
cattle’) combined with enjoyment of their work and lifestyle. Farmers 
who tended to score highly on economic/financial motivation were 
driven by wanting to generate profit, income, and assets. Farmers who 
scored highly on social motivation tended to be more strongly driven 
by family considerations and making a contribution to global food 
production. 
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The motivational profile is consistent with the literature (Maybery et 
al. 2005) and, importantly, supports the motivation factor structure 
of pastoralists proposed by Greiner et al. (2009b). That research 
had demonstrated a positive correlation between graziers’ level of 
stewardship and lifestyle motivation and the adoption of best practice 
grazing land management, including the spelling of riparian areas 
and early de-stocking of the property when drought conditions were 
emerging. The recent choice experiment similarly found a significant 
positive influence of intrinsic interest in biodiversity — defined as 
the native animals and plants — and likelihood of participation in 
agri-environment schemes (Greiner 2015).
Table 13.1: What motivates pastoralists and graziers: Mean 
rating scores and factor loadings from a survey of northern 
Australian farmers (n=104).













Look after the natural assets of the 
property
4 .5 0 .8
Pass on land in good condition 4 .6 0 .8
Safeguard the property’s natural 
assets
4 .4 0 .7
Enjoy life and work on the property 4 .6 0 .7
Improve resource/land condition 4 .3 0 .7
Protect the environment 4 .3 0 .7
Look after cattle 4 .6 0 .6
Get satisfaction from living and 
working on the land
4 .6 0 .6
Produce high‑quality cattle 4 .4 0 .6
Raise family on a grazing property 3 .7 0 .8
Retire on the farm 2 .5 0 .6
Ride horses/motorbikes/helicopters 3 .1 0 .6
Put children through school/
university
4 .0 0 .6
Step in ancestors’ footsteps 2 .3 0 .6
Produce beef to help feed the world 
population
3 .9 0 .5
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Earn a high income 3 .1 0 .7
Maximise company profit 4 .0 0 .7
Maximise cattle production from 
the land
4 .0 0 .7
Avoid years with very little or 
negative income
3 .8 0 .6
Build up land, wealth and assets 3 .9 0 .5
Be among the best in the industry 3 .5 0 .5
Run a profitable business 4 .4 0 .5
Eigenvalue  6 .0 2 .5 2 .2
Cumulative (Eigenvalue)  6 .0 8 .6 10 .7
% Total (variance)  27 .4 11 .5 9 .9
Cumulative (%)  27 .4 38 .9 48 .8
1 Items in the table are sorted by factor association and loading value.
2 Survey question: ‘When you think about being a land owner/manager and pastoralist, how 
important are the following motivations to you?’ A five‑point response scale with 1=‘not at 
all important’ to 5=‘extremely important’.
3 Factor analysis conducted in Statistica 12, principal component extraction of factors, 
varimax orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion of missing values, deletion of items with 
factor loadings <0.5. 
Table 13.2: Attitudes of graziers and pastoralists towards 
biodiversity: Agreement with attitudinal statements and 
attitude factor scores from a survey of northern Australian 
farmers (n=104). 












As a landowner/land manager, 
I have an obligation to look after 
the native biodiversity and other 
natural assets on the property
4 .5 0 .8
Caring for biodiversity is 
important to me personally
4 .2 0 .7
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I take pleasure from seeing 
native biodiversity around
4 .3 0 .7
Every pastoralist has a moral 
responsibility to look after the 
biodiversity and other natural 
assets on his/her land
4 .3 0 .6
Abundance of certain native 
animals is an indicator of the 
health of the country
4 .1 0 .6
Grazing plays a minor role in 
biodiversity decline compared 
to other pressures
3 .5 0 .8
Statutory duty of care is 
sufficient to protect biodiversity
2 .9 0 .7
Feral animals and plants pose 
a greater threat to native 
biodiversity than grazing
4 .1 0 .7
Current national parks 
are sufficient to safeguard 
biodiversity of the savannas
2 .9 0 .6
I have noticed a decline of 
native animals and plants on 
my property
1 .9 0 .7
Protecting endangered species 
on my property is easy
2 .8 ‑0.7
It is relatively easy to safeguard 
native biodiversity on my 
property
3 .4 ‑0.7
Eigenvalue  2 .7 2 .0 1 .4
Cumulative (Eigenvalue)  2 .7 4 .8 6 .2
% Total (variance)  19 .5 14 .5 10 .3
Cumulative (%)  19 .5 34 .0 44 .2
1 Statements in the table are sorted by factor association and loading values.
2 Survey question: ‘how strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements?’ 
five‑point response scale with 1=‘strongly disagree’ to 5=‘strongly agree’. 
3 Factor analysis conducted in Statistica 12, principal component extraction of factors, 
varimax orthogonal rotation, pairwise deletion of missing values, deletion of items with 
factor loadings <0.5. 
173
13 . CONTRACT PREFERENCES AND PSyChOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATION
How farmers relate to biodiversity and what they 
think about agri-environment schemes influences 
likely participation in agri-environment schemes
The survey explored attitudes towards biodiversity and policy tools, 
including agri-environment schemes. Biodiversity attitudes were 
derived using factor analysis from the level of agreement with a Likert 
scale containing biodiversity related statements. The three-factor 
model provided a parsimonious construct of how farmers related to 
and thought about biodiversity (Table 13.2).
The factors captured the level of stewardship ethic, what farmers 
believed to be the causes of and solutions to biodiversity decline 
on pastoral land, and the extent to which they thought they could 
influence biodiversity on their properties. Farmers who scored highly 
on the ‘stewardship ethic’ factor attributed higher intrinsic value to 
biodiversity and believed landholders had a duty of care towards 
biodiversity. Farmers who scored highly on the ‘causes of decline’ 
factor tended to believe that biodiversity decline was mainly caused 
by factors other than grazing and that the formal conservation estate 
was sufficient to safeguard biodiversity. Farmers who scored highly on 
the ‘biodiversity on own property’ factor tended to notice a decline of 
biodiversity on their properties and did not think that safeguarding of 
biodiversity was a trivial task.
When these factors were included into the choice models, ‘stewardship 
ethic’ was shown to significantly and positively influence likely 
participation in agri-environment schemes (Greiner 2015). The level 
of ‘stewardship ethic’ as an attitude was significantly positively 
correlated with ‘stewardship and lifestyle motivation’ (p<0.001). 
Interpreted through the lens of Chapter 14, this can be interpreted 
as meaning farmers with higher stewardship ethic derive non-
monetary private benefits from participation in agri-environment 
schemes, which reduces the financial incentive required. Accounting 
for these kinds of benefits when planning conservation can increase 
agri-environment schemes efficiency (for example, more biodiversity 
conservation for the same amount of program expenditure).
This research measured farmers’ attitudes towards agri-environment 
schemes in terms of perceived effectiveness and found that, in general, 
farmers rated agri-environment schemes similarly favourably as 
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income tax incentives and as more effective in incentivising more on-
farm conservation than property planning, research, persuasion, and 
recognition measures (Table 13.3). Farmers who rated agri-environment 
schemes more favourably were found to be more likely to participate 
in contractual biodiversity conservation (Greiner 2015). 
Table 13.3: Preferences for policy instruments and other 
measures: Perceived effectiveness based on a survey of 
northern Australian farmers (n=104).




Government investment in safeguarding/expanding overseas 
cattle markets
4 .1 1 .1
Income tax incentives 3 .8 1 .0
Financial incentives schemes (payments for ecosystem 
services) such as the ones explored in this research
3 .8 1 .1
Property management planning 3 .5 1 .1
Increased public acknowledgement of environmental 
achievements by graziers 
3 .4 1 .2
More research into animals and grazing systems 3 .4 1 .1
Courses in grazing systems/grazing land management 3 .3 1 .2
More extension and consulting services offered on‑farm 3 .2 1 .1
Debt‑for‑conservation swaps 3 .1 1 .3
Environmental management plans/systems 3 .1 1 .0
Industry organisations promoting the benefits of farm 
enterprise diversification
3 .1 1 .2
voluntary (industry and regional) grazing code of practice 2 .8 1 .1
Increased peer recognition of grazier achievements 
(e.g. awards)
2 .5 1 .1
Community involvement (volunteers, schools) in on‑ground 
works
2 .4 1 .2
1 Items in the table sorted by mean effectiveness value.
2 Survey question: ‘how effective would the following measures be in helping you to 
undertake (more) conservation activities on your operation?’. A five‑point response scale 
with 1=‘not at all effective’ to 5=‘extremely effective’.
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What this means for agri-environment 
scheme design
The empirical research summarised in this chapter suggests that 
agri-environment schemes are well liked by farmers and that 
participation in agri-environment schemes is readily considered once 
such programs are available to farmers. Participation decisions have 
been found to be subject to a number of factors. In addition to farm 
economic considerations about associated benefits and costs, a farmer’s 
decision to participate in an agri-environment scheme at a certain 
incentive level is likely to be influenced by his or her like or dislike of 
contractual features, the trade-offs between contractual features, the 
reasons that drive him or her to be a farmer, and how he or she relates 
to the natural environment — in this case, biodiversity.
Figure 13.3: The brolga (Grus rubicunda) is one species that 
could benefit from environmental management in tropical 
savannas. 
Source: Photo by Romy Greiner.
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To ensure sufficient uptake to be effective and efficient, 
agri-environment schemes need to be carefully tailored to the 
contextual conditions. Of course, an agri-environment scheme is 
principally there to address an environmental problem and is only fit 
for purpose if the conservation requirements effectively address this 
problem. However, agri-environment schemes must equally succeed in 
engaging with the diversity of businesses, preferences, and attitudes 
of the target audience. The environmental success of agri-environment 
schemes depends on voluntary participation and farmers’ willingness 
to participate, given the contractual conditions.
The challenge for the design and administration of agri-environment 
schemes is how to achieve effectiveness and efficiency of a program, 
and also consider matters of equity and procedural justice. On the 
basis of the research outlined herein, the following principles require 
consideration:
• Contracts need to stipulate conservation actions that meet the 
requirements of the biodiversity targeted for conservation. If some 
production can co-exist with conservation, farmers are significantly 
more willing to participate.
• Giving farmers a suite of contract options to choose from helps 
to entice landholder participation by responding to diverse cost 
structures (opportunity costs, risk premiums and transaction 
costs), diverse preferences for contract attributes, and diverse 
motivations and attitudes. 
• Care needs to be taken to ensure that program features do not crowd 
out voluntary conservation actions that farmers may already be 
providing. This is particularly problematic in places such as northern 
Australia, where many farmers attribute a high value to biodiversity 
and are strongly motivated by stewardship considerations. 
• In situations where intrinsic motivation is low and/or 
attitudes towards agri-environment schemes are unfavourable, 
complementary  strategies are required to create an improved 
psychological foundation for agri-environment scheme 
participation.  Complementary strategies can include information 
and extension efforts to articulate the values of biodiversity and 
demonstrate how farming impacts biodiversity, and showcase 
the effects of conservation actions. Regulatory and statutory 
requirements on landholders, for example in the form of an 
environmental duty of care (Greiner 2014b), are relevant supporting 
mechanisms.
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• Allowing farmers to negotiate their land area contribution to 
an agri-environment scheme is important, particularly in an 
environment where individual operators are custodians of very 
large areas of land (the typical size of a pastoral station in northern 
Australia is around 2,500–10,000 km2). This gives rise to the 
scenario where a single farmer may control significant biodiversity 
assets on a portion of the property’s area, so that engaging this 
single farmer in a conservation contract may be critical for 
safeguarding those biodiversity assets. The locality-specificity of 
biodiversity conservation combined with low number of potential 
services providers reduces opportunities for investors to implement 
agri-environment schemes in a competitive fashion (e.g. through 
environmental tenders). In such scenarios, negotiated approaches 
will be required with small numbers or single pastoralists who can 
achieve a desired conservation outcome. Successful negotiation 
will require a flexible approach to contract design.
• Biodiversity conservation on private land, funded by voluntary 
contractual arrangements, is an expensive way to do conservation, 
as the European experience shows (Batáry et al. 2015, p. 1014) and as 
the results of this research confirm. From the perspective of efficiency 
and permanency, inclusion of land into the formal conservation 
estate is preferable. However, agri-environment schemes can play a 
vital role of securing strategically important areas into a multi-tenure 
conservation system in the short- to medium-term.
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Accounting for private benefits in 
ecological restoration planning
Maksym Polyakov and David Pannell
Key lessons
• Selecting an effective ecological restoration project requires 
information about the levels of public and private net benefits that 
are likely to result from project implementation.
• Environmental assets on private land in agricultural landscapes 
may provide benefits that are valued by the landholders. The value 
of these benefits could be reflected in property sale prices.
• An extra hectare of native vegetation is valued more highly by 
the landholders of smaller properties and by the landholders of 
properties with smaller areas of native vegetation.
• Accounting for the private benefits generated by native vegetation 
when planning and targeting ecological restoration results in 
substantially greater biodiversity outcomes.
Introduction
Approximately 77 per cent of Australia’s land area is managed by 
private landholders, which makes conservation on private lands an 
essential part of Australia’s conservation strategy. Some examples 
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of conservation initiatives on private land are the BushTender in 
Victoria, the Environmental Stewardship Project in New South Wales 
and Queensland, and the Whole of Paddock Rehabilitation (WOPR) 
scheme run by Greening Australia. Developing cost-effective ecological 
restoration programs on private lands is important, and it is crucial 
that the drivers of landholder participation in ecological restoration 
programs be identified (e.g. Blackmore and Doole 2013).
In this chapter, we explore several key lessons that would allow 
environmental managers to design effective ecological restoration 
programs by aligning landholders’ private benefits with the public 
benefits of biodiversity conservation. We do this by identifying the 
circumstances in which native vegetation on private lands is likely 
to be valued by the landholder. This knowledge can be incorporated 
in the planning of ecological restoration programs and targeting of 
ecological restoration sites.
Public and private benefits 
Environmental assets in rural landscapes provide a variety of benefits, 
or ecosystem services, to landholders (private benefits to the owners 
of the land in question) and to the public (public benefits to people 
other than the landholder). Private benefits of native vegetation 
include provision of shade for livestock, recreational opportunities, 
and increased amenity through improved aesthetics. Examples of 
public benefits provided by native vegetation include the provision 
of habitat for biodiversity, and regulation of water flows. The optimal 
allocation of rural land between intensive agricultural use, such as 
cropland or modified pasture, and native vegetation, which has 
conservation, amenity, and limited production value, depends on 
the balance between public and private benefits generated by the 
native vegetation, and the costs of land use change, such as ecological 
restoration, including the opportunity cost of foregone agricultural 
production.
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Figure 14.1: A brown honeyeater feeding its young. 
Source: Photo by Maksym Polyakov.
One of the ways to increase the provision of public benefits from 
agricultural landscapes is to use ecological restoration to reallocate 
land from intensive agriculture to conservation use. Designing 
effective policy instruments to implement natural resource 
management (NRM) actions, such as ecological restoration on private 
lands, requires information on private benefits generated by these 
management actions. Pannell (2008) developed a framework to guide 
the choice between policy mechanisms, based on the levels of public 
and private net benefits likely to result from proposed management 
actions (see Chapter 18). The framework highlights the importance of 
targeting funds in environmental programs to selected spatial targeting 
areas, based on the likely levels of public and private net benefits. For 
example, selecting ecological restoration projects that provide public 
benefits and modest private benefits would provide high value for 
money, because policy mechanisms are likely to influence behaviour 
at relatively low public cost (Polyakov et al. 2015). 
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Environmental benefits valued by the 
landholders
Environmental assets located on private properties, such as native 
vegetation, may generate private benefits that could be reflected in 
property values. These values can be estimated using the hedonic 
pricing method. While there have been many studies that value 
environmental assets on public lands, few studies have investigated 
the values of ecosystem services generated by environmental 
assets located on private rural lands. For example, Ma and Swinton 
(2011) found that environmental assets, such as forest, wetlands, 
and streams, located both on the property and in the surrounding 
landscape, increase the value of rural properties in Michigan. Walpole 
and Lockwood (1999) measured the effect of native vegetation on 
the values of rural properties in north east Victoria and southern 
New South Wales. While they did not find a measureable impact on 
property value when native vegetation covered less than 50 per cent 
of property area, coverage above 50 per cent decreased property value. 
Polyakov et al. (2013) estimated that the native vegetation on rural 
lifestyle properties in Victoria has a positive and diminishing marginal 
value, with the property value maximised when the proportion of area 
occupied by native vegetation is approximately 40 per cent, which 
increases property value by 10.5 per cent relative to the value of a 
similar property without native vegetation. However, when the area 
occupied by native vegetation exceeds 80 per cent of the property, the 
value of the property is reduced to less than the value associated with 
no native vegetation. Since the current extent of native vegetation is 
lower than the extent that would maximise its amenity value to many 
landholders (Polyakov et al. 2013), the welfare value to people living 
in the landscape may be improved by restoring native vegetation on 
cleared lands. 
These examples demonstrate that environmental assets in agricultural 
landscapes, which generate supporting, regulating, and cultural 
ecosystem services, provide private benefits to the landholders. 
These benefits are reflected in increased property values. Ecological 
restoration on private land can increase both the welfare of landholders 
and the provision of public benefits. 
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Property size and extent of native 
vegetation matters
Native vegetation on private land provides a range of cultural, 
recreational, and aesthetic amenity benefits to landholders. On rural 
properties, the retention of native vegetation is generally in conflict 
with agricultural practices used to produce food and fibre. As with 
any limited resource, both native vegetation and agricultural land are 
likely to exhibit diminishing marginal values. This means that the value 
of the last hectare of land is lower than the value of the second last 
hectare. There could be an optimal combination of native vegetation 
and agricultural land on private rural property that maximises the 
total benefit a landholder derives from the property, which would 
be reflected in a higher property value. The optimal combination of 
these land uses depends on the landholder’s goals and preferences 
(see Chapter 13). It is likely that the value of native vegetation varies 
across the spectrum of landholders, such as full-time farmers, part-
time farmers, and lifestyle farmers. For example, owners of lifestyle 
properties have relatively strong preferences for amenity values of 
native vegetation, while owners of large agricultural properties have 
preference for the production value of agricultural land.
Polyakov et al. (2015) used data from around 7,500 rural properties in 
north central Victoria sold between 1990 and 2011 to estimate the value 
that a variety of rural landholders place on native vegetation on their 
properties. They used property size as a proxy for landholder type to 
model differences in the values of native vegetation across the range of 
property types in a multifunctional rural landscape. They found that 
the value of native vegetation is smaller on larger properties, which 
are associated with production-oriented farmers, and larger on smaller 
properties, which are associated with lifestyle landholders. The value of 
additional native vegetation is higher on the properties which currently 
have little native vegetation, and decreases with greater areas of native 
vegetation. This implies that increasing the area of native vegetation on 
a property increases its value up to an optimal point (see Figure 14.2), 
after which additional native vegetation decreases the property value. 
The proportion of native vegetation that maximises the property 
value, as well as the extent to which it increases the property value, 
varies across property sizes (see Figure 14.2). This reflects landholders’ 
targets and priorities. For example, a 1 hectare property would reach 
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its highest value when native vegetation covers about 45 per cent of its 
area. Such a property would be worth approximately 25 per cent more 
than a similar property without any native vegetation. Further increase 
of the area of native vegetation would decrease the property value 
relative to the optimum, and when the proportion of native vegetation 
exceeds 90 per cent of the property area, its value becomes lower than 
the value of similar property without any native vegetation. As the 
property size increases, the optimal proportion of native vegetation 
becomes lower and native vegetation has a smaller impact on property 
values. The  optimal proportions of native vegetation for 10 hectare, 
100 hectare, and 1,000 hectare properties are estimated to be 37 per cent, 
29 per cent, and 20 per cent, respectively. These proportions would 
increase property values by, respectively, 16 per cent, 9 per cent, and 
5 per cent relative to the values of similar properties without any 
native vegetation. Adding more native vegetation after reaching these 
optimal proportions would decrease property values: after proportions 
of native vegetation reach 64 per cent, 58 per cent, and 40 per cent, 
respectively, values of these properties would become lower than the 
values of similar, fully cleared properties.
Figure 14.2: Effect of the proportion of native vegetation on 
land value by property size over time. 
Source: Maksym Polyakov, David J. Pannell, Ram Pandit, Sorada Tapsuwan, Geoff Park, 
‘Capitalized Amenity value of Native vegetation in a Multifunctional Rural Landscape’, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2014, 97(1): 299–314,  by permission of 
Oxford University Press.
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It is important to account for private 
benefits when planning ecological 
restoration 
A large proportion of the costs of ecological restoration projects 
consist of opportunity costs, which in this context is the loss of 
income that occurs when land use is changed from agriculture or other 
productive use to conservation. Traditionally, opportunity costs of 
ecological restoration in agricultural landscapes have been accounted 
for using land values (Westphal et al. 2007) or the capitalised revenue 
of agricultural production (Crossman and Bryan 2006). The latter is 
aggregated present value of future net income from the land, which 
should approximately match the land’s sale value if the only values 
that matter are commercial values. Using these values to represent the 
opportunity cost of restoration implies that when a parcel of land is 
acquired for an ecological restoration project, the landholder loses all 
private benefits generated by this parcel. However, when ecological 
restoration is conducted on private land with the landholder retaining 
ownership of the land, the landholder captures the benefits generated 
by the restored ecosystem, such as amenity from native vegetation. 
This reduces the opportunity cost and overall cost of the restoration 
project. Furthermore, because the value of privately captured benefits 
of ecosystem services varies with property type, size, and the amount 
of existing native vegetation on the property (see Figure 14.2), the 
opportunity costs of ecological restoration would be lower on smaller 
properties and properties with little native vegetation. Ignoring private 
benefits in calculation of opportunity costs of ecological restoration on 
private lands could lead to misleading recommendations for ecological 
restoration planning. 
In a study of Mt Alexander Shire in Victoria, Polyakov and Pannell 
(2014) tested whether ignoring private benefits in calculating the 
opportunity cost resulted in different optimal (from the point of 
view of maximising public benefits) spatial allocation of ecological 
restoration and different biodiversity outcomes. They compared 
optimal ecological restoration strategies resulting from two different 
assumptions about opportunity cost. In one scenario, opportunity cost 
was based on the land value, while in another scenario, opportunity 
cost was estimated by taking into account the land value and private 
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benefits of native vegetation. The scenario accounting for private 
benefits of ecological restoration gave a substantially (up to 75 per cent) 
better biodiversity outcome than the scenario using opportunity cost 
based on only land values. The spatial pattern of ecological restoration 
in these scenarios differed substantially. In the scenario that uses land 
values for opportunity cost, ecological restoration is selected on larger 
properties, which have lower per hectare land values. In the scenario 
that takes into account private benefits of native vegetation, ecological 
restoration takes place on smaller properties (lifestyle landholders). 
The land value of these properties is higher, but converting part of 
the property to native vegetation does not decrease property value. 
As a result, allocation of ecological restoration shifts towards smaller 
properties, even though transaction costs and overhead costs of 
implementing smaller ecological restoration projects are higher. 
This outcome is consistent with the findings of Race et al. (2010) that 
lifestyle landholders and part-time farmers undertake a considerable 
amount of work to revegetate and enhance native vegetation.
These results show that in order to avoid providing misleading 
recommendations to environmental managers, it is important to 
take into account amenity values of native vegetation and variable 
opportunity cost when prioritising ecological restoration. This is 
especially important in multifunctional landscapes with heterogeneous 
landholders.
Conclusion
This chapter summarises lessons from recent studies of the private 
benefits of environmental assets in rural landscapes, in the context of 
ecological restoration. Ecosystem services of the environmental assets, 
such as native vegetation on private lands, generate private benefits 
that are captured by the landholders. The value of private benefits 
generated by an extra hectare of native vegetation depends on the 
property type and area of native vegetation currently on the property. 
This information on private benefits from restoration is relevant to 
the decisions about the targeting of ecological restoration because 
private benefits of ecological restoration can reduce the public cost. 
Specifically, landholders with high marginal private benefits of 
revegetation would be more willing to participate in revegetation 
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programs. Targeting those landholders would provide better value for 
money because the program could be implemented at lower cost and 
with higher probability of success. Accounting for private benefits 
in planning and targeting restoration would result in restoration 
programs delivering greater benefits.
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• Agri-environment schemes are often highly variable in both their 
economic cost and biodiversity benefit, creating the potential for 
significant inefficiencies in conservation expenditure.
• Evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of agri-environment schemes 
can identify opportunities to significantly improve the conservation 
gains with the available resources, however, such evaluations are 
uncommon. 
• Simple economic evaluation tools can be applied by researchers or 
policymakers, using minimal economic data, to compare the cost-
effectiveness of agri-environment schemes at different scales and at 
stages through the implementation process. 
Introduction
Over the past decade, concerns have been raised regarding the 
effectiveness of agri-environment schemes in conserving biodiversity. 
Studies have shown that the success of these schemes is highly variable, 
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ranging from strong positive biodiversity benefits to neutral and even 
negative consequences. With global biodiversity declining dramatically 
and further threatened by agricultural intensification, a focus on 
the most effective strategies for conservation is critical. This issue is 
even more pertinent given that the funds available for biodiversity 
conservation are not sufficient to address the scale of the problem, and 
so agri-environment schemes are in competition with other conservation 
activities for limited resources. It is critical, therefore, that the cost-
effectiveness of agri-environment schemes are maximised to increase the 
biodiversity benefits obtained with available resources. 
Figure 15.1: The cost-effectiveness of agri-environment 
schemes can be influenced by many factors, from the location 
of sites to the specific conservation techniques used. 
Source: Photo by Brisbane City Council available at www.flickr.com/photos/brisbanecity 
council/7926277216 under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
Typically, evaluation of agri-environment schemes has been dominated 
by ecological or economic perspectives (Uthes and Matzdorf 2013). 
There has been comparatively little attention given to the cost-
effectiveness of these schemes. A recent review of 239 studies on the 
effectiveness of agri-environment schemes around the world found 
that fewer than 15 per cent considered economic costs in the evaluation 
195
15 . DEFINING AND DESIGNING COST‑EFFECTIvE AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES
(Ansell et al. in preparation). This is surprising, given the scale of 
the public expenditure in agri-environment schemes and increasing 
recognition of the biodiversity benefits that can be achieved through 
consideration of economic costs in the conservation planning process 
(see Chapter 17 by Fiona Gibson and colleagues). 
This chapter explores issues of the effectiveness and efficiency of 
agri-environment schemes, first defining cost-effectiveness in the 
context of such schemes, and providing an overview of common 
evaluation approaches. I conclude with a discussion on the outcomes 
of previous evaluations of the cost-effectiveness of agri-environment 
schemes, highlighting key aspects relevant to the design and 
implementation of agri-environment schemes in Australia.
What is cost-effectiveness?
Cost-effectiveness refers to the relative efficiency of an action in 
achieving an outcome. It can be expressed as the total cost of 
producing a single unit of benefit (i.e. cost/benefit), or alternatively as 
the total benefit produced per unit of cost (i.e. benefit/cost) (Wätzold 
and Schwerdtner 2005). Both approaches generate a ratio, referred 
to as the cost-effectiveness ratio or benefit–cost ratio, which forms 
the basis of a cost-effectiveness analysis. The ratio allows one to 
compare the efficiency of alternative actions. Note that while I focus 
here on evaluation approaches involving non-monetary measures of 
conservation benefit, as opposed to methods that assign a monetary 
value to the effectiveness measure, the concepts discussed apply 
generally across both approaches.
When applied to the evaluation of biodiversity benefits of 
agri-environment schemes, we can take cost-effectiveness as the 
biodiversity benefit produced per unit of cost (or, alternatively, cost 
per biodiversity unit). Comparison of the cost-effectiveness of different 
agri-environment schemes allows identification of those that provide 
the greatest biodiversity benefit per dollar spent. 
Variation in both the economic costs and effectiveness of conservation 
activities give rise to differences in the cost-effectiveness of 
agri-environment schemes (Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005). 
Agricultural ventures are rarely static in time and space, with 
farming practices, production intensity, and commodity choice 
varying according to various external market factors (Barraquand 
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and Martinet  2011). This  gives rise to significant variation in the 
opportunity costs of conservation on farmland at multiple spatial 
and temporal scales. Similarly, the effectiveness of agri-environment 
schemes in conserving biodiversity is highly variable, both temporally 
and spatially, and is influenced by factors at the field or farm scale 
(e.g. site size, management history) as well as at the landscape or 
regional scales (e.g. surrounding land use, connectivity, climate) 
(e.g.  Concepción and Díaz 2011). Effectiveness also varies between 
taxa, with some schemes providing positive conservation outcomes for 
some taxa while providing no benefit or even negative outcomes for 
other taxa (Kleijn et al. 2006). 
Complex interdependencies also exist between the effectiveness and 
cost of conservation activities in agri-environment schemes. For 
example, the overall cost of an agri-environment scheme is strongly 
influenced by the configuration (i.e. size and shape) of the particular 
field, with larger sites incurring a higher opportunity cost to the 
landholder, in turn requiring an increased payment rate, and often 
requiring increased materials. This can also influence biodiversity 
outcomes, with factors such as field size and shape shown to be 
important determinants of conservation effectiveness (Conover et 
al. 2011). This variation in costs and effectiveness, and the complex 
interactions between the two, create the potential for significant 
inefficiencies in conservation expenditure. Simple evaluation of the 
cost-effectiveness of agri-environment schemes can reveal factors 
driving conservation efficiency and identify opportunities to maximise 
the conservation benefits from investments.
Cost-effectiveness in practice
A critical step in the evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of 
agri-environment expenditure is the assessment of the costs of the 
scheme itself. The costs associated with agri-environment schemes can 
be categorised as acquisition (e.g. land rent), management (e.g.  site 
establishment, maintenance), transaction (e.g. negotiation, legal), and 
opportunity costs (e.g. forgone agricultural production) (Naidoo and 
Ricketts 2006). Consideration of the latter is particularly critical, as it 
can influence the design, uptake, and ultimately the effectiveness 
of biodiversity conservation in farmland, but is often omitted from 
project evaluations. 
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Evaluations can use realised or actual costs (Klimek et al. 2008), or 
estimated costs based on market rates, averages, or surrogates (Bamière 
et al. 2013). While evaluation based on actual costs provides improved 
accuracy, such information is not always readily available. Naidoo and 
Ricketts (2006) provide an overview of approaches for the estimation 
of common cost components of biodiversity conservation. Evaluations 
should attempt to take account of the full costs (and benefits) of 
agri-environment schemes (Bamière et al. 2013).
The other key component in the evaluation of cost-effectiveness 
is obviously the measure of the benefit or the effectiveness of 
conservation. As the numerator in most cost-effectiveness equations, 
it can strongly influence the outcomes of the evaluation and therefore 
careful selection is critical. Evaluation can use direct or field-based 
measures of effectiveness such as changes in single species abundance 
or density, or, alternatively, look at measures of community diversity 
(e.g. Ulber et al. 2011). Measures of habitat area or quality have also 
been used, either as direct measures of agri-environment schemes 
effectiveness (e.g. Wynn 2002), or as surrogate measures of broader 
biodiversity benefits (e.g. Hansen 2007). Thompson et al. (1999) use 
area of land enrolled in the particular agri-environment schemes under 
review as a proxy for effectiveness.
Many evaluations, particularly those carried out at the planning 
stages of agri-environment schemes (i.e. ex ante, see below) are based 
on modelled or predicted outcomes as measures of effectiveness. 
For example, Bamière et al. (2013) use spatial modelling to assess the 
efficiency of agri-environment policies by focusing on the spatial 
configuration of farm land for habitat conservation, specifically aiming 
for a random mosaic of sites, noting that such a configuration is more 
effective in the conservation of certain species, such as their model 
species, the little bustard, which depends on a mosaic of agricultural 
land use (i.e. crops, grassland).
Except where the particular objectives of the agri-environment 
schemes or research question dictates the use of a specific measure of 
effectiveness — for example, changes in the abundance of a species 
or in the area of a certain habitat — the researcher will be faced 
with the difficult task of selecting a suitable measure to capture, to 
the extent possible, the extent of the biodiversity benefits resulting 
from the scheme. In such cases, multiple benefits can be captured in 
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a metric that can then be used in economic analysis. Multi-criteria 
analysis approaches have also been used to combine multiple disparate 
environmental values into single measures (e.g. Hajkowicz and Collins 
2009). (In Chapter 17, Fiona Gibson and David Pannell discuss the 
consequences of using the wrong metric, while in Chapter 20 Phil 
Gibbons provides an overview of the development of metrics.) 
Irrespective of the particular effectiveness measure selected, careful 
consideration should be given to the means of collecting that 
information and its expression within the cost-effectiveness evaluation. 
Experimental design is critical in the assessment of cost-effectiveness. 
Failure to account for conservation status in the absence of the 
treatment (i.e. control or counterfactual) can lead to inflated measures 
of benefit and cost-effectiveness (a topic discussed by Duncan and 
Reich in Chapter 19). Kleijn and Sutherland (2003) found significant 
shortcomings in the design of studies evaluating the effectiveness of 
European agri-environment schemes, stemming largely from either 
poor, or absent, controls. The authors propose a number of remedies, 
including the use of baseline data, comparison of trends in treatments 
and controls, and use of carefully selected treatment and control site 
pairs. Of particular importance is the use of conservation gain (i.e. the 
difference in the biodiversity value between the treatment and 
control) as the measure of conservation benefit, rather than absolute 
values. This provides a more accurate measure of the benefit that has 
been purchased with the investment and controls for differences in 
the baseline condition or value (Maron et al. 2013). 
Cost-effectiveness can be considered at a variety of scales in the 
agri-environment schemes process. For example, we can consider 
the efficiency of different agri-environment policies in achieving 
environmental outcomes at a broad scale. Bamière et al. (2013) 
use a modelling approach to compare the cost-efficiency of three 
different agri-environment schemes, each using a different incentive 
mechanism, in achieving a specific objective for the conservation 
of little bustard habitat in French farmland. In contrast, we can 
compare the cost-effectiveness of specific measures in achieving 
their biodiversity objectives. Wilson et al. (2007) evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of two different conservation activities (a low cost habitat 
preservation option and a high cost habitat restoration option) aimed 
at improving wading bird populations in southern England under the 
Environmentally Sensitive Areas scheme. They find that, despite the 
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habitat restoration measure costing 50 per cent more per hectare than 
the habitat preservation measure, the return on investment from the 
higher cost option, measured as cost per breeding pair of waders, was 
more than 90 per cent higher than the low-cost option. This provides 
a strong example of the power of a simple cost-effectiveness analysis 
in comparing the efficiency of different conservation activities. 
The  choice of scale for evaluation should be appropriate for the 
research or policy question, and will influence the detail or resolution 
of the ecological and economic information required in the evaluation.
Box 15.1: Before, during and after — timing of AES 
evaluation.
We can also consider the cost‑effectiveness of agri‑environment schemes 
at different time stages throughout the process. Evaluations carried out prior 
to the implementation are referred to as ex ante evaluations and can provide 
important input into scheme design and implementation. Such evaluations 
provide the opportunity to optimise the efficiency and biodiversity benefits of 
agri‑environment schemes investments. van der horst (2007) assessed the 
efficiency gains from spatial targeting of a woodland agri‑environment schemes 
and found biodiversity gains of 1.6–2.1 times greater than that achieved through 
the untargeted scheme. White and Sadler (2011) achieve a 17 per cent budget 
saving through the use of conservation contracts based on variable payments 
tailored to outcomes achieved on individual enrolled farms compared to traditional 
fixed‑price contracts.
Evaluations can also be carried out during (in media res) or upon completion 
(ex post) of a scheme. In contrast to ex ante evaluations, which typically involve 
modelling of predicted biodiversity benefits and costs, such evaluations can use 
realised benefits and actual costs as inputs, provide a retrospective assessment 
of the efficiency of expenditure, and identify improvements for future programs. 
Both ex ante and ex post evaluations provide useful information about the 
biodiversity benefits of agri‑environment schemes. While the use of predicted 
biodiversity benefit and cost information in ex ante evaluations may provide 
less accurate information than approaches using realised benefits and actual 
costs (i.e. ex ante evaluations) (Boardman et al. 2010), conducting evaluations 
at this stage may improve the efficiency of an agri‑environment scheme before 
funding is expensed. In contrast, ex post evaluations, while providing information 
to improve the efficiency of future expenditure, can be hampered by limited 
availability of financial data and methodological issues around the measurement 
of biodiversity gains. 
Despite these shortcomings, both approaches can contribute to the refinement 
of agri‑environment schemes and increase the biodiversity gains and efficiency of 
agri‑environment expenditure. Ultimately, the choice of evaluation approach may 
be determined by financial and logistical constraints.
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Lessons learnt
While we may be tempted to think that the more we spend on 
agri-environment schemes, the better the biodiversity outcomes, 
evaluations reveal the relationship between the two is anything 
but straightforward. While some studies support this concept by 
demonstrating higher levels of conservation benefit with increasing 
expenditure (Barraquand and Martinet 2011; Wilson et al. 2007), 
others reveal more complex relationships. For example, in an ex post 
evaluation of the Scottish Woodland Grants Scheme, which aimed 
to improve priority habitats in farmland, Wynn (2002) found wide 
variation in cost, biodiversity benefit, and cost-effectiveness across 
different farm types. 
Shining a light on the economics of biodiversity conservation in farming 
landscapes can reveal some ugly truths that would otherwise not be 
uncovered by traditional ecological evaluations. Examples include 
the prevalence of significant windfall effects in agri-environment 
schemes, where farmers receive payments for environmental services 
or biodiversity outcomes that would have occurred regardless of 
whether the scheme was implemented (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 
2013; Sierra and Russman 2006; Ulber et al. 2011), and a reliance on 
agri-environment schemes payments for farm income (Pietzsch et al. 
2013). Recent modelling of the cost-effectiveness of habitat restoration 
on Australian farmland suggests that our current focus on restoring 
remnant habitats, as is the focus of the Australian Government’s 
largest agri-environmental scheme, the Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme (see Chapter 3 by Burns and colleagues), is suboptimal, with 
revegetation of cleared areas demonstrating higher biodiversity gains 
per dollar spent (Jellinek et al. 2014). 
While it is important that seemingly negative research outcomes 
such as these be evaluated and communicated, there is a potential 
risk of perverse conservation outcomes where seemingly adverse 
economic results drive policy decisions (i.e. cancellation of programs) 
at the expense of important biodiversity values or priorities. The 
challenge is in maintaining perspective in evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of agri-environment schemes and assessing the outcomes 
of such evaluations in the context of the scheme’s overall biodiversity 
objectives. 
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Evaluation can also provide important lessons for the design of future 
conservation programs. Many agri-environment schemes use a simple 
incentive system, where payments to farmers are based on fixed rates 
per hectare. Such approaches are relatively easy to administer, but 
risk significant inefficiency though overcompensation of farmers 
otherwise willing to accept a lower price for conservation (Klimek 
et al. 2008). This can also exacerbate the problem of marginal, low 
productivity areas dominating the enrolled land as farmers seek to 
minimise opportunity cost and maximise returns from enrolment 
(Bamière et al. 2013).
Several studies demonstrate the efficiency gains that can be achieved 
through more complex delivery mechanisms, such as auction-based 
and payment-by-results type systems (e.g. Barraquand and Martinet 
2011; Thompson et al. 1999; Klimek et al. 2008). Stoneham et al. 
(2003) compared the outcomes of a pilot auction for the Victorian 
BushTender scheme and found such an approach would achieve 
the same biodiversity outcomes at a cost seven times less than 
those achieved using a fixed-rate incentive payment. The increased 
efficiency of these approaches, however, must be balanced against 
the higher administrative or transaction costs associated with their 
implementation (Klimek et al. 2008; White and Sadler 2011). 
Conclusion
It is unfortunate that better use is not made of simple tools of economic 
evaluation in the planning and assessment of conservation expenditure 
in agricultural land. By focusing only on biological or ecological 
aspects in our evaluations, we miss opportunities to significantly 
increase the biodiversity benefits that can be achieved with the 
limited funding available. As demands to feed a growing population 
place even greater pressure on biodiversity in agricultural landscapes 
and the conservation purse strings tighten, maximising the efficiency 
of our conservation dollar becomes even more critical. Understanding 
the cost-effectiveness of our agri-environment investments is a critical 
step towards meeting this aim.
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Transaction costs in 
agri‑environment schemes
Stuart Whitten and Anthea Coggan
Key lessons
• Transaction costs of agri-environment schemes include the time, 
effort and expense of gathering information, identifying projects, 
negotiating contracts, and monitoring and compliance.
• They are incurred by participants, scheme proponents and 
administrators and can be significant, impacting not only on total 
scheme costs, but also on efficiency.
• Transaction costs are directly related to both scheme design and 
scheme implementation.
• Considering transaction costs does not necessarily mean reducing 
them — indeed, efficient program design may require increased 
transaction costs in order to more confidently deliver the desired 
outcome.
Transaction costs — a necessary evil?
Agri-environmental schemes, which are designed to support private 
land managers in delivering positive environmental outcomes, involve 
a range of costs to government and landholders. These include the direct 
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costs from implementing desired agri-environmental management 
actions (materials, labour, and equipment), opportunity costs from 
changes to agricultural production, transformation costs (physical or 
other changes to the business to allow the management actions to be 
implemented), and transaction costs (arising from program design, 
implementation, and management). While direct costs are generally 
highly visible and well reported, transformation and transaction costs 
are often less obvious and are neglected in analyses. Transaction costs 
are a particularly pervasive, yet relatively recent concept in economics, 
important in the design and implementation of agri-environment 
schemes.
Figure 16.1: There are numerous transaction costs associated 
with agri‑environment schemes, including compliance 
monitoring and program evaluation. 
Source: Photo by Declan Feeney available at www.flickr.com/photos/ardboline/9797787304 
under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0.
So what are these transaction costs? There are three overlapping 
definitions that apply somewhat differently depending on the 
particular environmental issue that a scheme is concerned with. From 
the perspective of the organisations involved in an agri-environment 
scheme, transaction costs relate to the costs of gathering information, 
negotiating or otherwise identifying who to pay, who to be paid by, 
and how much, as well as contracting, monitoring, and enforcement 
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(Williamson 1998). These costs apply to the scheme proponent (usually 
government agencies or third parties engaged by government) and 
to firms, individuals (i.e. landholders), or other agents engaging in 
the scheme (McCann et al. 2005). They are generally held to include 
the direct costs of designing the scheme, but a narrower definition 
applied by North (1990, pp. 1–35) limits transaction costs to the costs 
of specifying and supporting the contract. This definition is most 
relevant in direct comparison of existing agri-environment schemes 
designed for the same purpose, where the costs of designing the 
instrument can be considered sunk or legacy costs, and evaluation 
only applies to future efficiency.
The third definition applies when social coordination is required 
to produce the desired outcome — such as biodiversity corridors 
or management of a common water resource (Reeson et al. 2011). 
The costs of social coordination, through collective action, consultative 
planning or other measures would then be included as a transaction 
cost (Ostrom 1990). While such coordinated action is by no means 
unusual in agri-environmental settings, most schemes are designed and 
intended to interact with individuals separately, even where a socially 
coordinated outcome is intended. These schemes are also sufficiently 
novel that they are not generally available off the shelf and involve 
at least some investment in refining their design and implementation 
for a particular context. The relevant transaction costs in the most 
common agri-environmental settings include design, implementation, 
and administration costs across proponents and participants. Design 
and implementation costs do not generally involve changes to the 
institutional environment and legal settings when the scheme is 
limited to payments to landholders for existing rights, but may if the 
scheme involves creation of tradeable rights that are then purchased 
— such as in new water markets or biodiversity offset schemes. 
Transaction costs may be monetary costs (e.g. administrative staff, 
legal advice on contracts, cost of travel to meetings to discuss the 
transaction), opportunity costs (e.g. time invested in exploring 
incentive options that would otherwise have generated an income), 
and non-monetary costs (e.g. time spent managing business affairs 
instead of recreation). A summary of the likely range of transaction 
costs in agri-environment schemes, drawing in particular on Coggan 
et al. (2010), is set out in Table 16.1.
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repeated as needed.












such as making 
payments, basic 
reporting, and so on.
Make payments, record 








— auditing and 
any enforcement 
required.












and after scheme 
(length depends on 
ecological response 
time).
Data collection and 
evaluation of ecological 
outcomes (relative to 
problem formulation).





During and after 
contract completion. 







These costs will vary from scheme to scheme depending on:
• The type of transaction (e.g. simple versus complex, once-off or 
long-term) which is linked to the type of scheme. It will also depend 
on transaction uniqueness, frequency, and uncertainty in various 
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elements, including ease of observing actions and outcomes, time-
lags to environmental effects. 
• Who is involved in the transaction — especially their prior 
experience, opportunism or extent of self-interested strategic 
behaviour. 
• Other influences including previous and other policy and 
procedures, trust in administrators, comfort with policy principles 
and social connectedness (Coggan et al. 2010).
Two recent themes in the transaction cost literature have refined our 
understanding of transaction costs in agri-environment schemes. 
Firstly, transaction costs have a dynamic element through time (which 
partly covers our earlier point about when transaction costs can be 
considered sunk and thus irrelevant to informing current decisions) 
as the effectiveness of instruments through time and under different 
demands will change with experience, technology, and other factors 
(Arrow 1962; Falconer et al. 2001; Fang et al. 2005; McCann et al. 
2005). This is particularly relevant to trading schemes, but could also 
apply to impacts of technological change on, for example, monitoring 
in grant schemes. 
Secondly, a broader emphasis has arisen towards the role of transaction 
costs in evaluating overall policy efficiency, rather than on measuring 
transaction costs in isolation (see Pannell et al. 2013, for example). 
There are a number of very good studies either stepping through 
the process of measuring the transaction costs of agri-environmental 
and broader environmental policy (see McCann et al. 2005; Kuperan 
et al. 2008) or measuring transaction costs from actual schemes (see 
Falconer and Saunders 2002; Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck 
2009; Ofei-Mensah and Bennett 2013).
Transaction costs are not trivial
A number of researchers have directed their attention toward the 
empirical assessment of transaction costs across a wide range of 
settings. Estimates of transaction costs to scheme administrators and 
proponents have ranged from <1–100 per cent of the payments made 
to scheme participants. For instance, studies carried out in the US show 
that public transaction costs represent a substantial part of total costs 
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incurred in designing a policy objective, with a magnitude ranging 
from 8 per cent of the water purchase cost (Howitt 1994) to 38 per 
cent of the agricultural assistance program (McCann et al. 2005). Public 
administration transaction costs of agri-environmental schemes across 
Europe was initially 102 per cent of payments to landholders (1992/93) 
but declined over time to 18 per cent (1998/99) (Falconer et al. 2001). 
Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck (2009) explicitly look at 
private transaction costs of an agri-environmental scheme and report 
that, on average, these are 15 per cent of the total cost of the policy. 
Recent Australian estimates have indicated that the average transaction 
costs amount to nearly $8,400 for Reef Rescue participants (average 
total transaction cost per farm was 38 per cent of average funding 
provided) (Coggan et al. 2014). On the proponent and administrator 
side of the equation, Binney et al. (2010) indicate that the costs to the 
Australian Government of the Environmental Stewardship Program 
was around 10 per cent, and the (Tasmanian) Forest Conservation Fund 
was around 11 per cent of total scheme costs, although these exclude 
some elements of investigation, design, and establishment. Our own 
experience with one regional Victorian catchment management 
authority with substantial experience in agri-environment scheme 
delivery identified ongoing transaction costs (i.e. only implementation, 
scheme management, and some elements of monitoring and compliance) 
of around 10 per cent of total costs for a tendering program, and 95 per 
cent of program costs for a parallel grant scheme. Differences resulted 
from the grant scheme funding smaller projects, requiring a minimum 
cost-share from landholders, and apparently requiring additional 
recruitment effort into a less flexible program. 
So we can see that transaction costs are likely to vary across 
applications and the type of scheme implemented. In Table 16.2, we 
set out some of the likely differences in costs across different types 
of agri-environment schemes, namely grants (rule-based allocation 
of funds, often with or without consideration of cost-effectiveness), 
tendering or reverse auction approaches (funds allocated 
competitively  to landholder applicants based on relative cost-
effectiveness), and offset schemes (usually negotiated contracts with 
landholders). We  note that indicating the per unit costs is difficult 
because transaction costs are made up of fixed and variable costs. 
Fixed costs are not strongly influenced by the amount of payments or 
participants, while variable costs are directly related to participation. 
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Table 16.2: Likely differences in transaction costs between 
agri‑environmental payment approaches.
Transaction cost Grants Conservation tenders Offset payments
Information about 
the problem
Costs unlikely to differ across schemes, although there will 
likely be additional lobbying and consultation costs in two‑sided 
markets, such as offsets.
Scheme selection 
and development 
Usually can be 
adapted from 
existing approach 
(likely to be less 
reliance on metric 
for assessment).
Greater costs in bid 
assessment and 





both market sides 








and engagement, new 
systems to receive and 
rank bids. Often more 
















Any field assessment 





substantial time and 
legal costs where 
relevant .
Unlikely to differ 
substantially 
from tenders, but 
continue to be 
incurred whilst 
tenders tend 
to be one‑off 










Landholders may need 
to submit detailed 
annual reports. May be 
ongoing payments.
Ongoing cost 









Often little or no 
landholder self‑
monitoring.
Usually at least some 
landholder self‑
monitoring.
Usually at least 
some offset provider 
ongoing self‑
monitoring required.
Compliance monitoring is low across all schemes in practice but 





highly dependent on whether the scheme is formally evaluated or 
repeated. Will usually be higher for a trading mechanism because 
it is explicitly ongoing but so little is done in practice that costs 
unlikely to differ.
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So which costs are likely to matter most? Available data mostly focuses 
on costs from the establishment stage onwards. For example, the 
National Market Based Instruments Pilots program (BDA Group 2009) 
and Binney et al. (2010) focus on costs to government and natural 
resource management (NRM) groups once a particular approach has 
been selected. Most of these establishment costs are likely to be fixed 
(though investment in human skills can be easily lost). The major 
transaction costs to government are likely to be implementation 
costs, particularly where site visits and heterogeneous or customised 
contracts are required. While transaction costs such as these are often 
unavoidable, some measures can be taken to reduce the cost. Retaining 
corporate knowledge on processes and data collection methodologies 
for site visits is one solution. Targeting schemes to critical landholders 
where customised contracts are required is another. Metric design is 
often thought to be expensive, but was less than 1 per cent of the 
environmental stewardship program budget (Binney et al. 2010). 
Good data storage and use of corporate knowledge could have been 
contributing factors here. On the private side, transaction costs 
appear to be driven by complexity of both the scheme and the 
individual interaction required more than scheme type, although 
there are few studies that actively examine the differential aspects of 
transaction costs (see Chapter 21 for some insights on conservation 
tenders, for example). Timely, clear and consistent communication 
of scheme requirements by the administrator, along with easy access 
to information for private parties, can significantly reduce private 
transaction costs (Coggan et al. 2013).
Conclusions
Transaction costs for agri-environment schemes are the cost of time and 
effort, as well as direct expenditure incurred in scheme investigation, 
design, implementation, management and administration, and 
monitoring and evaluation. The scale and distributional burden of 
transaction costs should be carefully considered alongside other costs 
and benefits from agri-environment schemes, as an essential element 
of understanding whether government policy is efficient, or at least 
cost-effective. Of course, in some settings, some costs are sunk and 
should not be considered in an analysis of the comparative efficiency 
of different schemes. Hence, it is important for scheme proponents 
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and designers to identify which are likely to be the most important 
transaction costs, who bears them, and how they impact on different 
elements of scheme design or implementation. 
The purpose of considering transaction costs is not necessarily 
to minimise or reduce them. Instead, a focus on efficient program 
design may require increased transaction costs in order to focus more 
closely on delivering the desired outcome. That is, different program 
designs will have different implications for transaction costs and 
overall efficiency. Despite the increasing number of transaction costs 
analyses, none focus on the potential for efficiency dividends to be 
achieved from higher transaction costs, and this would seem to be a 
particularly useful area to explore given the emphasis on minimising 
delivery overheads. Delivery and implementation of agri-environment 
schemes can benefit from a closer focus on transaction costs.
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What a difference a metric makes: 
Strong (and weak) metrics for 
agri‑environment schemes
Fiona Gibson and David Pannell
Key lessons
• A range of metrics are used to evaluate and prioritise projects 
within agri-environment schemes.
• The way the metric is calculated, and the choice of variables 
included, are important decisions in the evaluation process.
• When funds are scarce, the quality of the metric is important.
• Errors in metric design are readily avoidable. 
• It is more important to ensure that high-quality decision metrics 
are used than to invest in improving the quality of information 
about projects.
Good decision-making in agri-environment schemes is information-
intensive. Environmental managers usually collect and weigh up 
information on landscape characteristics, ecological responses, 
human behaviour, and project risk. This information feeds into their 
decision-making. Environmental managers usually put a lot of effort 
into collecting this information, but often take a rough-and-ready 
approach to combining it into a form that is useful for decision-
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making. For  example, for investments made in the National Action 
Plan, Pannell and Roberts (2010) commented: ‘The processes used 
by Catchment Management Organisations generally did not involve 
comprehensive systematic analysis of investment options or project 
design options.’ 
Figure 17.1: Failed revegetation project in northern Victoria. 
Effective decision metrics can help to identify and prioritise 
projects that are more likely to succeed. 
Source: Photo by David Freudenberger.
Does this matter? Does it make a difference to environmental outcomes 
to use a theoretically sound decision metric, compared with a 
weak decision metric? That was the question we set out to answer 
by comparing environmental outcomes generated by these two 
approaches. 
What we found, in short, was that it does matter which decision 
metric you use. Indeed, it can make an enormous difference. As a 
consequence, many decision metrics used by environmental managers 
result in us missing out on very large environmental benefits. 
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What’s in a metric?
What is a decision metric and why are they so important? Around 
the world, billions of dollars worth of public funds are allocated to 
environmental projects each year. These funds are scarce, relative 
to the amount needed to support all possible environmental projects, 
so prioritisation is essential. This means some projects are determined 
to be more valuable than others and will receive funding whereas the 
less valuable projects miss out.
A common approach used by environmental managers to score the 
projects they have to choose between is to define a set of variables 
believed to correlate with projects’ benefits and costs, and combine 
them into a formula or metric so that projects can be compared. 
Numerical values or scores are assigned to each potential project 
and these scores are used to rank the projects. For example, the 
Conservation Reserve Program in the United States combined measures 
of wildlife benefit, water quality benefit, erosion risk, enduring 
benefit, air quality benefit, priority area, and cost to evaluate program 
investments (Hajkowicz et al. 2009). 
Of course, there are many different ways the various benefits and costs 
of a project could be combined, and there are thousands of different 
decision metrics in practice around the world. Unfortunately, many 
if not most of these decision metrics have problems in the way they 
determine the value of the project. Indeed, our analysis showed that 
the performance of many of these metrics is not much better than 
choosing projects at random. If that’s the case, there’s little point 
in wasting your time on using these metrics — which take time 
and money to generate — because you may as well simply draw 
projects out of a hat. Commonly used decision metrics have a range 
of weaknesses, including adding variables that should be multiplied, 
omitting important variables related to environmental benefits, 
omitting project costs, or subtracting costs rather than dividing by 
them (see Box 17.1).
But what do these weaknesses add up to in terms of lost value? 
Surprisingly, few have undertaken such analysis (see Joseph et al. 
2009). We estimated the environmental losses resulting from each 
of these weaknesses. 
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Box 17.1: Divide benefit by the cost — don’t subtract. 
The first principle of creating a strong metric is understanding that it reflects 
a measure of project benefits divided by a measure of project costs. Economists 
call this metric a benefit–cost ratio (BCR).
There are plenty of project ranking metrics in actual use that don’t do this. Some 
subtract costs instead of dividing them, and some (remarkably) ignore costs 
entirely. These are mistakes that are costly to the environment.
To illustrate this, consider the following three hypothetical projects, with the 
indicated benefits (B) and costs (C). Because the budget is limited, the first project 
we should choose is the one with the highest benefits per unit cost (the highest 
BCR), which is project one. But if we rank according to B‑C (i.e. benefit minus the 
cost), the top ranked project seems to be project two, while ranking according 
to just B (i.e. benefit ignoring costs altogether) tells us that project three is best. 
The loss of environmental values from using the wrong metric (i.e. ranking 
according to B‑C or B) depends on how tight the budget is. Assuming that 
the budget is enough to fund 10 per cent of projects, the loss of environmental 
benefits is 12 per cent for B‑C, and 19 per cent for B (based on simulating 1,000 
funding rounds with 100 potential projects in each).
In other words, fixing up the formula is like increasing the program budget by 
14 per cent or 23 per cent. It’s much easier to fix the formula than to increase 
the budget.
Project B C BCR B‑C Rank (BCR) Rank (B‑C) Rank (B)
1 5 1 5 4 1 2 3
2 7 2 3 .5 5 2 1 2
3 8 7 1 .1 1 3 3 1
The attributes of a robust metric
Pannell (2013) described the requirements for a theoretically sound 
and practical decision metric for ranking environmental projects. 
He recommends:
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where BCR stands for benefit–cost ratio, and benefits depend on the 
value (V) of the environmental assets; the likely adoption of new 
practices or behaviours (A); the effectiveness of the new practices 
at increasing environmental values (W); the risk of project failure 
(R); the time lag until benefits occur (L); and the discount rate (r). 
Benefits are divided by costs (C) to derive the BCR, with higher BCRs 
demonstrating a more cost-efficient project. All of the benefit-related 
variables are multiplied, not weighted and added, for reasons explained 
by Pannell (2013). We obtained distributions for each of these variables 
from a database of 129 projects that have been evaluated using 
INFFER (the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources — 
see Chapter 18). 
Essentially, our analysis involved evaluating and ranking 
projects using Pannell’s metric (given above) and an alternate 
metric with one or more weaknesses included — for example, 
, which omits costs (C). 
By comparing the two results, we estimated the overall loss of 
environmental values from selecting relatively weak projects using the 
alternative metric. We tested the metrics for different program budget 
levels — from 2.5 per cent to 40 per cent of the budget required to 
fund all the projects. Altogether, the analysis simulated 27 million 
projects being considered in 270,000 project-prioritisation decisions. 
What’s lost?
Using weak metrics makes an enormous difference: the wrong projects 
get funded, resulting in big losses of environmental values. Where 
funding is tight (as it almost always is) we found that poor metrics 
resulted in environmental losses of up to 80 per cent — not much 
better than completely random, uninformed project selection. 
The most costly errors were found to be omitting information about 
environmental values, project costs, or the effectiveness of management 
actions. Using a weighted-additive decision metric for variables that 
should be multiplied is another costly error commonly made in real-
world decision metrics (e.g. adding cost in the Conservation Reserve 
Program’s environmental benefits index). We found that omitting 
information about project costs or the effectiveness of management 
actions, or using a weighted-additive decision metric (that should be 
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multiplied) can reduce potential environmental benefits by 30 to 50 
per cent. Think about how hard it would be to double your budget 
(achieve a bigger slice of the funding pie), and yet that could be 
achieved in effect in many cases by simply strengthening the decision 
metric being used. 
What about the quality of the information?
Of course, it’s not just the structure of the metric calculation that could 
be a weakness in the prioritisation. The quality of the information 
going into the calculation is also a factor (see Anderson et al. 1977 for 
a description of the standard theoretical framework for calculating the 
value of information to an application in agriculture). We looked at the 
environmental losses resulting from use of poor-quality information, 
such as inaccurate cost data, in the decision metric. We compared 
results from prioritising projects based on perfect information and 
uncertain information. 
Naturally, poorer quality information about projects results in some 
relatively weak projects being selected for funding. Surprisingly, 
however, we found that the quality of the decision metric makes a 
much bigger difference to environmental outcomes than the quality of 
the information used within it. 
If a very poor metric is used, then the benefits of improving data 
quality from high uncertainty to perfect information are remarkably 
low: 3 to 6 per cent. Improving information quality (e.g. by collecting 
more or different types of data) only produces benefits greater than 10 
per cent if a reasonably good decision metric is used, and even then 
only if the available budget is tight.
That’s an amazing finding which suggests environmental managers 
(and policymakers) should be more concerned in the first instance 
about how they calculate a decision metric rather than funding the 
acquisition of higher quality (and inevitably much more expensive) 
information to feed into that metric (see chapters 20 and 21). 
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Does it really matter?
Our results show that relatively simple improvements to metrics used 
for environmental decision-making can make a big difference to the 
environmental benefits generated by funded projects. Environmental 
budgets are usually small, relative to the problems faced, so good 
decision metrics are crucial.
It does really matter which decision metric you use. Another way of 
thinking about this is by considering how much effort people put into 
increasing environmental budgets. Of course, getting a bigger slice 
of the budget pie will help in achieving environmental outcomes. 
However, this analysis suggests that efforts to improve environmental 
decision processes may be even more beneficial than equivalent efforts 
devoted to increasing the total environmental budget. With less 
funding available for agri-environment schemes, the design of high-
quality project selection metrics is critical. 
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Public benefits, private benefits, 




• The selection of the best policy tool or delivery mechanism for an 
agri-environmental project depends crucially on the levels of public 
net benefits and private net benefits generated by the project.
• A framework is presented that recommends a policy mechanism 
from one of five categories: (a) positive incentives; (b) negative 
incentives; (c) extension (technology transfer, education, 
communication, demonstrations, support for community network); 
(d) technology development; and (e) no action.
• Private net benefits (which drive landholder behaviour) are just as 
important as public net benefits (e.g. for the environment) when 
selecting the policy mechanism. 
• Australian programs tend to rely too much on extension and too 
little on positive incentives and technology development. 
• Program managers can use the framework provided here to better 
match policy mechanisms to particular projects and programs.
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Figure 18.1: Conservation actions can generate private 
benefits — for example, addressing land degradation issues, 
such as erosion, that impact on agricultural production. 
Source: Photo by Dean Ansell.
Agri-environmental programs around the world have been created to 
attempt to encourage changes in land management on privately owned 
lands in order to enhance environmental conservation or natural 
resource management (NRM). To encourage change, these programs 
use a range of policy mechanisms that can be categorised as (a) positive 
incentives (financial or regulatory instruments to encourage change), 
(b) negative incentives (financial or regulatory instruments to inhibit 
change), (c) extension (technology transfer, education, communication, 
demonstrations, support for community network), and (d) technology 
change (development of improved land management options, such 
as through strategic R&D, participatory R&D with landholders, or 
provision of infrastructure to support a new management option). 
A fifth option available to governments is (e) no action, which can be 
appropriate if the cost of achieving a desired change is so large that 
it outweighs the resulting benefits, or if the benefits are expected to 
occur without government intervention.
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In practice, the choice among these possible policy mechanisms is 
often not very sophisticated. Programs primarily tend to rely on a 
small number of mechanisms, sometimes as few as one. The choice 
among these mechanisms depends on the levels of public net benefits 
and private net benefits from the land-use changes being proposed. 
Private net benefits refer to benefits minus costs accruing to the 
private land manager as a result of the proposed changes in land 
management. Private net benefits are the main driver of adoption 
of new innovations, and depend on a wide range of factors, not just 
profits (Pannell et al. 2006). 
Public net benefits means benefits minus costs accruing to everyone 
other than the private land manager. Defining these terms in these 
ways is helpful because the private net benefit dimension provides 
insight into the behaviour of the landholder, while the public net 
benefit dimension relates to the effects on everyone else that flow from 
the landholder’s behaviour.
The Public: Private Benefits Framework
In this chapter, I present the Public: Private Benefits Framework, 
a simple tool that helps to identify which type of policy instrument is 
most suitable for a particular agri-environmental project or program, 
based on the levels of public and private net benefits that are likely 
to result from the land-use change (Pannell 2008). It is useful in cases 
where environmental managers wish to influence the management of 
private lands to promote the conservation of natural resources or the 
environment. It is based on levels of public and private net benefits 
of changing land management, and a set of simple rules. It provides a 
powerful tool for targeting environmental investments to high-payoff 
projects, and for selecting policy mechanisms that are most likely to 
be cost effective.
The starting point for the framework is the recognition that 
agri-environmental managers can invest in a range of projects 
involving changes in land management or land use on private land, 
and that the available options vary widely in the levels of public and 
private net benefits they generate, potentially including negative net 
benefits. The aim is to identify which policy mechanisms are likely to 
be suitable for each potential project. 
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To select policy mechanisms, the following set of rules is proposed, 
leading to Figure 18.2.
1. Do not use positive incentives for land-use change unless public 
net benefits of change are positive.
2. Do not use positive incentives if landholders would adopt land-use 
changes without those incentives.
3. Do not use positive incentives if private net costs outweigh public 
net benefits.
4. Do not use extension unless the change being advocated would 
generate positive private net benefits. In other words, the practice 
should be sufficiently attractive to landholders for it to be adoptable 
once the extension program ceases. 
5. Do not use extension where a change would generate negative 
net public benefits. Note that rules four and five are referring to 
cases where extension is used as the main tool to achieve land-use 
change. Extension could also be used to support any of the other 
policy mechanisms, playing a supporting role rather than being 
the main tool.
6. If private net benefits are negative (but not overly negative), consider 
technology development to create improved (environmentally 
beneficial) land management options that can be made adoptable 
with or without positive incentives (Pannell 2009).
7. If private net benefits outweigh public net costs (such that the 
project would have negative net benefits overall — in other 
words, a net cost), the land-use changes could be accepted if 
they occur, implying no action, or they could be penalised at an 
appropriate level, but not prohibited. The latter approach uses a 
pricing mechanism to force landholders to consider the negative 
consequences of their actions. This allows them to weigh up 
whether their benefits exceed those negative consequences, thus 
making prohibition unnecessary. 
8. If public net costs outweigh private net benefits, use negative 
incentives.
9. If public net benefits and private net benefits are both negative, 
no action is necessary. Adverse practices are unlikely to be adopted.
10. In all cases, the suggested action needs to be weighed up against 
a strategy of no action.
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Figure 18.2: Recommended efficient policy mechanisms 
based on a simple set of rules.
Sources: Author’s research.
For any given project, the levels of public net benefits and private 
net benefits, relative to current practice (which is represented by the 
zero–zero point in the centre), are estimated and plotted on the graph. 
Depending on the location of the project on the graph, the appropriate 
policy response is indicated. For advice on how to estimate public net 
benefits and private net benefits, see my ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ 
page for the framework: dpannell.fnas.uwa.edu.au/ppf-faq.htm. 
Note that the zero–zero point remains the current practice no matter 
how good or bad that practice is with regard to public net benefits. 
The relevant questions addressed by the framework are (a) whether 
it is possible and worthwhile to do better than current practice, 
(b) whether it is worthwhile stopping or discouraging landholders 
from switching from their current practice to something more 
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environmentally damaging, and (c) if so, how? These remain relevant 
questions whether the current practice is highly damaging or highly 
beneficial to the environment. 
When estimating net benefits, if there are time lags until the realisation 
of costs or benefits, these should be discounted using standard 
discounting methods. The public and private net benefits that are 
graphed would thus be present values (Pannell and Schilizzi 2006). 
This is quite a simple framework, but it is a good start. It significantly 
narrows down the range of policy tools that environmental managers 
should be considering depending on public and private net benefits 
in a particular situation. We can make it more sophisticated in various 
ways, including by allowing for time lags until adoption, learning 
costs involved in land-use change, the fact that extension reduces but 
does not eliminate lags to adoption, the transaction costs of extension, 
and through requiring higher levels of selectivity (a higher benefit–
cost ratio) than just covering costs. Figure 18.3 allows for these 
complexities, and requires a benefit–cost ratio of at least two.
In broad terms, the framework advocates the use of:
• positive incentives if the public net benefits of land-use change are 
high, and the private net benefits are not too negative;
• extension if the public net benefits of land-use change are high, 
and the private net benefits are moderate;
• no action if private net benefits are positive and public net benefits 
are not sufficiently high;
• no action if private net benefits are greater than public net costs;
• negative incentives if private net benefits are less than public net 
costs; 
• no action if public net benefits and private net benefits are both 
negative; and
• technology development if private net benefits are low-to-
moderately negative and public net benefits are positive 
(Pannell 2009).
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Figure 18.3: Efficient policy mechanisms for encouraging land 
use on private land, refined to account for various complexities 
described in the text. A smaller number of projects would 
qualify for incentives or extension in this more targeted 
approach, relative to Figure 18.2.
Source: Author’s research.
Past Australian agri-environmental programs have often been 
inconsistent with these insights. For example, the National Action 
Plan for Salinity and Water Quality relied largely on extension and 
small temporary incentive payments (which are essentially a form 
of extension), but promoted practices that, in most cases, were not 
adoptable at the required scale (Pannell and Roberts 2010). For many 
of the land management strategies that were promoted, public net 
benefits were low (Graham et al. 2010) and private net benefits were 
highly negative (Kingwell et al. 2003), such that the projects would 
have fallen in to the ‘no action’ or ‘technology change’ sections of 
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the framework’s top left quadrant. The program made almost no 
investment in development of improved technologies for salinity 
management, even though this was the strategy most likely to succeed 
in many areas. 
The Public: Private Benefits Framework is embedded within INFFER 
(the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources) (Pannell 
et al. 2012). When a project is evaluated using INFFER’s Project 
Assessment Form, the location of that project on the Public: Private 
graph is provided as an output. The framework can be modified to 
suit particular contexts or target groups. For example, Pannell and 
Wilkinson (2009) adjusted it for lifestyle landholders (also known as 
hobby farmers). Their adjustments involved increasing the transaction 
costs per hectare (reflecting the small sizes of these properties) and 
increasing the private net benefits from environmental actions. 
The framework highlights the importance of targeting funds in 
environmental programs to selected areas, based on the levels of public 
and private net benefits. Environmental managers tend to be focused 
on the level of public benefits when selecting their investments, but 
often pay inadequate attention to the level of private net benefits, 
which, perhaps surprisingly, turns out to be even more important as a 
driver of policy decisions.
It is worth noting that the rules underlying the framework are based 
on an objective of efficiency (biggest environmental benefit per dollar 
spent). In practice, governments often also pursue other objectives, 
ranging from perceived equity to raw political motives. I hope that 
by improving the understanding of what an efficient policy would 
look like, this framework can make it easier for that objective to be 
pursued.
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Controls and counterfactual 
information in agro‑ecological 
investment
David Duncan and Paul Reich
Key lessons
• Appropriate contrasts, such as controls and counterfactual data, 
are fundamental to sound interpretation of the effectiveness 
of agri-environment schemes.
• Such contrasts are rarely included in evaluations of Australian 
agri-environment schemes for a range of reasons, including 
logistical constraints.
• Different kinds of contrasts exist that permit different kinds 
of inference about program effectiveness.
• Effective evaluation incorporating sampling counterfactual data 
need not cost more than is currently expended on monitoring and 
evaluation.
• Every scheme should explicitly include counterfactual thinking 
in evaluation plans, even if there is no intention to monitor. 
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Figure 19.1: A riparian zone near Euroa, Victoria, that has been 
fenced and replanted with a mix of native species. Evaluating 
the benefits of projects such as these requires an understanding 
of what would have happened in the absence of the project — 
the counterfactual.
Source: Photo by Paul Reich. 
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Introduction
Despite the large amounts of money invested in agri-environment 
schemes in Australia (Hajkowicz 2009), there remains high uncertainty 
about the magnitude of expected environmental benefit. Sophisticated 
approaches for dealing with uncertainty are now routinely adopted 
in systematic conservation planning processes (e.g. prioritisation, 
optimisation, Sarkar et al. 2006). Unfortunately, these advances have 
not been matched in the evaluation, learning, and improvement 
part of the decision cycle, where conservation and environmental 
management lag behind other complex domains such as social policy 
and medicine (Stem et al. 2005; Ferraro 2009; Field et al. 2007). 
Reporting of management performance (activity and outputs, sensu 
Mascia et al. 2014) in agri-environment schemes has itself been patchy, 
but direct demonstrations of the impact of intervention, that is, the 
difference in change between intervention and non-intervention sites, 
are exceedingly rare (Margoluis et al. 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak 
2006; but see Hale et al. 2011; Lindenmayer et al. 2012). As we discuss 
in this chapter, this so-called counterfactual evidence (derived from 
control sites without intervention) is fundamentally important for 
meaningful evaluation of agri-environmental investment schemes. 
We outline the difficulties that investment in environmental change 
poses for management experiments, and suggest positive ways of 
addressing those difficulties. 
Our focus is the type of evaluation questions identified by Mascia 
et al. (2014) as ‘impact evaluation’ where the interpretation logically 
demands a counterfactual contrast (Ferraro 2009). For example, what 
is the impact of livestock exclusion from remnant vegetation on the 
abundance of sensitive native herbs?
In most cases, the effectiveness of work funded by agri-environment 
schemes is evaluated using post-hoc, space-for-time substitution 
surveys (e.g. Prober et al. 2011; Read et al. 2011). To accept the 
implied effect, we assume that the sites were equivalent at some point 
in the past and that the difference is due to the funded intervention, 
but we cannot be certain of this. Particularly in agricultural settings, 
many confounding factors exist that could inflate or obscure the 
effects of the intervention. Also, we ignore the possibility of influence 
of interactions between, for example, climatic regime and the 
LEARNING FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES IN AUSTRALIA 
240
intervention. More powerful conclusions about the effectiveness of 
changed management can be made when data are collected through 
time, for the period of the intervention.
Responses to large-scale interventions have been evaluated where 
sufficient long-time series data were available to allow change point 
analysis (i.e. the detection of a change in a time series, Box and Tiao 
1975; Stewart-Oaten and Bence 2001; Thomson et al. 2010; Stoffels 
and Weatherman 2014). These examples have no direct counterfactual 
sampling option because the subject or events cannot be replicated 
meaningfully (e.g. matching an entire river, estuary, city, etc.). Instead 
the interpretation relies on consideration of whether the observed 
change could have been generated independently of the intervention. 
This is one example of model-based counterfactual inference, where 
an expected alternative under no intervention may be credibly argued 
with reference to weight of data accumulated prior to the intervention. 
By contrast, the investments in agri-environmental schemes are usually 
conceptually and practically replicable, although we acknowledge that 
important constraints exist. Time series analysis based on intervention 
sites are usually impossible because the locations where interventions 
will occur are rarely known for long enough in advance to enable 
adequate data collection, and the interventions themselves are 
relatively short term. This means that direct counterfactual inference 
must come from simultaneous sampling of control and intervention 
sites. 
Why are controls needed to estimate the 
impact of agri-environmental schemes?
By making payments, agri-investment schemes seek to change the 
status quo. The basic assumption is that those sites or landscapes where 
investment (intervention) is made will have a different future to sites 
where no intervention occurs. When change is estimated only from 
intervention sites, there is an implicit assumption that non-funded 
sites will not change (e.g. Figure 19.2a). While this is one plausible 
scenario, there are others that should be considered. Counterfactual 
information from control sites allows us to weigh rival interpretations 
of the outcomes of interventions (Ferraro 2009).
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Figure 19.2: Simplified representation of mean agri-environment 
program outcomes, contrasting mean change over the course 
of investment in intervention sites (solid line) against mean 
background change (dotted lines, panels a–f), and mean change 
in reference sites (dashed lines, panels d–f). 
Source: Authors’ research.
For example, the most recent State of the Environment Committee 
Report (2011) concluded that native ecosystems on private land are 
mostly in decline. This suggests that agri-environment schemes could 
be considered successful even if managed sites show a reduced decline 
in condition compared with non-intervention sites (e.g. Figure 19.2b). 
Another possibility is that positive changes in the extent of native 
ecosystems, consistent with the objectives of agri-environment 
schemes, are occurring spontaneously due to declining extent of 
agricultural production and land use changes (Kyle and Duncan 2012; 
Geddes et al. 2011). Government investment in agri-environment 
schemes may have only marginal benefit over the improving 
background trend (e.g. Figure 19.2c).
Counterfactual data from control sites — or at minimum a coherent 
conceptual model of the presumed fate of control sites (see the final 
option of Table 19.1) — are required to interpret responses measured at 
intervention sites and appropriately evaluate the success or otherwise 
of a given agri-environmental investment scheme. As Figure 19.2d–f 
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illustrates, an additional contrast against reference sites (the desired 
state) can provide valuable additional insight into the relative 
performance of interventions against non-intervention (Downes et al. 
2002; Coffman et al. 2014).
There are different types of controls and 
contrasts
In the context of agri-environment schemes, distinct options for 
control sites exist that permit subtle differences in the inference 
possible (Table 19.1). It is important to think about what these options 
mean, and the limits to their interpretation. Here we present a range 
of different control options available for comparison, and assess each 
against its likely relative value with regards (1) strength of inference 
for a given sample size, (2) transferability of the inference beyond 
the specific program, (3) contribution to a causal understanding, 
and (4) capacity to accommodate multiple response variables.
The most efficient learning scenario is to construct a management 
experiment where there is potential to select sites based on a 
management question, and then randomly allocate sites to treatment 
and non-treatment classes. This scenario, for a given sample size, 
offers the strongest chance to learn about what works, where, and 
why. However, it can be hard (and often impossible) to get support and 
sufficient sample sizes for experimentation on large scales, particularly 
involving public money on private land. In the past, many Australian 
states and the CSIRO had access to publicly owned production land 
where demonstration farming and experimentation took place for 
agricultural productivity. Such holdings may offer a cheaper and more 
secure opportunity for the Australian Government to learn about the 
effectiveness of interventions in comparison to building management 
experiments into the implementation of agri-environment schemes.
243
19 . CONTROLS AND COUNTERFACTUAL INFORMATION IN AGRO‑ECOLOGICAL INvESTMENT
Table 19.1: Attributes and constraints of distinct counterfactual 
and contrast scenarios, spanning tailored management 
experiments where the strongest inference might be anticipated 
through to model‑based calculation of impact, for which the 
major constraint is the paucity of available evidence from the 
types of sampling listed higher in the table.
Source: Authors’ research.
A more likely route to ensure adequate sample sizes is to build 
quantitative evaluation into major investment programs. In this 
instance, the researcher has to reactively match control sites to sites 
selected by the funding agency. Lindenmayer et al. (2012), for example, 
have established a major evaluation of the impact of 10–15-year grazing 
management agreements in the Box Gum Grassy Woodlands on native 
flora and fauna, comparing treatment sites with control sites located on 
the property of winning bidders in the auction program. This approach 
takes advantage of the convenience of an established relationship with 
the participating landholder, and should reduce sources of random 
variation, such as spatial variation in environmental factors, and farm 
level management factors (both historical and contemporary). These 
benefits permit a relatively robust comparison of the difference in 
change between treatments and sites under pre-existing management, 
although some limitations exist (see below). 
Duncan and Vesk (2013) suggested that unsuccessful bidders for 
agri-investment payments could be a potential source of control sites 
for successful bids. These sites have the advantage of being assessed 
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as part of the bidding process, so landholders have been engaged and 
some data may be available to guide their inclusion. However, greater 
random difference due to spatial effects and past management might 
be expected, so the comparison would be expected to be noisier, and 
the inference weaker, for a given sample size compared to a matched 
control on a winning bid. In both of the preceding cases, it would be 
hard to match the starting condition of funded sites with control sites, 
as the selection process is designed to favour the best-quality sites 
available for intervention.
The potential downside of locating control sites on the property 
of a paid participant is that the existence of the treatment, and the 
accompanying negotiation, may bias a participant’s approach to 
management. After all, permanent behavioural and attitudinal change 
is one objective of government investment in agri-investment schemes, 
rather than merely switching on favourable management for the 
duration of a contract. Lindenmayer et al. (2012) expressed confidence 
the management of control sites was unaffected by the management of 
the paired treatment, but elsewhere involvement in auctions has been 
shown to influence the way landholders manage non-intervention 
areas (Windle et al. 2009).
These comparisons do not enable change in treatment sites to be 
compared against the way the average site is managed, but rather 
against the way a landholder positively disposed to conservation 
programs might manage their land. The estimates of background 
change we obtain from controls in agri-environment schemes are 
therefore unlikely to represent the average trend from the broader 
landscape, which may constitute a more desirable impact statement 
for program managers. We might ideally like to randomly sample 
appropriate controls for funded treatment units from the broader 
landscape, however, in practice problems of selection bias remain 
in those that choose to allow their properties to be visited and sites 
sampled. An estimate of variation associated with a randomly selected 
group of control sites would also require a larger sample size.
The minimal option should be an explicit, model-based counterfactual 
comparison (see final option of Table 19.1). A simple version might 
involve sampling intervention sites, with the amount of change being 
subsequently claimed as impact against a clear justification for what 
control sites are expected to do. The most important change from the 
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way evaluation is typically conducted at present is that the model 
of control site behaviour must be made explicit and well justified. 
We are not aware of any examples of this kind of practice in action. 
More commonly, change data from intervention sites is claimed as an 
impact, with no declaration about what is presumed to be happening 
under business-as-usual scenarios. 
One can imagine further sophistications of this model-based 
approach, where relevant quantitative data on background change 
under business-as-usual scenarios can be used to simulate the likely 
behaviour of control scenarios in evaluation. However, this possibility 
will not generally be available or particularly compelling until relevant 
data is accumulated from the more conventional approaches higher up 
in Table 19.1. 
Why are controls and counterfactual 
contrasts so rarely obtained?
There are challenges to be overcome in identifying, negotiating, 
funding, and interpreting appropriate counterfactual data to use 
in evaluating agri-environmental schemes (e.g. Ferraro 2009; Kibler 
2011). Perhaps due to these challenges, program specific or generic 
monitoring and evaluation advice relevant to agri-environment 
schemes may be released without any mention of their importance, 
or considerations for sampling controls or counterfactual data 
(e.g.  the Conservation Measures Partnership 2013; DSEWPaC 2013). 
Such omissions contribute to evaluation design that does not explicitly 
discuss how counterfactual evidence will be gathered, inferred, or 
done without. We agree with Ferraro (2009) that evaluation plans 
should at least demonstrate counterfactual thinking.
Cost of sampling control sites
One factor that surely limits agency support for sampling control sites 
is cost, usually conceived as an increase in the total monitoring budget. 
A simplistic assumption might be that including (paired) controls in 
the sampling design would double the cost allocated to monitoring, 
further diminishing the amount assigned to action. However, one of 
the primary reasons to monitor is to demonstrate impact and learn 
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about treatment effectiveness (e.g. this program has increased the 
occupancy of woodland birds by X per cent over a background trend 
of Y per cent). Therefore, it can readily be demonstrated that control 
sampling is fundamental to all cost-effective designs, as no amount of 
monitoring without controls can support the required inference. 
Once the desired result statements are clearly defined, one can simulate 
the data collection and analysis in advance to examine which sampling 
scenarios are mostly likely to cost-effectively deliver that result. 
In  reality, strategic sampling for impact evaluation, by including 
a subset of treatments and controls, could probably be achieved 
for a similar cost to that typically spent on monitoring programs 
which have failed to generate strong insight about the effectiveness 
of interventions. 
Funding models and process
The way in which agencies tend to allocate and deliver funding 
for agri-environmental schemes, at both program and project level, 
can make it difficult to design and implement strong quantitative 
evaluation. For example, projects may be awarded funds concurrent 
with, or even before, the design of evaluation, making it impossible 
to obtain pre-intervention data from intervention sites, let alone 
control sites. 
Lack of clarity of objectives and process model 
hinders evaluation design
The failure to make explicit program objectives and a conceptual 
or process model of cause and effect hinders monitoring of any 
sort (Field et al. 2007), and compounds the difficulty in identifying 
an appropriate control in program evaluation. The objectives and 
assumptions in the conceptual model of cause and effect should 
indicate what sort of trajectories and effect sizes to expect, and also 
guide the selection of a suitable control. 
Some investment objectives are particularly difficult to control for. 
While controls should be achievable for site-scale interventions and 
responses (e.g. Lindenmayer et al. 2012; Hale et al. 2014), the greater 
the spatial scale of the program objective (e.g. landscape connectivity), 
or the greater the number of links in the causal chain between source 
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and impact (e.g. changing agricultural land use to reduce oceanic 
hypoxia, Rabotyagov et al. 2014), the harder it may be to identify 
appropriate controls. 
Horses for courses in counterfactual data 
collection
We intuitively think of the ideal control site as an independent 
site, closely matched to our treatment. Constructive solutions could 
be identified by focusing instead on the specific counterfactual 
requirements for response variables in the conceptual model of cause 
and effect. Within a given investment program, this may imply different 
data gathered at different scales or indeed locations. An appropriate 
control for measuring aquatic responses should differ from terrestrial 
plant responses, which could be different again for faunal responses. 
Consider investment in restoration of riparian corridors. The impact of 
the investment on terrestrial vegetation might be well accommodated 
by a fenceline contrast (i.e. comparison of management regime either 
side of a fence), whereas the control for aquatic responses may be 
best placed some distance upstream of the treatment to maximise 
independence owing to the directional movement of water and its 
constituents. For occupancy responses of mobile biota, direction may 
not matter, but distance between sites may be important to achieve 
requisite independence.
What is required to improve our understanding?
The design of evaluation for all agri-environmental schemes should 
explicitly include counterfactual thinking (Ferraro 2009). In theory, 
this thinking should be represented in program logic diagrams or 
conceptual models that set out the expected difference in outcome 
comparing intervention and no-intervention (e.g. model-based 
counterfactual, Table 19.1). Larger schemes should produce well 
designed and resourced quantitative evaluation, linked to those 
models. 
Be realistic. High rigour generally means less replication and reduced 
coverage of important contexts or covariates. A strategic mix of 
observational and experimental studies that explicitly complement 
and reference each other are required. 
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Large and small agri-environment schemes should do the best with 
what is available, including supporting post hoc comparisons, and 
using simulation models and scenario analyses. All techniques that 
can help make the most of existing data will remain important, and 
sound evaluation design should inform and guide data requirements. 
However, none of these fallback options excuse the persistent failure 
to conduct robust evaluation of agri-environment programs, including 
obtaining counterfactual data.
Be upfront about limitations to interpretation. Where less than ideal 
evaluation and assessment takes place, it is important to clearly state 
the limits to interpretation. For example, Duncan and Vesk (2013) 
estimated a substantial reduction in weed cover in sites funded by 
Victoria’s BushTender program comparing before and after data from 
intervention sites. However, due to the lack of control sites, they 
explicitly cautioned that the observed changes were just as plausibly 
attributable to sustained drought.
Synthesise and disseminate. There are major programs beginning 
to establish rolling synopses of evidence of effects of different 
agri-environmental interventions (Dicks et al. 2013; Pullin and Knight 
2009), including studies containing counterfactual evidence. Those 
synopses are tailored to the implementation context of northern and 
western Europe, so Australia should expect to support its own version, 
given our environmental, cultural and land use history and pattern. 
Conclusions and recommendations
The current forms of monitoring and reporting (e.g. MERI — 
Monitoring, Evaluation Reporting, Improvement — Australian 
Government Land and Coasts 2009) undertaken in Australia have a valid 
role in the delivery and evaluation of agri-environmental schemes, but 
there is an urgent need to translate rhetoric into disciplined practice 
in quantifying environmental impact. However, our current systems 
routinely deliver poorly designed data collection activities, the results 
of which are scarcely, if ever, analysed and publicised.
Considerable coordination and nuance may be required to obtain 
inference about the impact of interventions in a cost-effective manner. 
For example, counterfactual data for interventions may be sourced 
at different spatial and temporal scales, as defined by the conceptual 
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model relationship between treatment and response. It is likely that 
no evaluation program will encompass all elements and scales of space 
and time, but every program should be expected to make a coherent 
statement about effectiveness that includes an explicit contrast with a 
non-intervention scenario.
Done well, effective evaluation incorporating counterfactual data 
need not cost more than is currently expended on monitoring and 
evaluation. Importantly, even though not all programs will undertake 
such sampling, all should explicitly represent counterfactual thinking 
in MERI plans and program design. In addition to an immense 
literature relevant to setting objectives for agri-environment schemes, 
we offer the following checklist for evaluating whether a MERI plan 
for an agri-environment scheme has met minimum requirements: 
1. The management behaviour or resource trend that funded 
treatments are intended to address, ameliorate, or reverse should 
be specified, in its appropriate spatial and temporal context.
2. The counterfactual prognosis (in terms of averages and some 
indication of variation) should be specified for the term of the 
funded treatments, and beyond, according to the definition of 1.
3. Elements 1 and 2 should be expressed in a manner that conveys the 
degree of certainty and scientific consensus, regarding averages 
and sources of variation, so that MERI programs that will guide 
field data collection are designed for maximum benefit. 
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Achieving greater gains 




• Agri-environment schemes should focus on investments that 
maximise gains in biodiversity relative to the status quo.
• It is widely viewed that our conservation priorities should be 
biodiversity that has high values of irreplaceability (biodiversity 
that must be protected to achieve conservation targets) and has 
high vulnerability (the likelihood that biodiversity will be lost 
without conservation investment).
• Too much agri-environmental investment is in biodiversity that 
is not vulnerable to loss, and this investment does not result in 
substantial gains to biodiversity relative to the status quo.
• Agri-environment schemes should be informed by a decision 
framework that calculates gains in biodiversity relative to the 
status quo (i.e. the difference in biodiversity with investment and 
losses without investment). This will shift more investment from 
large, high-quality remnants to smaller, more modified remnants 
that are more vulnerable to loss.
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Figure 20.1: Increasing the conservation status of threatened 
species such as the hooded robin (Melanodryas cucullata) is 
a key motivation for many agri‑environment schemes. 
Source: Photo by Geoff Park.
If I was to invest in a farm, I would not invest in the largest farm on 
the market, but a farm with greatest potential to return growth on 
my investment. In this chapter, I argue that our current investment 
strategy for biodiversity in agri-environment schemes is frequently 
the opposite: we tend to invest in sites that support large amounts 
of biodiversity, rather than sites with potential to return the greatest 
gains in biodiversity as a result of the investment (Figure 20.2).
257
20 . AChIEvING GREATER GAINS IN BIODIvERSITy FROM AGRI‑ENvIRONMENT SChEMES
Figure 20.2: Agri‑environment schemes often prioritise sites for 
investment based on the total biodiversity that occurs on a site, 
rather than the gain in biodiversity that is likely to occur with 
investment. The former approach places priority for investment 
in high-quality sites (top), while the latter places priority on 
moderate-quality sites (bottom).
Source: Author’s research.
The theory of biodiversity prioritisation
Historically, there has been a bias in protected areas within Australia 
towards land unsuitable for agriculture. Australia’s reserves therefore 
tend to protect areas that are steep and/or infertile (Pressey et al. 2002). 
As a consequence, one-third of Australia’s bioregions are very poorly 
represented (less than 5 per cent) in Australia’s National Reserve 
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System (Hatton et al. 2011). Many of the most poorly protected 
ecosystems in Australia occur in agricultural landscapes. Margules and 
Pressey (2000) outline the principles upon which future conservation 
investment should be based to rectify past biases. These and other 
authors argue that our conservation priorities should be those areas, 
or elements of biodiversity, that have highest values of irreplaceability 
and vulnerability (Figure 20.3).
Figure 20.3: Higher priorities for conservation are those sites 
that have high irreplaceability and high vulnerability, as indicated 
in green.
Source: Author’s research.
Irreplaceability refers to the likelihood that a site must be protected 
to meet a conservation target. This concept is analogous to 
complementarity (Margules and Pressey 2000), which is the extent to 
which an area contributes unrepresented biota to a reserve system. 
For example, if the conservation target is to protect at least 17 per cent 
of the original (pre-European) extent of each ecosystem, and less than 
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17 per cent remains of a particular ecosystem, then all remaining 
remnants of this particular ecosystem are 100 per cent irreplaceable. 
That is, all examples of this ecosystem that are left are required to meet 
the conservation target.
Vulnerability refers to the likelihood that a site will be lost without 
immediate conservation investment (Margules and Pressey 2000). This 
principle is based on the assumption that the areas and actions needed 
to secure biodiversity exceed the resources available for conservation 
and thus we need to prioritise our conservation investment in those 
areas or for those actions that are most urgent. For example, a remnant 
in which natural regeneration has ceased due to a land use such as 
livestock grazing — and will disappear over time — is more vulnerable 
than a remnant in which natural regeneration is still occurring.
Where is our current biodiversity 
investment in agri-environment schemes?
The principle of irreplaceability has been embraced within Australia. 
We now tend to prioritise our conservation investment in biota that are 
poorly represented in our existing protected area network (National 
Reserve System Task Group 2009) and this thinking is reflected 
in agri-environment schemes. For example, the Environmental 
Stewardship Program (see Chapter 3) focused on ecological communities 
poorly represented in Australia’s National Reserve System. However, 
the concept of vulnerability has not been embraced as fully. For 
example, BushTender is the most established agri-environment scheme 
focused on biodiversity in Australia, with over 35,000 ha managed for 
conservation on private land. The metric that underpins the way sites 
are prioritised for investment in BushTender multiplies the current 
condition of a site by the condition that the site is likely to achieve 
with investment (Maron et al. 2013). That is, other things being equal, 
a site that can be improved from 20 to 80 out of 100, will score less 
(20×80=1,600) than a site that can be improved from 70 to 90 out of 
100 (70×90=6,300) even though the gain in biodiversity at the latter 
site (20) is a third of the gain achieved on the former site (60). In this 
metric, the total value of the site for biodiversity is given more weight 
than the gain in biodiversity that will be achieved. If the metric was 
instead based only on the gain in biodiversity at each site, then a site 
that can be improved from 20 to 80 of 100 (with a gain of 60) will be 
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prioritised for investment over a site that can be improved from 70 to 
90 (with a gain of 20). These two scenarios are illustrated conceptually 
in Figure  20.2. Similarly, the investment strategy underpinning the 
Australian Government’s Environmental Stewardship Program for 
Box Gum Grassy Woodland in south eastern Australia stipulated that 
remnants must be at least 10 ha. Focusing agri-environmental investment 
on patches greater than 10 ha could result in most of the remaining 
area of this ecological community being lost. This is because most of 
this ecological community (at least in the southern part of its range) 
occurs in much smaller patches (Gibbons and Boak 2002), and these 
smaller patches are more likely to be approved for clearing (Gibbons et 
al. 2009) and are least likely to contain natural regeneration (Weinberg 
et al. 2011). Maron et al. (2013) identifies other metrics that result in 
similar outcomes. Given this, our agri-environmental investment may 
not be returning the gains in biodiversity that are possible.
Where should we be investing?
There is a bias in agri-environmental investment towards large, high-
quality remnants for three key reasons: (1) there is an assumption that 
all remnants on private land are equally vulnerable to loss; (2) there 
is an assumption that small remnants and poor-quality remnants 
are of limited value for conservation relative to large remnants; and 
(3) managing fewer, larger remnants is considered more cost-effective 
than managing more, small remnants. These assumptions should be 
considered critically.
On the first point — the assumption that all remnants on private land 
are equally vulnerable to loss — not all biodiversity on private land 
that is highly irreplaceable is also vulnerable to loss. For example, 
the larger remnants of our most cleared ecosystems have not been 
cleared because they tend to occur on sites with low productivity 
and are therefore neither intensively grazed, nor profitable to clear or 
fertilise, and are not as vulnerable to invasion by exotic plants than 
more productive sites. It is also important to acknowledge that there 
is legislation that affords a high level of protection to these sites, and 
it is important that agri-environment schemes do not undermine this 
existing duty of care. In contrast, smaller remnants of these ecological 
communities are very vulnerable to loss because they tend to be on 
more productive land, under greater threat from land management 
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practices in the agricultural matrix (Driscoll et al. 2013), have a lower 
likelihood of supporting natural regeneration (Weinberg et al. 2011), 
and are more likely to be approved for clearing (Gibbons et al. 2009).
On the second point, there is a widely held view that small sites, poor-
quality sites, and highly fragmented landscapes are of limited value for 
conservation. For example, the Habitat Hectares metric (Parkes et al. 
2003) that underpins agri-environmental investment in Victoria affords 
greater score or value to larger patches and more intact landscapes. 
However, the species-area curve (Rosenzweig 1995) predicts that 
adding a unit area of habitat to a smaller patch or more fragmented 
landscape will result in a greater increase in species than improving or 
adding the same amount of habitat to a larger patch or intact landscape 
(Figure 20.4). This prediction has been recently confirmed for birds in 
agricultural landscapes within Australia (e.g. Cunningham et al. 2014; 
Huth and Possingham 2011). A counter argument is that conservation 
efforts in small remnants will favour only common species. While 
this argument might hold for dispersal-limited species, small patches 
make an important contribution to the conservation of declining birds 
(Fischer and Lindenmayer 2002).
Figure 20.4: A generic species-area curve (using an exponent of 
0.25) indicating the predicted gain in species richness with the 
same conservation effort (indicated by arrows) in (A) a smaller 
patch or highly cleared landscape compared with (B) a larger 
patch or more intact landscape.
Source: Author’s research.
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Finally, large sites are considered to be more cost-effective to manage 
than small sites. However, if the cost-effectiveness of investments 
are considered in agri-environment schemes (i.e. biodiversity gain 
is divided by cost), then a higher cost of management (per ha) on 
smaller sites could be offset by a higher rate of gain in biodiversity. 
Results from the Australian Government’s Environmental Stewardship 
Program found that the cost (per ha) of tenders to manage biodiversity 
on private land were similar for small and large remnants (Whitten et 
al. 2009). That is, no discernible economy of scale was observed. This 
may be because the unit of management for agri-environment schemes 
is effectively the farm rather than the individual remnant — and thus 
is influenced by characteristics of the farming enterprise rather than 
the individual remnant. However, more sites may be more costly to 
administer (e.g. more assessments) or manage where infrastructure 
(e.g. fencing) is required.
Conclusion
Agricultural areas of Australia support many highly irreplaceable 
ecosystems that are vulnerable to loss, and these landscapes are 
important for biodiversity conservation. Investment in biodiversity 
conservation through agri-environment schemes makes intuitive 
sense. However, the amount of investment in agri-environment 
schemes is unlikely to be sufficient to meet our conservation targets, 
so we must prioritise this investment carefully. Shifting the focus 
of agri-environmental investment towards activities that are likely 
to return the greatest gains in biodiversity (i.e. the difference with 
investment and losses without investment) is likely to see a greater 
emphasis on investment in smaller, modified remnants and more 
fragmented landscapes than is currently the case.
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Lessons for policy from 
Australia’s experience with 
conservation tenders
Graeme Doole and Louise Blackmore
Key lessons
• This chapter reviews the drivers of cost-effectiveness in 
conservation tender programs, with a focus on what promotes 
landholder participation, based on survey results.
• Key lessons are drawn from the statistical analysis of survey 
responses from landholders, researchers, and agency staff with 
previous involvement in these schemes.
• Non-landholders identify the value of flexible tender designs, 
involving low-cost monitoring and strong relationships with 
stakeholders.
• Landholder responses suggest that tender schemes may have limited 
impact due to the crowding out of private investment, inadequate 
support during bidding and monitoring, and high administrative 
workload.
• Overall, future tender programs must employ options to counteract 
crowding out if they are to achieve additional environmental 
outcomes.
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Australia is one of 17 mega-diverse nations, which overall support 
more than 70 per cent of the world’s biodiversity, but constitute less 
than 10 per cent of the global land area (Chapman 2009). The existing 
suite of protected areas found throughout Australia is inadequate to 
achieve broad biodiversity conservation, especially in regions highly 
favoured for agricultural production (Fitzsimmons and Wescott 
2001). Over the past decade, there has been an increasing focus on 
conserving national biodiversity, broadly promoted in recent years 
through Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010–2030. 
In particular, a strong motivation to achieve more cost-effective 
environmental outcomes on private land has stimulated the widescale 
use of market-based instruments (MBIs). Conservation tender (CT) 
schemes have been the most widely applied MBIs for biodiversity 
conservation throughout Australia to date. CT programs involve 
landholders submitting a bid to a management authority (e.g. regional 
natural management bodies or non-government organisations) 
outlining the actions they will take for a given payment. The authority 
evaluates the environmental benefit accruing to each set of actions 
and funds those landholder actions that will provide the greatest 
environmental benefit for the given budget (Latacz-Lohmann and 
Schilizzi 2005; Windle and Rolfe 2008). 
The primary objective of this chapter is to review what drives the 
cost-effectiveness of CT programs, particularly relating to promoting 
the participation of landholders. Given the scarcity of available funds, 
it is justified that regulatory authorities seek to maximise the cost-
effectiveness of programs to motivate biodiversity conservation 
among Australian landholders (Pannell 2008). It is also consistent 
with the broad goal of Australia’s Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 
2010–2030 to deliver conservation initiatives in a cost-effective 
manner. A cost-effective or efficient program is defined as one that 
provides a given set of conservation outcomes at least cost. It is timely 
to reflect on the drivers of the cost-effectiveness of these programs, 
given that despite the broad employment of conservation auctions 
over the last decade throughout Australia, their use has now declined 
markedly. A number of potential reasons for this disadoption exist, 
including but not limited to thin markets, high administration 
costs for landholders and governing agencies, lack of political will 
to continue funding, and uncertainty for producers regarding the 
implications of their contracts. This study focuses on these drivers, 
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among others, to explore what determines the cost-effectiveness of 
conservation auctions across Australia. This analysis is particularly 
timely, given that it reflects on past programs that arose during a 
period of proliferation for conservation auctions in Australia, using 
this information to guide how to gain the best return for public funds 
in future programs. These future programs are likely to be targeted, 
reinforcing the need for careful design. This summary provides a useful 
assessment of cost-effective design for auction programs, drawn from 
the Australian experience, for readers in other nations. Lessons here 
are drawn from the statistical analysis of survey responses from non-
landholders (n=49) and landholders (n=23) who have been involved 
in past CT programs. More detail regarding these studies are available 
in Doole et al. (2014) and Blackmore and Doole (2013) respectively. 
Non-landholders are researchers and agency staff who have previously 
been involved in CT schemes, while the landholders are previous CT 
participants from north central Victoria. Low sample sizes motivate 
the use of small-sample econometric methods (generalised maximum 
entropy regression) to analyse the primary drivers of cost-effectiveness 
and participation in the non-landholder and landholder data sets 
respectively (Golan et al. 1996).
Results and discussion
Statistical analysis of the results from the non-landholder survey 
(Doole et al. 2014) highlights five key lessons for improving the cost-
effectiveness of CT programs. Listed in decreasing order of importance, 
these are:
1. Increase funding for both individual tenders and groups of tenders. 
Respondents generally believed that the cost-effectiveness 
associated with tender implementation increased with their scale. 
This highlights the presence of increasing returns to scale, whereby 
the costs of tender implementation are believed to decline as tenders 
are more widely used, due to improved administrative efficiency and 
‘learning by doing’ by the agency (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 
2012). As experience and familiarity builds within agencies, it is 
thought that transaction costs will greatly decrease, allowing their 
cost-effectiveness advantages over flat rate subsidy schemes to be 
fully realised (Windle and Rolfe 2008). However, recent experience 
in Australia suggests that the development of this experience may 
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be severely challenged, primarily by a lack of political will and the 
funding opportunities required for the continued implementation 
of these policy mechanisms. Broader adoption will also lead to more 
widespread achievement of biodiversity outcomes, provided these 
programs are effectively managed. Nevertheless, the overall scale 
of a program depends on the number of contracts formed and the 
scale of individual bids. A higher number of contracts will impose 
additional variable costs, such as those associated with monitoring. 
However, through learning from experience, cost-effectiveness 
associated with the fixed costs of a program, and some variable 
costs — for example, the development of more efficient monitoring 
programs —may fall across time. 
2. Develop flexible tender designs for broad implementation. Substantial 
effort has now been invested in the assessment of tender programs 
involving different components — for example, through testing the 
relative implications of the number of rounds involved, whether 
tenders are budget- or target-constrained, whether bids are open 
or sealed, whether bidder information is symmetric or asymmetric, 
and so on (e.g. Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 2007; Reeson et al. 
2011; Boxall et al. 2012). However, the broad implementation of 
more generic tender designs may promote ease of organisation, 
and thereby the cost-effectiveness of these programs, as opposed 
to the development of auction designs that may suit a given set 
of circumstances more specifically, but are costly to identify 
and more difficult to apply. This principle has been observed in 
practice, with the success of the BushTender program (Stoneham et 
al. 2003) being replicated throughout Australia, in programs such 
as EcoTender and RiverTender. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that such examples are very localised, with a high concentration 
in Victoria, and the number of examples across Australia is now 
in steady decline. The reasons for this decline are manifold, but 
mainly revolve around funding challenges and political climate. 
For these reasons, it is important to recognise that while the down-
scaling of auction programs will hamper learning by doing, the 
isolation of principles for cost-effective design identified throughout 
this chapter remain of key importance. Indeed, their significance is 
promoted when it is considered that a need for efficient delivery is 
even more pronounced when funds are scarce.
3. Encourage greater landholder competition. This result is consistent 
with strong theoretical (Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 
1997) and empirical (Stoneham et al. 2003; Connor et al. 2008) 
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evidence that this is a key principle underlying the success of CT 
programs, relative to subsidy schemes. Indeed, a central premise of 
neoclassical economics is that greater competition within markets 
will encourage greater efficiency through dissolution of market 
power. Nevertheless, a CT represents an artificial market, in which 
a management authority is the single buyer of products put forward 
by landholders. Accordingly, greater participation is not an end 
in itself. Indeed, there is an optimal number of participants that 
depends on balancing the impact of participation on competitive 
behaviour, while also considering its concomitant effect on 
evaluation, monitoring, and other administrative costs, especially 
those imposed prior to contract selection (Whitten et al. 2013).
4. Invest in means to identify low-cost monitoring strategies. 
Respondents highlighted the critical importance of addressing 
the difficulty associated with measuring the benefits of tenders 
for conservation activity and/or outcomes. Value for money in 
conservation programs depends on whether actions are achieving 
on-ground change (Connor et al. 2008). Accordingly, the 
development of appropriate low-cost management strategies is of 
vital importance. This result has also been identified for European 
MBI programs (Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). 
5. Establish strong landholder relationships. New programs for 
environmental protection are difficult to understand for many 
landholders because of their complexity (Pannell et al. 2006). 
Accordingly, the overall cost-effectiveness of tenders was believed 
to respond to investment by regulatory authorities in landholder 
education and relationships. However, investment in relationships 
with landholders was determined to be around three times more 
important than investment in education and support in the 
non-landholder survey. This reflects the central importance of 
landholders as potential suppliers of improved environmental 
outcomes within tender programs. It also represents a critical 
challenge to auction programs, in that while these relationships are 
critical to success, they are also costly in terms of time and money. 
However, there is anecdotal evidence that these costs are mostly 
imposed in the early stages of a program, when familiarity and the 
competency of landholders is lower. Accordingly, these represent 
an explicit example of costs that decrease with learning by doing.
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Analysis of the results from the landholder survey using descriptive 
statistics (Blackmore and Doole 2013) highlights five key lessons for 
increased landholder participation within tender programs. Listed in 
decreasing order of importance, these are:
1. Crowding out of private conservation investment may be significant in 
Australian CT programs. Crowding out describes a situation where 
government funding drives down private funding, providing 
little or no additional benefit in terms of practical outcomes. 
In  the context of conservation auctions, crowding out of private 
conservation investment infers that public funds provided for 
conservation expenditure through the tender mechanism merely 
offset private funding, providing little or no additional conservation 
benefit. There is only mild agreement among respondents that 
the time they had spent on conservation had increased during 
and after their participation in CT programs. Most respondents 
were conservation-minded, with 83 per cent of the sample stating 
that they were active members of at least two environmental 
groups. These results suggest that pre-existing levels of voluntary 
conservation effort among the sample were likely to be high. This is 
consistent with the findings of DSE (2006) and Moon et al. (2012), 
and suggests that crowding out may limit the cost-effectiveness of 
tenders throughout Australia. Efforts to engage landholders outside 
existing conservation communities may improve the conservation 
outcomes achieved by CT programs. 
2. Landholders are likely to be receptive to 10-year contracts within 
tender programs. Shorter contracts (e.g. five years or less) often fail 
to achieve desired outcomes, whereas longer contracts (e.g. 15 years 
or more) represent a commitment beyond what landholders are 
willing to accept. This suggests a tension between landholders’ 
desire to implement long-term conservation management strategies, 
and concerns relating to the limited tenure of farmers and the 
potential restriction of the options available to future generations 
farming that land.
3. Landholders feel that agency performance has been adequate in the 
areas of providing introductory materials and advertising, specifying 
management actions, and payment scheduling. These may be 
considered low-priority targets for future improvement.
4. Landholders feel agency performance needs improvement in the areas 
of providing information workshops, providing support during bid 
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construction, and providing information regarding bid selection. 
Tender programs typically limit the quantity of information 
provided to participants to minimise the possibility of collusion, 
which involves landholders conspiring to submit inflated bids 
(Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005). In this study, being unable 
to communicate with other participants, having limited support 
in constructing bids, and being confused about the bid-selection 
process left many landholders feeling isolated, frustrated, and 
even betrayed by the agency. There is evidence that landholder 
participants in the Environmental Stewardship Program have 
experienced similar issues (MJA 2010; Zammit 2013). Our results 
support those of Moon et al. (2012) and Whitten et al. (2007), 
indicating a need to ensure that landholders receive assistance 
and support to maintain or increase program participation, while 
seeking to minimise collusion among them. 
5. Landholders feel that monitoring within tender programs requires 
improvement, with ongoing support during this phase an important 
step in better delivering management outcomes. Most landholders 
submitted annual reports to the agency, and monitoring site visits 
were generally infrequent or non-existent. A lack of monitoring 
visits made most landholders feel isolated and unsure of their 
ability to complete contracted tasks. Low monitoring activity by 
agency employees reflects cost concerns and a wish to promote 
ownership of the scheme by landholders. However, our results 
support those of Morrison et al. (2008), suggesting that more active, 
frequent monitoring by agencies could enhance participation rates, 
while also helping to improve the likelihood that meaningful 
environmental outcomes are attained among participants.
It is important to discuss the amount of information provided 
by regulatory authorities (see fourth point in the preceding list) 
further, since it has significant implications for auction performance. 
The  distinction between information relating to the quality of 
alternative bids (in terms of their ability to deliver conservation 
outcomes) and that relating to price is critical. Information regarding 
the suitability of proposed actions put forward by participants is 
necessary for sensible bids, with both parties (sellers and buyers) 
within a conservation auction program benefiting from this data. 
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In contrast, a lack of price information promotes competition among 
landholders; hence, management authorities responsible for the 
implementation of these schemes generally perceive it to be optimal to 
not provide such data. However, this action can reduce the probability 
that suitable practices are put forward for funding, while increasing 
the uncertainty faced by landholders regarding the construction of 
reasonable cost estimates. The latter can increase inefficiency above 
that experienced in subsidy programs, given that increasing bids will 
generally accompany greater uncertainty on the behalf of landholders 
(Latacz-Lohmann and van der Hamsvoort 1997). 
The revelation of too much information can increase transactions 
costs and promote strategic bidding by landholders, which reduces 
competition and cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the provision of 
information workshops can strengthen landholder networks and 
potentially promote collusion. Survey results indicated that the 
agencies involved in implementing the programs that landholders 
had participated in generally provided less information, rather 
than more. Together with the inefficiency highlighted with a lack 
of information above, survey output suggests that these actions are 
actually hampering future participation in tender programs, given 
that one of the primary drivers of participation identified in the 
landholder survey is honest and respectful communication with the 
implementing agency (see below). 
Analysis of the results from the landholder survey using small-sample 
econometric methods (Blackmore and Doole 2013) highlights five key 
lessons for increased landholder participation within tender programs. 
Listed in decreasing order of importance, these are:
1. Landholders are more likely to participate in future CT programs 
when they have a strong, respectful, and continuous relationship 
with the implementing agency, involving face-to-face contact. 
CT programs are more likely to succeed in areas characterised by 
strong, trusting agency–landholder relationships (Whitten et al. 
2013). This is also thought to apply to the adoption of innovations 
more broadly (Pannell et al. 2006). Where such relationships are 
absent, personal engagement with landholders should be a high 
priority to ensure program success. 
2. Landholders are more likely to participate in future CT programs 
when the administrative load associated with participation is  low. 
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Streamlining the participation process is likely to enhance 
participation in future programs. This aspect is outlined in more 
detail in Chapter 16.
3. Landholders with an altruistic attitude and strong conservation focus, 
with a relatively low focus on monetary outcomes, are more likely 
to participate in future CT programs. Survey results indicate that 
75 per cent of respondents would participate in future programs, 
but only 25 per cent of respondents believe that conservation 
tenders increase short-term income. These findings emphasise 
the significant potential for CT programs to crowd out voluntary 
conservation spending on Australian farms. Investigating 
strategies to engage landholders without these attributes will be 
critical to the achievement of broad-scale biodiversity outcomes. 
Accordingly, this has been a focus of the recent Environmental 
Stewardship Program (MJA 2010). 
4. Landholders are less likely to participate in future CT programs 
when they have the necessary skills to undertake conservation works 
independently. The majority of respondents to the landholder survey 
highlighted that their primary driver to be involved in a CT program 
was not monetary, but rather altruistic and associated with a strong 
conservation ethic. Survey results indicate that landholders may 
become confident to manage an area for biodiversity conservation, 
independent of agency involvement, after their contracts expire. 
Ensuring that landholders leave programs with a high skill level 
and a realistic ongoing management plan could liberate funding to 
recruit new landholders into future CT schemes.
5. Landholders are less likely to participate in future CT programs if 
they have received strong support and education in previous schemes. 
Respondents generally had a strong conservation ethic and did not 
alter their conservation management efforts significantly during or 
after the CT program. Forty per cent of the sample found the cost 
of additional administrative work prohibitive. Accordingly, good 
support and education by the implementing agency was generally 
felt by participants to adequately equip them with the necessary 
skills to undertake future conservation projects, independent of 
agency involvement and the administrative burden associated with 
participation. 
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Conclusions
Conservation tenders have been broadly utilised over the last decade 
for biodiversity conservation throughout Australia. It is timely 
to review what drives the cost-effectiveness of these programs, 
particularly relating to promoting the participation of landholders, to 
inform the future implementation of biodiversity markets. 
Non-landholders generally believed that the cost-effectiveness 
of tender  programs could be encouraged through the broad 
implementation of flexible tender designs that involved low-cost 
monitoring strategies and strong relationships with landholders. 
However, landholders highlighted that the cost-effectiveness of 
these schemes may be hampered due to the crowding out of private 
conservation investment, inadequate support during the bidding 
process and monitoring stage, and the workload associated with 
administration. Survey results showed that landholders within the 
sample are mainly driven by a strong conservation ethic and altruism, 
rather than a focus on monetary outcomes. Accordingly, many of 
the landholders who were interviewed changed their conservation 
activity little due to their involvement in a tender program. This 
highlights that the current use of tenders may actually achieve little 
additional benefit in terms of concrete biodiversity gains. 
It is imperative to address the potential crowding out of public funding 
in CT schemes if they are to achieve prospective efficiency gains. Several 
means could be used to do so. First, market-segmentation analysis 
(Morrison et al. 2011) could be used to identify the characteristics 
of a given landholder population. This data can then be used to 
inform how a tender could be structured to reduce the potential for 
crowding out. Second, monitoring is important to ensure that trades 
are based on activity that is currently occurring. Third, encouraging 
landholders to submit the proportion of the total cost of an activity 
that they expect the agency to cover and the proportion they expect 
to cover encourages the idea that cost-sharing is expected, even if 
such information is not used during bid selection (Windle and Rolfe 
2007). Last, a reserve price should be set, so that over-priced bids — 
potentially inflated due to the substitution of private investment by 
agency funds — are not accepted.
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Improving the performance 
of agri‑environment programs: 
Reflections on best practice 
in design and implementation
David Pannell 
Key lessons
• We should be guided by experience. Agri-environment programs 
have been run over many years in many countries. They provide 
lessons of success factors (and barriers to success) that should 
inform how we design new programs and projects.
• Key elements of best practice relate to:
 – the design of programs/institutions;
 – the design of projects/investments;
 – how investment options are ranked;
 – how uncertainty is managed;
 – how people’s biases, preconceptions, and self-interest are 
managed; and
 – how transaction costs are managed.
• Delivering best practice requires expertise. Agencies with 
responsibility for agri-environment programs should foster the 
development of expertise in these issues amongst their staff.
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Figure 22.1: A mixed agricultural landscape showing linear 
plantings, patches of remnant native vegetation, and plantings 
in the middle of the paddock. 
Source: Photo by Dean Ansell.
Research and practical experience with agri-environment programs 
around the world provides many lessons on what leads to success or 
failure. New programs are often designed without sufficient awareness 
of these lessons, resulting in lost opportunities to achieve more 
valuable outcomes. 
In this chapter, I outline key elements of what I believe can be 
identified as best practice in the design and implementation of agri-
environment programs. The recommendations are derived from 
various reviews of programs (e.g. European Court of Auditors 2011; 
Pannell and Roberts 2010), published guidelines (e.g. OECD 2010) and 
15 years’ experience working closely with a range of agencies and 
organisations responsible for management of natural resources and the 
environment (e.g. Seymour et al. 2008; Roberts and Pannell 2009). I 
divide these issues into six sections: 
1. The design of programs/institutions;
2. The design of projects/investments; 
3. Ranking projects/investments;
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4. Managing uncertainty; 
5. Managing people’s biases, preconceptions, and self-interest; and 
6. Managing transaction costs.
Depending on the political and administrative context, some elements 
of best practice may be difficult or impossible to achieve. For 
example, I note below the importance of long-term funding for many 
(probably most) environmental projects to deliver their intended 
benefits. However, given the political and administrative realities 
of the Australian Government, long-term funding arrangements 
for environmental projects are exceptionally rare. Perhaps the 
only example, the Environmental Stewardship Program, was shut 
down after only four years because it clashed fundamentally with 
administrative arrangements and culture, and because its virtues were 
not recognised. (See Chapter 3 for a description and reflection on the 
Environmental Stewardship Program.)
I have chosen not to exclude recommendations that may be 
incompatible with some government contexts. However, I have noted 
those that are likely to face the greatest challenges. 
Design of programs/institutions
Additionality: Agri-environmental programs should aim to avoid 
paying farmers for undertaking actions that they would have done 
in any case. In other words, managers need to evaluate whether the 
benefits generated by a program investment are additional. 
Continuation after investment ends: Where a program is intended 
to provide only temporary support to farmers (e.g. in all Australian 
programs, but not in European programs), it is important to ensure 
that the actions being supported are attractive enough that farmers 
will continue to undertake them once funding ends. Otherwise the 
investment has no enduring benefit. 
These first two principles combine to mean that, where support will 
be temporary, perhaps the only defensible role for agri-environmental 
payments is to encourage farmers to get experience in a new practice 
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that they are likely to be keen to continue once funding ends. 
The practice might be something new of which farmers are currently 
unaware, or which becomes more attractive to farmers with experience.
Appropriate institutional delivery: In some agri-environmental 
programs, responsibility for overseeing some or all on-ground delivery 
of projects is devolved to regional organisations. This has been the case 
in all of Australia’s major programs since the late 1990s. In these cases, 
the program needs to be designed in a way that provides incentives for 
these regional organisations to respond appropriately. In particular, 
they should be incentivised to pursue sustained improvements in 
natural resource outcomes, rather than to support project activities 
without considering their resulting outcomes. There should be an 
emphasis on spending program resources well, rather than rapidly. 
Unfortunately, some of Australia’s major programs have generated 
incentives that directly go against these recommendations. Short 
time frames for programs and rules that funding will be withdrawn if 
not spent rapidly enough increase the difficulty of meeting this best 
practice requirement. (Chapter 5 on environmental NGOs discusses 
how these organisations can help here.)
Balancing small, moderate and large projects: In programs where 
the availability of funding is small relative to the amount needed to 
fund all attractive projects (i.e. in all Australian programs), there is 
often a temptation to share the available resources amongst a large 
number of small projects. Sometimes this results in good leverage of 
program resources, but often it means that almost all projects have 
inadequate resources and are unable to achieve worthwhile outcomes. 
This advice sometimes clashes with political preferences to support 
many projects rather than few. A compromise strategy could be to use 
a portion of funding (e.g. 25 per cent) to support many small projects 
to satisfy political needs, and use the remaining 75 per cent to support 
larger projects that are more likely to be effective. 
On the other hand, achieving the most ambitious environmental 
targets is often disproportionately expensive, with costs increasing 
dramatically as targets become more ambitious. To maximise outcomes, 
it may be best to pursue a moderate number of moderate-sized projects, 
rather than many small or few large projects. 
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Sufficient time for planning: Program performance is often hampered 
by a tendency for agencies to delay planning new programs until 
a previous program has ended or is about the end. Good planning and 
design of programs and prioritisation of investments requires more 
time than is usually allowed. Ideally, organisations should commence 
planning and analysis to develop the next program years before the 
end of the current program. Even though the scope and parameters 
of the next program cannot be known in advance, these can be 
predicted, and sometimes influenced, by the agency to some extent. 
Having already-analysed investment options ready to put forward can 
be highly persuasive, and increases the likely environmental benefits 
generated. 
Investment longevity: Finally, funding for agri-environmental 
programs in Australia tends to be temporary and short-term — 
typically five years. Environmental problems usually take much 
longer than this to resolve, so systems for providing long-term 
funding should be used where possible. If it is not possible to ensure 
long-term funding, then this should have a strong influence on which 
projects are selected for funding. In particular, projects that would 
require significant funding in the long term to maintain the benefits 
generated by an initial project should not be supported. For example, 
most projects for control of feral animals or plants would fall into this 
category because feral animals reinvade once control ends. Similarly, 
cases where farmers are likely to disadopt practices once funding 
ends should be excluded. Typically, programs are much too optimistic 
about ongoing adoption of practices post funding. 
Design of projects/investments
SMART targets: A number of agri-environmental programs have been 
criticised for failing to establish appropriate targets (e.g. European 
Court of Auditors 2011; ANAO 2008; Park et al. 2013). Specifically, 
targets should be SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, 
and Time-Bound) in order to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of a 
program, and to ensure that the funded investments are focused onto 
suitable activities (see Chapter 4 on setting SMART targets). 
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Sufficiency: Many projects funded in agri-environmental programs 
are not designed in a logically consistent way. They are consistent with 
a project logic, but only in a qualitative sense. They fail when assessed 
against quantitative questions, such as ‘are the funded activities 
sufficient to achieve the intended land-use changes?’, or  ‘are  the 
intended land-use changes sufficient to achieve the desired natural 
resource outcomes?’ A good project logic is more than a description or 
diagram of connections between elements of the system being managed 
or influenced; it quantifies the connections and makes assumptions 
transparent. 
Selecting the right policy tool: There is a tendency for little thought 
or analysis to be put into the selection of policy mechanisms to be 
used in a project or program, resulting in inappropriate choices in 
many cases. In Australia, there is too much reliance on extension in 
situations where it cannot deliver the desired outcomes. For example, 
Australia’s national salinity program between 2001 and 2007 relied 
mainly on extension to encourage farmers to change their practices, 
but the practices being promoted were not attractive to farmers on the 
required scale and so were adopted to a very limited extent — much 
too limited to achieve the program’s goals (Pannell and Roberts 2010). 
On the other hand, in Europe and the United States, financial payments 
are almost the only mechanisms used, often funding activities that are 
not additional. The framework of Pannell (2008) helps organisations to 
evaluate the type of mechanism that is most suitable for a particular 
project. (See also Chapter 18 on the choice of tools depending on 
public benefits and private benefits arising from an investment.) 
Sometimes programs specify which policy mechanisms will be used 
by projects prior to identification of the projects, and then project 
investments are selected without considering whether they are 
suitable for the predetermined policy mechanism. Preferably, policy 
mechanisms should be selected to match the type of projects that will 
be necessary to achieve the desired program outcomes. They should 
be project specific, to some extent. As noted in Chapter 18, Australian 
programs tend to rely too much on extension and too little on the 
development of technology.
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Ranking projects/investments
Prioritisation: Where funding is limited, prioritisation of investment 
options is essential. The quality of the prioritisation process can 
make a major difference to the natural resource outcomes delivered 
(e.g. Barry et al. 2014).
Rank projects: Programs should prioritise projects, not problems, 
regions, or issues. Some programs prioritise regions or issues without 
defining projects, which means that it is not possible to properly 
consider issues of project cost, project risks, project benefits, or time 
lags, all of which should be factored into the prioritisation process. 
Rank according to value for money: Projects should be ranked 
according to their value for money — a measure of their benefit 
divided by their cost (see Chapter 15 on designing cost-effective 
agri-environment schemes). Failure to do this is one of the most serious 
mistakes that can be made when ranking projects, but unfortunately 
it is common. Some systems fail to consider costs entirely, some do 
include costs but fail to divide by them, and many include only some 
of the costs that should be considered. For example, it is important to 
factor in long-term maintenance costs, since they vary so much between 
different projects, but few Australian systems do so. If maintenance 
costs are needed but are not expected to be provided, then project 
benefits should be scaled down accordingly in the ranking process. 
Measure the gain against a counterfactual: When ranking projects, 
benefits should be estimated from the predicted difference in natural-
resource outcomes with those without the proposed investment 
(see Chapter 19 on counterfactuals). Although this seems like common 
sense, Maron et al. (2013) found that 15 out of 16 systems in use for 
ranking biodiversity projects failed to do this correctly. 
Incorporate all the benefits and risks: There are many factors 
that could be considered when estimating the benefits of a proposed 
project. The essentials are the potential values generated, the likely 
level of adoption/compliance with the project by landholders 
(Pannell  et  al.  2006; chapters 12 and 13), various risks that might 
result in project failure (technical, social, financial, and managerial 
risks), and time lags until benefits are generated. 
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Use a sound metric: A commonly neglected issue is how to combine 
the variables that determine benefits and costs into a metric for 
ranking projects. Most metrics in use are theoretically unsound and 
provide poor rankings, even where project information is accurate. 
Indeed, as is discussed in Chapter 17, the level of benefit delivered 
is more sensitive to the quality of the metric than the quality of the 
information fed into the metric. Potential benefits from investment 
are very sensitive to the use of inferior ranking metrics. Chapter 17 
on metrics and Pannell (2015) outline the requirements for a sound 
ranking metric. 
Figure 22.2: INFFER team members discuss the protection of 
environmental assets with landholders in north central Victoria. 
Source: Photo by Geoff Park.
Managing uncertainty
When decisions about project funding are being made, uncertainty 
about those projects is usually high. Common areas of major 
uncertainty include the technical feasibility or effectiveness of the 
proposed actions to be funded by the project, and the valuation of 
those environmental benefits that are generated. Uncertainty should 
be accounted for in several ways. 
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Identify key uncertainties: Project proponents should be required 
to identify key uncertainties, and to specify what will be done in the 
project to reduce them. 
Carry out feasibility assessment and pilot studies: Projects above a 
certain scale should be subject to rigorous feasibility assessment before 
longer-term funding is committed. Funding to support information 
collection, perhaps in a pilot study, should be provided for six to 12 
months, after which longer-term funding should be conditional on the 
results obtained. 
Learn from early experience: Projects and programs should be 
managed in an adaptive way, with information collected during early 
stages of the program or project being used to inform changes in 
management, or even cessation in some cases. In practice, few programs 
operate with that degree of flexibility, resulting in the continuation of 
poorly designed investments after their faults are apparent. 
Managing people’s biases, 
preconceptions, and self-interest
Acknowledge the values that people bring with them: Being 
human, the people involved with agri-environment programs are 
subject to biases, preconceptions, and self-interest (consider the 
discussion of the different ways restoration and conservation are 
valued in different places in Chapter 10), all of which can reduce 
program performance. If managers are aware of these human traits, 
they can introduce systems to limit their negative impacts. 
Optimism versus realism: A pervasive problem is the tendency for 
people to be overly optimistic about proposed projects. It is common 
to see proposals in which the benefits are exaggerated, and the costs, 
risks, and time lags are underestimated. Several factors contribute 
to this, including vested interests, wishful thinking, and a failure 
to recognise all relevant difficulties and risks that are likely to affect 
a project. The ideal strategy to overcome this problem is serious 
independent expert review of project proposals, but this is only 
justifiable where projects are sufficiently large. This is another factor 
that tends to favour moderately large projects over small projects. 
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Self-blindness: People involved in allocating program funds 
commonly perceive their existing prioritisation processes as being of 
high quality. For example, in a survey we found that staff from most 
regional natural resource management (NRM) organisations believe 
that their processes are better than average — clearly an impossibility. 
In reality, the majority of prioritisation processes I have examined 
have had serious problems. The common belief that they are strong 
is an impediment to the improvements that are needed. Addressing 
these misperceptions required strong leadership and participation in 
appropriate training, and it may be assisted by appropriate signals 
and incentives built into the program. 
Equity versus effectiveness: Proposals to target investment in high-
priority projects sometimes meet resistance in the form of arguments 
that this is inequitable — that resources should be distributed widely 
amongst many projects on the grounds of fairness. If natural resource 
or environmental outcomes are desired, these arguments should be 
resisted, as they can have a serious adverse effect on the achievement 
of those outcomes. A case built on maximising environmental benefits 
can readily be built. 
Managing transaction costs
When considering potential improvements to the design and 
implementation of agri-environmental programs, there is a balance 
to be struck between improving natural resource outcomes and 
increasing  transaction costs (Pannell et al. 2013b; Chapter 16). 
The most detailed rigorous approaches are only worth the transaction 
costs involved for relatively large projects. To limit overall transaction 
costs I have two suggestions. 
Beware many small projects: Avoid having the program being 
dominated by numerous small projects for which an investment in 
information and analysis cannot be justified. Such programs have little 
prospect of delivering and demonstrating genuine natural resource 
benefits. 
Start broad, finish deep: When evaluating potential investments, 
adopt a strategy of starting broad and finishing deep. In the early 
stages of the process, you can consider numerous potential projects, 
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but each is evaluated in a relatively simple way that requires low 
transaction costs. This simple procedure is used to eliminate most of 
the projects from consideration. In the final stages, consider a relatively 
small number of project proposals, but require them to be developed 
in a rigorous way to allow sound decision-making about them. 
Final comments
Improved natural resource outcomes from agri-environment programs 
are needed and expected (Audit Office reports have pointed out 
a repeated failure by the Australian Government to demonstrate 
environmental outcomes from NRM investment, ANAO 2008). 
Generating these outcomes is readily achievable with sufficient will, 
leadership, and attention to the issues raised here. 
If you are involved with the design or implementation of an 
agri-environment scheme or program, can you answer the questions 
set out in Box 22.1? If you can’t, have you considered what this might 
mean to the success of your project or program?
Box 22.1: Key elements of good design.
A summary checklist of the issues raised in this chapter. Can you answer yes 
to the following questions?
1 . Designing programs 
• Would farmers have adopted the desired practices even without the 
program?
• Will farmers continue their adoption of the new practices once program 
support ends?
• Are the institutions that are responsible for program delivery incentivised 
to pursue outcomes?
• Is the typical project size large enough without being too large?
• Is there adequate time for planning?
• Will the practices being promoted require ongoing funding that the 
program is unable to provide?
2 . Designing projects
• Does it have appropriate targets?
• Are the project activities sufficient to achieve its targets?
• Does it use the right policy tool?
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3 . Ranking projects
• Are actions (projects, not problems, issues or regions) being ranked? 
• Is ranking based on value for money?
• Are benefits being measured against a counterfactual?
• Are all relevant benefits and risks being factored in?
• Is a robust metric being used for the ranking?
4 . Managing uncertainty 
• have the key uncertainties been identified?
• have feasibility assessments been done?
• Can we learn from the early stages of implementation?
5 . Managing people’s interests
• has independent expert review been undertaken to balance over‑
optimistic expectations?
• have efforts been made to deal with self‑blindness?
• have arguments for equity undermined the effectiveness of the 
program?
6 . Managing transaction costs
• Does the program support projects that are too small to justify the 
transaction costs needed to deliver and demonstrate benefits?
• Does project selection start broad and finish deep?
Of course, success requires recognition that there is a body of 
expertise that needs to be mastered, as described above. Agencies 
with responsibility for agri-environment programs should foster the 
development of this expertise amongst their staff. 
INFFER (the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources) 
has been designed to streamline the implementation of many of the 
recommendations presented here (Pannell et al. 2012, 2013a; and see 
Box 4.1). 
The knowledge and experience is there. It is within our power 
to improve the performance of agri-environment programs.
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Conclusion — Elements 
of good design 
Dean Ansell, Fiona Gibson and David Salt
Breaking News — Australia’s national agricultural lobby, Farmers 
for Farmers, have just signed a historic accord with the conservation 
lobby, Conservationists at Large, pledging a redoubled effort to renew 
the natural values of our national farming estate. What makes the 
accord particularly noteworthy is that the federal government has 
acknowledged the importance of this new consensus and has pledged 
$3 billion over five years to reverse the rising rate of extinctions, and 
declining quality of our land and water resources. The investment 
will be made primarily through a ramp up of the country’s agri-
environment schemes. ‘This is a once in a lifetime opportunity’, says 
the prime minister.
Of course, this is a hypothetical news story, but you never know what 
lies around the political corner. The Decade of Landcare announced 
in 1989 was not anticipated by many in the years preceding it. While 
it was well received by all and sundry, it did not produce the level of 
enduring environmental outcomes that was expected (see Chapter 7 
by David Salt). 
Perhaps that is not surprising. Back then, our understanding of 
community-based natural resource management (NRM), robust 
environmental frameworks, market-based instruments, and 
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environmental accounting was basic at best. A quarter of a century 
later, these fields have developed enormously, and we now have 
innumerable case studies to reflect on and learn from.
Figure 23.1: A native tree planted in a farm paddock in south 
east Australia. 
Source: Photo by Dean Ansell.
So, when the next big opportunity to conserve biodiversity on farms 
comes around, will we be able to show that we have learnt from our 
experiences in agri-environmental policy? What are the key factors 
a policymaker needs to consider when designing and delivering 
an agri-environment scheme? Each chapter in this book provides 
valuable lessons and insights that policymakers should keep in mind 
when developing agri-environment schemes. We discuss here six 
central themes that have emerged from the discussions contained in 
the previous 22 chapters. 
Additionality
Agri-environment schemes arguably have two main goals: (1) to 
shift certain agricultural practices and behaviours towards more 
environmentally sustainable alternatives; and (2) in doing so to protect 
or enhance environmental values. Consideration of both is critical. 
Faced with the decision of where to invest our scarce conservation 
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funds, the decision maker should follow the mantra of any savvy 
investor and ask the question: ‘where can I maximise my returns while 
minimising the risk?’
Additionality is a term used to define the size of the effect, or the 
amount of benefit, resulting from an action. In the context of 
agri-environment schemes, we can think about additionality from 
two different but equally important perspectives. The first concerns 
farmers’ adoption of on-farm activities.
Consider a farmer who adopts an environmentally desirable agricultural 
practice and receives payment from an agri-environment scheme as a 
result. If the farmer had not received a financial incentive, would she 
have undertaken that specific practice anyway? If the answer is no, 
we would say that the benefits of the scheme are additional. If the 
answer is yes, however, we would say that the farmer has received a 
windfall — a payment for something she was going to do regardless 
of the scheme. 
The extent of additionality achieved by agri-environment schemes 
varies widely. The USDA Agricultural Resources Management Survey 
for 2009–2011 showed that additionality in conservation payments 
ranges between 56 and 88 per cent, depending on the type of scheme 
(Claassen and Duquette 2014). In other words, for some schemes, close 
to half of the farmers receiving payments would have undertaken 
the particular action without the payment. An evaluation of several 
different agri-environment schemes in France showed that the 
complexity or scale of change required in farming practice influences 
additionality. The additionality of more complex measures such as a 
shift from conventional to organic farming was typically much higher 
than that of more simple measures (e.g. changing crop diversity)
(Chabé-Ferret and Subervie 2013).
We can also think of additionality in terms of environmental outcomes, 
and ask whether the scheme has led to any change in conservation 
value or ecological condition. In Chapter 20, Phil Gibbons stresses the 
importance of focusing on those conservation actions that provide the 
highest additional benefits, specifically the greatest biodiversity gains 
relative to the status quo. In doing so, he challenges the traditional focus 
on investing in the conservation of high-quality habitats on farm land 
and instead advocates emphasis on ‘smaller, more modified remnants 
that are more vulnerable to loss’ and which provide the greatest 
biodiversity gains as they are starting from a lower ecological condition.
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A key challenge lies in identifying and measuring additionality, be it 
during the planning of an agri-environment scheme and selection of 
sites, or in retrospect during evaluation of a scheme’s effectiveness. 
Both are important and contribute to improving the efficiency of 
conservation expenditure. However, as David Duncan and Paul Reich 
point out in Chapter 19, the consideration of additionality (through 
a comparison of results with and without the investment) is lacking 
in the evaluation of Australian agri-environment schemes. They also 
note that some decision makers hold the false perception that the use 
of counterfactuals in the evaluation of agri-environment schemes adds 
considerably to the cost of evaluation. They argue that simplified 
designs that ignore the counterfactual represent a waste of resources, 
as their results are unreliable. For an example of cost-effective 
monitoring and evaluation of agri-environment schemes, the reader is 
encouraged to review the work of David Lindenmayer and colleagues 
on the Environmental Stewardship Program (Lindenmayer et al. 2012).
Longevity 
Program and project longevity is an important ingredient in designing 
effective agri-environment schemes. In Australia, agri-environmental 
schemes tend to be temporary and short-term — typically five years 
or less. Longevity refers to how long a particular agri-environment 
scheme (or program) needs to run to be successful. It refers to two 
different things: (1) whether a scheme is run for long enough to induce 
a change in landholder behaviour; and (2) whether it is long enough to 
achieve environmental objectives.
The first four chapters in Part 1 of this book (the agri-environment in 
the real world) all commented on the long-term nature of environmental 
action on private land. 
‘Achievement of these outcomes requires significant, long-term 
changes in land use and land management, which come at considerable 
financial and social cost to farmers’, observes Geoff Park in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 2, Graham Fifield further supports this, noting that ongoing 
commitment to a site is important if the landholder is to achieve a good 
environmental return on the initial investment.
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Emma Burns and colleagues (Chapter 3) describe the Environmental 
Stewardship Program as a policy innovation that delivered this long-
term support, providing payments over a 15-year period, but note 
the challenge of operating such schemes over multiple political and 
accounting cycles. Indeed, the designed longevity of this program was 
possibly both its greatest strength and weakness (and a major reason 
it was discontinued).
But longevity is not just about the completion of on-ground works, 
numbers of hectares enrolled into a program, or even ecological 
benefit. It is just as much about changing the behaviour, attitudes, 
and values of landholders — a program needs to run long enough for 
this to occur. As David Pannell points out in his chapter on improving 
the performance of agri-environment schemes (Chapter 22), Australian 
programs provide only temporary support to farmers. Pannell notes 
that, where support is temporary, ‘it is important to ensure that 
the actions being supported are attractive enough that farmers 
will continue to undertake them once funding ends. Otherwise the 
investment has no enduring benefit.’
When it comes to program longevity, enduring benefit is an important 
goal against which to judge policy proposals. And if the provision 
of long-term funding is not possible, then, as Pannell suggests in 
Chapter 22, a hard truth should be acknowledged about what should 
be funded: ‘projects that would require significant funding in the long 
term to maintain the benefits generated by an initial project should 
not be supported.’
Long-term funding is important to creating enduring ecological and 
social outcomes, but it also contributes to the generation of human 
capital (skills and knowledge) and social capital (networks, trust and 
information sharing). Burns and colleagues concluded their review 
of the Environmental Stewardship Program in Chapter 3 with the 
observation that ‘a valuable outcome that the Commonwealth secured 
through this program (in addition to the hectares being managed) 
was the relationships forged with the contracted land managers and 
developed with the CSIRO and ANU. These relationships should be 
nurtured to foster further learning and trust’.
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Longevity is also an important characteristic influencing the 
desirability of a scheme to land owners. When it comes to schemes 
based on tenders, Graeme Doole and Louise Blackmore found in 
Chapter 21 that 10-year contracts seemed the most desirable. They 
noted that shorter contracts (five years or less) often fail to achieve 
desired outcomes, whereas longer contracts (15 years or more) 
represent a longer commitment than farmers are willing to accept. 
Further, farmers may require a higher price to enrol in programs that 
run for longer time frames and potentially impact on their agribusiness 
flexibility (Ruto and Garrod 2009).
In Chapter 13, Romy Greiner also commented on how the duration 
of a scheme influenced the willingness of land owners to participate. 
She  noted that, for the land owners she surveyed, ‘graziers were 
asking for a $0.40 increase in annual per hectare payment … for an 
additional year of contract duration’. (This might sound a paltry sum 
per hectare but keep in mind the properties she surveyed ranged in 
size from 2,500–10,000 km2.) This underlines a tension between land 
owners wanting to participate but not wanting to commit to anything 
for too long.
Given the short time frames of most programs, the role of environmental 
non-government organisations (eNGOs) as brokers is critical. As David 
Freudenberger states in Chapter 5: 
The advantage of engaging a  broker is the ability to build lasting 
relationships to help navigate the complexities and risks of entering 
and persisting in any market. Many eNGOs have persisted through 
decades of agri-environment schemes that often don’t last for more 
than one election cycle. Continuity and organisational identity is a 
strength of many eNGOs.
Policy mechanisms for changing behaviour 
The primary aim of an agri-environment scheme is to get landholders 
to adopt farming practices that deliver improved environmental 
outcomes. Over the years, a range of mechanisms have been used 
to try to achieve behavioural change. There have been payments, 
government regulation (to prevent damaging farming practices), tax 
advantages, extension (technology transfer, education, communication, 
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demonstrations, support for community network), and development 
of improved land management options, such as through strategic R&D, 
participatory R&D with landholders, and provision of infrastructure 
to support a new management practice. Academic research and on-
ground experience shows that the success of these mechanisms in 
changing behaviour is varied (Pannell et al. 2006). Several chapters in 
this book point to some of the reasons why. 
First, the incentive for participating in a scheme is not always 
predominately financial. For example, the results of surveys 
of landholders presented in chapters 12, 13, and 21 reveal:
[Commercial] farmers rated environmental factors as most frequently 
influencing their adoption of native vegetation management practices 
(Chapter 12).
[F]armers in northern Australia have a high intrinsic stewardship 
motivation for safeguarding their cattle, land, and biodiversity assets, 
and that this is fundamentally linked to the pursuit of pastoralism as 
a chosen lifestyle (Chapter 13). 
Landholders with an altruistic attitude and strong conservation focus, 
with a relatively low focus on monetary outcomes, are more likely 
to participate in future [conservation tender] programs (Chapter 21). 
It is clear that at least some landholders adopt pro-conservation 
practices voluntarily, without requiring payments. For example, Saan 
Ecker in Chapter 12 described a survey of landholder motivations 
to participate in the Environmental Stewardship Program. She 
noted: ‘Most respondents “strongly agreed” that conservation and 
enhancement of native vegetation contributed to improved property 
or landscape health, aesthetics, soil stabilisation, and controlling 
rising water tables.’ 
Another example is Chapter 14, in which Maksym Polyakov and 
David Pannell estimate the extent to which private benefits from 
native vegetation on farms are built into the price of land, and how 
those price premiums vary in different circumstances. One potential 
problem occurring when there are private benefits from conservation 
is that these benefits are not additional (as discussed earlier). 
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Another is the problem of ‘crowding out’, where government funding 
for a practice reduces the level of unfunded voluntary adoption 
of that practice by people who are not supported by the program. 
This can occur if landholders feel that it is unfair for them to receive 
no recognition for their voluntary efforts while other landholders are 
receiving payments for the same actions. Graeme Doole and Louise 
Blackmore in Chapter 21 note that ‘tender programs must employ 
options to counteract crowding out if they are to achieve additional 
environmental outcomes’. It’s not obvious what these other options 
may be — aside from not to provide incentive payments at all — 
and is therefore an issue worthy of further research. 
We have also seen that flexibility in delivery mechanisms is important. 
For example, the features of a land management contract may encourage 
or inhibit landholder participation if certain conditions aren’t available. 
As Greiner states in Chapter 13: ‘in general, farmers prefer higher 
payments, shorter contracts, more flexibility, less accountability and 
less paperwork.’ This is a point supported by Doole and Blackmore 
in Chapter 21. The importance of each of these features is likely to 
vary depending on the location, farming system, and characteristics 
of the landholder. We don’t suggest that policymakers pander to these 
desires — there are public benefits from opposite contract features 
— rather that they weigh up the public benefits and private costs in 
delivery mechanisms.
The message here is that agri-environment scheme designers should 
carefully consider the range of policy mechanisms they use, as 
some will be more suitable for some groups of farmers than others. 
Several evaluations of the effectiveness of schemes, both in Australia 
(e.g.  Michael et al. 2014) and around the world (e.g. Gabriel et al. 
2010), have found that a one-size-fits-all approach often fails to deliver 
the best biodiversity outcomes. 
Prioritisation 
We need to prioritise because there is never enough money available to 
fund all the available projects. To maximise the environmental benefits 
delivered by the budget of a program, governments should seek to 
deliver the best possible value for money. This is done by comparing 
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the benefits and costs of proposed projects and funding those that 
provide the best return on investment — that is, the highest ratio of 
benefits to costs (Joseph et al. 2009).
In his chapter on improving the performance of agri-environment 
programs (Chapter 22), David Pannell provides a checklist of the key 
aspects of (cost-effective) prioritisation including a focus on projects 
(actions); ranking according to value for money; using counterfactuals 
to calculate benefits (as the difference in outcomes with versus without 
the investment); incorporating all the benefits and risks; and using 
a sound metric to rank investments. These elements were highlighted 
separately in several chapters.
Central to the prioritisation process is the explicit consideration 
of the costs of each project. Failing to acknowledge cost, or failing 
to appropriately compare costs between projects, has been a major 
weakness of project prioritisation in the past (Pannell 2013) and is 
poorly done across environmental evaluation in general (Wortley et al. 
2013; Armsworth 2014). This is one of the key reasons that Pannell 
recommends that prioritisation should be applied to projects or 
actions, not to different regions, problems, and issues. Only by defining 
projects is it possible to meaningfully estimate investment costs. 
Projects should be ranked according to value for money — a measure 
of their benefit divided by their cost. In Chapter 15, Dean Ansell 
points out that the application of this simple principle could result in 
significant improvements in efficiency in conservation expenditure. 
He also notes that there is a variety of simple economic tools available 
to perform such evaluations that remain relatively under-used.
Decision makers should make sure all the benefits and risks are being 
incorporated. If the level of adoption or likelihood of success is not 
factored in when projects are being ranked, inferior projects may 
be selected. Saan Ecker (Chapter 12) and Romy Greiner (Chapter 13) 
both discuss the importance of understanding the willingness of land 
managers to participate in agri-environment schemes as being central 
to the success of the projects included in the schemes. 
As Fiona Gibson and David Pannell explain in Chapter 17, the way the 
metric used to rank projects is calculated and the choice of variables 
included are important. Errors here can lead to significant losses of 
environmental benefits. Interestingly, they also show that investing in 
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the collection of accurate information for ranking projects may not be 
as critical as is often assumed. In many cases, improving the quality of 
the metric used to rank projects makes a larger impact on the overall 
level of benefits generated by a program. 
Figure 23.2: A failed effort at native revegetation on a farm 
in NSW. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
Managing risk and uncertainty
As with many types of investment, agri-environment schemes carry 
significant risks. Chief among these is the risk of failure — primarily 
the failure to achieve the intended conservation outcomes, which in 
essence translates to the failure of the scheme. While there are many 
examples of successful agri-environment schemes, there are many 
that have failed to achieve their objectives or even led to negative 
consequences. For example, an evaluation of agri-environment schemes 
in Victoria found little evidence for benefits to the conservation of 
reptiles and amphibians (Michael et al. 2014), while a large scheme in 
Ireland led to an increase in agricultural pests, at the same time failing 
to achieve its goal of increasing the abundance of the threatened Irish 
hare (Reid et al. 2007). In Italy, declines in the population of the corn 
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crake, a threatened grassland bird found in farmland, coincided with 
the introduction of government subsidies for grassland conservation 
management (Brambilla and Pedrini 2013).
Outcomes such as these may be partly or fully attributed to 
poor planning and implementation, but are often the result of 
unexpected ecological response to management. The process of 
ecological restoration, a primary aim of many agri-environment 
schemes, is complex and remains poorly understood, particularly in 
agricultural landscapes where the legacies of past land use and current 
management and climatic factors create much uncertainty in the 
response of biodiversity to conservation. This uncertainty not only 
has the potential to impact on the environmental values delivered 
from agri-environment schemes, but, as Sayed Iftekhar and colleagues 
remind us in Chapter 10, also impacts on the adoption of scheme 
practices. Repeated failures run the risk of alienating farmers and 
undermining their participation in future schemes. 
This underscores the importance of a number of key factors in the 
design and implementation of agri-environment schemes. In particular, 
it highlights that identifying specific objectives for conservation is 
critical in defining and demonstrating success, yet the omission of such 
objectives is a perennial issue (Hobbs 2007). As Geoff Park outlines 
in Chapter 4, the use of SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Relevant, and Time-Bound) targets is crucial in the design of the 
scheme. Not only do SMART targets play a key role in establishing 
project budgets and time frames, but they also provide a centrepiece 
for negotiations with farmers around the aims, feasibility, and risks of 
proposed interventions. 
Several chapters in this book contain ideas and strategies for managing 
risk in agri-environment schemes. The benefits of starting small as a 
risk mitigation strategy is highlighted by several authors. We learnt 
in Chapter 2 that Greening Australia’s successful Whole of Paddock 
Rehabilitation (WOPR) scheme started with a single pilot site, which 
served not only as a way to assess the feasibility of the approach, 
but also as a demonstration to farmers interested in the program. 
As the saying goes, the proof is in the pudding. The Environmental 
Stewardship Program scheme also started small, focusing on a single 
target ecosystem and using the outcomes of that initial stage to broaden 
the coverage of the scheme as it evolved (see Chapter 3). 
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As David Freudenberger points out in Chapter 5, the level of acceptable 
risk differs between types of organisations. Non-government 
organisations, being largely free of the political constraints of 
government agencies, typically display a higher willingness to fail, 
and can therefore play a key role in innovation and trialling new 
approaches.
It is worth remembering, however, that many risks associated with 
agri-environment schemes, such as the uncertainty in ecological 
response, cannot be entirely removed. The efforts of the decision maker 
will be better spent factoring risk into the planning and prioritisation 
of agri-environment schemes, with various tools available to assist 
(see the simple metric provided by Fiona Gibson and David Pannell 
in Chapter 17, which includes the probability of success). The use of 
an adaptive management framework to identify, respond to, and learn 
from this uncertainty and unpredictability is strongly advocated by 
researchers (Lindenmayer et al 2008; Sayer et al. 2013). It should be 
noted that such an approach brings additional challenges (e.g. funding, 
expertise), albeit surmountable, for the policymaker.
Above all, understanding, acknowledging, and communicating these 
risks, particularly the risk of failure, was identified by many of our 
contributing authors as a critical factor in agri-environmental policy.
Capacity
In Chapter 22, David Pannell provides a list of 22 elements of good 
agri-environment scheme design. There was a 23rd element put 
forward by Pannell: ‘success requires recognition that there is a body 
of expertise that needs to be mastered … Agencies with responsibility 
for agri-environment programs should foster the development of this 
expertise amongst their staff.’ Which leads us to our final theme — 
capacity. Capacity is not just about the skills and knowledge contained 
in the organisations running these schemes; it also relates to the 
human and social capital found in the regions where agri-environment 
schemes are being implemented (Curtis and Lefroy 2010).
This book makes it clear that designing, implementing, and managing 
robust and effective agri-environmental programs requires a range 
of knowledge and technical skills. For agri-environment schemes 
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to be effective, these skills and knowledge need to be available to 
policymakers, NRM managers, and the landholders participating in 
the schemes. 
There are a number of ways to develop expertise amongst agency 
staff. The three approaches recommended by Cook et al. (2013) are: 
scientists embedded within agencies (internships), formal links 
between researchers and decision makers, and staff training. Formal 
links between researchers and scientists are facilitated through various 
government programs, such as cooperative research centres, Australian 
Research Council Linkage Projects and programs such as the National 
Environmental Research Program run by the Australian Department 
of the Environment. However, as pointed out by Emma Burns and 
colleagues in Chapter 3, the issue of dealing with scientific knowledge 
and its application in agri-environment policy within a government 
department is challenging and will require cultural reform for a more 
effective integration in future. Attwood and Burns (2012) discuss the 
disjunct between the spheres of science and NRM policy, suggesting 
it is systematic in nature. They  recommend that scientists need to 
spend more time understanding the policymakers’ bureaucratic and 
hierarchical system, while the public service structure needs to better 
reward scientific literacy. 
Returning to the issue of landholder capacity, Graham Fifield and 
David Freudenberger both pointed out in their chapters (chapters 2 
and 5 respectively) that landholders and agencies working in the agri-
environment need somewhere to turn when things go wrong. Often 
they seek advice from trusted sources — other landholders, locals, 
and environmental NGOs they have worked with over time. In recent 
decades, there have been cutbacks to the level of extension services 
offered by government (Pannell et al. 2006), and staffing levels of many 
NRM organisations (Curtis et al. 2014), all of which erodes the capacity 
of agencies and communities to participate in agri-environment 
schemes.
In his brief history of agri-environment programs (Chapter 7), David 
Salt noted that earlier investments in agri-environment programs 
focused more on building social capital (networks and community 
groups) and human capital (knowledge and awareness) than targeting 
specific environmental outcomes. Over time, we have improved our 
knowledge of what is required to develop programs that will generate 
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these outcomes. It is clear that enhancement of landholder capacity 
remains an important element of programs, although it is not the 
only element. There are likely to be benefits from targeting efforts to 
build capacity to situations where it can make the greatest difference 
to environmental outcomes. 
Box 23.1: The question of value.
The question of value arises throughout this book. It also underpinned much of 
the discussion at the workshop that gave rise to the book. Whose values are we 
talking about? Which values do we mean? how do we ensure value for money? 
Will there ever be enough political pressure for society to adequately protect the 
multiple values provided by our agricultural landscapes?
During workshop discussions, Rob Fraser, an economist based in the United 
Kingdom, pointed out that the broader UK society placed a high value on the 
country’s agricultural landscapes. They wanted this landscape to be available for 
the public to access for recreation, but they also wanted it to be there because 
it was part of their shared cultural history — even if they never visit it. This led 
him to raise the issue of different types of value: use values and non‑use values.
The use values of an agricultural landscape are the benefits it generates through 
people making direct use of it, such as for agricultural production (e.g. cropping 
and livestock activities), or recreation. 
Non‑use values arise when an agricultural landscape generates benefits even 
without people making direct use of it. Examples include existence value (the 
benefit of knowing that the landscape still exists in good environmental condition) 
or option value (the benefit of retaining the landscape in a condition that does not 
rule out various options for its future use).
In the UK, much of the agricultural landscape provides a combination of these 
use and non‑use values, with the social‑use value of recreation particularly 
recognised by policymakers. This feature is set to continue into the future, with 
recent agri‑environmental policy changes identifying the need to target areas 
of land for the provision of recreation values near major urban sites (European 
Commission 2013).
In Australia, Rob suggested the balance of social values in relation to the 
agricultural landscape is more towards the non‑use value of nature conservation, 
and less towards the use value of recreation of the UK. It seems likely that non‑
use values would be considered by many people to be less significant than 
use values, reducing the prospect of major increases in public funding in the 
Australian context. 
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Figure 23.3: Rob Fraser (on the right) at the agri-environment 
scheme workshop discussing how the UK society values 
the country’s agricultural landscapes. Australia’s agricultural 
landscapes can be glimpsed in the windows in the background. 
Source: Photo by David Salt.
Making ‘the next big thing’ a success story?
Despite the many challenges and criticisms of agri-environment 
schemes, the fact remains that they represent one of the strongest tools 
available in the quest to conserve biodiversity in farming landscapes. 
In our opening chapter, we discussed two contrasting schemes: one 
focused on restoration (WOPR, see Chapter 2), and the other on 
conservation (the Environmental Stewardship Program, see Chapter 3), 
and asked a set of questions about which was better and where the 
community is most likely to get value for money? The answers to these 
questions, of course, are ‘it depends’.
We would now qualify this context-dependent answer by stating that 
we believe that the key criteria for successful agri-environmental policy 
making revolve around our six central themes of additionality, longevity, 
the application of appropriate policy mechanisms, robust prioritisation, 
effective risk management, and sufficient levels of capacity.
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There are no simple black-and-white answers in addressing these 
themes, but it is important that the policy designer, implementer, and 
manager can, at the very least, frame more specific questions against 
each of them. Our aim in this book has been to help with that framing 
(and we would emphasise the more detailed list of questions posed by 
David Pannell in Chapter 22 — see Box 22.1). 
If the public mood or political pendulum were to suddenly give rise 
to a large amount of money being put up for an agri-environment 
program across Australia, would we as a nation be ready to make the 
most of it? It is our opinion that we have both the experience and 
expertise on hand to improve substantially upon past performance.
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